Event Notification Report for April 18, 2012

LOCAL ALARM HORN WAS FOUND TO BE INAUDIBLE DURING ROUTINE TESTING

"At approximately 1345 EDT on 4/18/12, during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #22), the local alarm horn in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #3 inspection records area was found to be inaudible. The cause and extent of the condition is under investigation.

"Personnel were removed from the inspection records area until compensatory measures were established. There are no active fissile material operations impacted by this discovery, thus no unsafe condition existed.

"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2)."

The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and the New Hanover County Emergency Response Center.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 05/17/2012 AT 1641 EDT * * *

"Upon further review, GNF-A has determined that the reported condition (EN 47851) was not required to be reported by the plain letter of the regulation (10 CFR 70.50(b)(2)) and the filing of the report was inconsistent with industry practice. As such, this report is being retracted. GNF-A has entered the condition identified in the course of the monthly tests (i.e., areas where audibility of the CAAS should be enhanced) into its corrective action program and is addressing them accordingly."

The licensee will notify NRC Region II (Thomas). Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS (Stablein).

FISHER TYPE 9500 BUTTERFLY VALVES CONTAIN NON DEDICATED PARTS

"While reviewing an incoming order for a Type 9500 Butterfly Valve, it was discovered that two parts, namely the Thrust Plate and Thrust Plate Cap Screws, were not called out for Commercial Grade Dedication per Fisher Manufacturing Procedure (FMP) 2K27. These parts are considered an essential-to-function part in order for the valve to perform an active safety function.

"Upon discovery of this possible failure to comply, an investigation was performed on all Safety-Related Type 9500 Butterfly Valves that have been shipped, are in active service or inventory, and are required contractually to be dedicated and it was determined that the Thrust Plate and Thrust Plate Cap Screws in these valves were supplied commercial grade and had not been dedicated per FMP 2K27.

"The Thrust Plates retain the Thrust Sleeve Assemblies which provide a bearing surface for the Valve Shaft. The Thrust Sleeve Assemblies also provide adjustment to the Valve Body Liner. The Thrust Plate Cap Screws retain the Thrust Plates. Without the Thrust Plates or the Thrust Plate Cap Screws, there is a risk that the Thrust Sleeve Assemblies will disengage from the Valve Body, preventing the valve from performing its active safety-related function.

"It is Fisher's opinion that while the Thrust plates and Thrust Plate Cap Screws were not dedicated, the failure to dedicate does not pose an inherent safety risk given the materials used.

"Fisher will revise its procedures to ensure that this issue is corrected and does not happen in the future.

"Action Required: Fisher will supply properly dedicated Thrust Plates and Thrust Plate Cap Screws for the affected valves that are in inventory or service, at no cost to the affected customers.

Notification has been made to plants with the Type 9500 Butterfly Valves for; Cooper Plant (NPPD), Vogtle Plant (Georgia Power), Ft. Calhoun Plant (OPPD), and Millstone Plant (Dominion) and specific valve order numbers and serial numbers were provided.

UNIT TWO AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE

"On April 18, 2012, at 1511 hours (CDT), an automatic scram occurred on high reactor pressure. The pressure increase occurred during post-modification testing on the main generator automatic voltage regulator, which had been upgraded during the recent refueling outage.

"Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately zero inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations (Reactor Water Clean Up and Secondary Containment Isolation) as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation.

"Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

All Control Rods fully inserted, decay heat is being removed through the bypass steam valves to the main condenser, and the plant remains in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

The high reactor pressure appears to have been caused by a load rejection associated with the main generator voltage regulator testing.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

FITNESS FOR DUTY

A non-supervisor licensed operator had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The operator's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarter Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.