Event Notification Report for April 17, 2012

PART 21 REPORT - SWAGELOK U SERIES BELLOWS VALVES LOOSENING OF STEM TIPS

"Swagelok received a return from Duke Energy (Oconee) for two 8U series bellows valves for investigation of stem tips that had loosened during performance testing of equipment.

"Our evaluation confirmed loosening of the stem tips and determined the root cause to be higher than normal torque being applied to the valve handle during closure. (Please note that we did not specify a minimum or maximum torque for our operating instructions). This caused the stem and the stem insert interface to loosen, but not fully disengage. Our tests show that closure to catalog specification of 4.0 x 10-9 atm. cc/sec of helium can still be achieved with this condition.

"Therefore, it is the opinion of Swagelok that there is no inherent safety risk associated due to this condition, however lower than expected flow through the valve, or erratic flow, can occur if the stem tip loosens. If utilities consider full flow as a safety function, they should evaluate the valves currently in service for this condition.

"Applicability - There have been no other field returns for this condition. The possible condition extends to the Swagelok 4U, 6U and 8U series bellows valves. Only hand operated valves are susceptible; air operated valves are excluded, as are the 12U series valves supplied by Swagelok."

Callaway may also be affected and will be notified by the Supplier.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HAD ONLY ONE POWER SOURCE DURING PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On April 16, 2012, at 0738 hours, the Harris Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center (i.e., Event Number 47838) of preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power supply.

"Following completion of the power transfer, it was discovered that in the current alignment, the TSC is only powered from one power source, which is the backup power supply.

"A backup diesel generator is stationed near the TSC which can be connected if necessary during an emergency.

"Activities are in progress to modify the existing procedure to allow the TSC to be connected to the offsite power source which will restore two sources of power to the TSC. This normal power arrangement is expected to remain in place while maintenance is performed on the TSC normal power supply for approximately two months.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

"This report was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO JOE O'HARA AT 1211 EDT ON 5/22/12 * * *

"On April 19, 2012, the power configuration was revised to restore the availability of two sources of power to the TSC. An extent of condition review identified two similar conditions in 2009 and 2010 where the TSC had only one source of power for approximately two months each time. The backup diesel generator described in the initial report was not available during these two periods; providing an alternate power source in the event it was needed would have required lifting a clearance and closing a breaker. These conditions might be of generic interest or concern and are therefore provided as a follow-up report."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

UNIT 2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AFFECTED BY VIOLATION OF UNIT 1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING OUTAGE

"At 1540 (EDT) on 4/17/12, with Unit 1 in mode 5 and Unit 2 in mode 1, the Work Control Center was notified that the U1 #2 Main Stop Valve (MSV) was disassembled. The U1 #2 MSV was required to be intact to maintain Unit 1 Secondary Containment. Ongoing work on the D Main Steam Line Outboard Valve created a pathway that violated Unit 1 secondary containment integrity. Unit 1 Secondary Containment is required to be operable for Unit 2 while Unit 1 Zone 1 is aligned to the Recirculation Plenum. Unit 1 Zone 1 was isolated from the recirculation plenum and Unit 2 Secondary Containment was restored at 1643 (EDT) on 4/17/12. Unit 2 Secondary Containment differential pressures were maintained throughout the event.

"This is considered a loss of an entire safety function and requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."

The licensee is still investigating the cause but it appears to be associated with recent administrative changes to the Reactor Vessel draining definition and work process procedures.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** RETRACTION FROM RON FRY TO S. SANDIN ON 6/7/12 AT 0205 EDT ***

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On April 17, 2012, work on the Unit 1 'D' Main Steam Line Outboard Valve with the Unit 1 #2 Main Stop Valve disassembled created a pathway that violated Unit 1 secondary containment integrity. Since Unit 1 Secondary Containment is required to be operable for Unit 2 while Unit 1 Zone 1 would be aligned to the Recirculation Plenum in the event of a secondary containment isolation signal, the condition impacted Unit 2 Secondary Containment. Susquehanna considered the impact a loss of safety function and reported the impact in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"Following the ENS report, Susquehanna analyzed the impact of the opening. Calculations were performed that show secondary containment would have maintained the dose consequences to the public and control room operators within regulatory limits (10 CFR 50.67) assuming a Unit 2 design basis accident (Unit 1 was in a refueling outage at the time of the condition).

"Based on the above information, Susquehanna has determined that there was no loss of safety function and this ENS report is retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Cahill).

PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED REPLACEMENT

"At 2130 (CDT) on April 17, 2012, the Unit 1 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 1 Refueling Outage. The Unit 1 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 1 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available in the MCR but not through ERDS for either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 2 Plant Process computer will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 1 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact to the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.

"The new Unit 1 PPC is scheduled to be functional on April 21, 2012. However, based on the mode Unit 1 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 1 PPC will be tested as mode changes occur. The Unit 1 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 1 PPC is declared functional.

"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."

* * * UPDATE FROM JOE KLEVORN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1035 EDT ON 05/15/12 * * *

"As of 1035 EDT on May 15, 2012, the Unit 1 PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a Major Loss of Assessment Capability no longer exists on Unit 1. The EP Manager will contact the NRC Computer Center for Unit 1 to ensure the ERDS data is being satisfactorily sent to the NRC.

"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update."

The R3DO (Patty Pelke) has been notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED IN THE OPEN POSITION

The following report was received via fax:

"On May 31, 2012 at 1530 hrs [EDT], the SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified by phone that during a routine shutter check on April 17, 2012, an Automation and Control Technology (ACT) Model TG-7 gauging device containing 100 mCi of Sr-90, had a shutter mechanism that was harder to operate than normal. An ACT Model TG-7 technician was evaluating the operation of the shutter when it failed and was unable to be moved into the closed position. The ACT technician was able to replace the shutter assembly and switch on April 19, 2012. A survey, as well as a shutter check was performed to insure proper function. A report was sent from ACT to Samuel Strapping Systems on April 30, 2012."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"On December 2, 2011, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by a facility owner that the licensee had abandoned what appeared to be Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauges in the building. Initial investigation revealed that the license had been revoked by the Agency for nonpayment. The Agency impounded 5 Troxler moisture/density gauges that were at the facility and conducted an on-site investigation. The investigation indicated there was one more gauge that had not been accounted for. The Agency contacted the individual who had been the last Radiation Safety Officer of record. During the investigation he was asked to contact anyone who had worked for the licensee that might have knowledge about the gauge. He responded that he had made contact with several former employees and a former partner and they told him the all of the gauges were in the storage area to their knowledge. The Agency contacted the manufacturer and two gauge service companies in the area. None of them had serviced the gauge recently and they agreed to mark their records to notify the Agency if the gauge came in for servicing. There was no information or evidence that the gauge had been legally sold or transferred. Investigation was closed on 04/17/2012 when gauge was determined lost/missing/stolen. During a record review on 11/14/2013 it was discovered that the event had not been previously reported in accordance with SA-300. The event was reported at that time through the NMED (TX130045). When the file was being processed on 11/21/2013, questions arose as to whether or not an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas. The gauges impounded by the Agency were examined and it was discovered that the source rods on the gauges were not locked to prevent the sources from being exposed. Based on that information, it was determined that there was a possibility that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas."

Troxler Model number 3430; Serial number 34552; 8 mCi Cs-137,40 mCi Am-241
Texas Incident #: I-8908


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf