Event Notification Report for March 28, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/27/2012 - 03/28/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47780477814778247783477844779247778
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47780
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DUNCAN HATFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DUNCAN HATFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 05:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 05:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM
"Planned maintenance activities are in progress on Catawba Nuclear Station's Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation System. These planned activities include replacement of a relay and relay base that render the ventilation system temporarily inoperable.
"The planned maintenance window is not expected to exceed 24 hours.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Planned maintenance activities are in progress on Catawba Nuclear Station's Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation System. These planned activities include replacement of a relay and relay base that render the ventilation system temporarily inoperable.
"The planned maintenance window is not expected to exceed 24 hours.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47781
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MARTIN ARNOLD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MARTIN ARNOLD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 15:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 15:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 55 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH WATER LEVEL CONDITION
"At 1503 hours EDT on March 28, 2012, with the unit in Mode 1 at 55% power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. The reactor trip was the result of a turbine trip from a 'B' Steam Generator Hi Level. All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) remained running.
"The Auxiliary Feeedwater (AFW) System automatically actuated due to both main feedwater pump breakers opening from a valid feedwater isolation signal. Steam Generator Levels were then controlled by Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. Steam Generator Blowdown was automatically isolated with the AFW actuation. The RCS Code Safety valves, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), Steam Generator PORVs or the Main Steam Safety valves (MSSVs) did not open during the event. All control rods fully inserted following the reactor trip.
"The normal post-trip electrical lineup is providing power to the plant and the electrical system is stable. Decay heat is being removed via the condenser. The reactor is currently in Mode 3 and stable.
"There were no radiological consequences or releases as a result of this event.
"The cause of the Steam Generator Hi Level is under investigation.
"The Resident NRC Inspector has been informed."
"At 1503 hours EDT on March 28, 2012, with the unit in Mode 1 at 55% power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. The reactor trip was the result of a turbine trip from a 'B' Steam Generator Hi Level. All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) remained running.
"The Auxiliary Feeedwater (AFW) System automatically actuated due to both main feedwater pump breakers opening from a valid feedwater isolation signal. Steam Generator Levels were then controlled by Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. Steam Generator Blowdown was automatically isolated with the AFW actuation. The RCS Code Safety valves, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), Steam Generator PORVs or the Main Steam Safety valves (MSSVs) did not open during the event. All control rods fully inserted following the reactor trip.
"The normal post-trip electrical lineup is providing power to the plant and the electrical system is stable. Decay heat is being removed via the condenser. The reactor is currently in Mode 3 and stable.
"There were no radiological consequences or releases as a result of this event.
"The cause of the Steam Generator Hi Level is under investigation.
"The Resident NRC Inspector has been informed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47782
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM PROELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM PROELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL RELEASE OF AMERTAP BALLS TO MISSISSIPPI
"On 3/28/2012, Xcel Energy Personnel determined that approximately 50% of the Amertap balls recently used were not recovered. A survey of the Mississippi River bank downstream of the plant by site personnel recovered an additional 3 Amertap balls, indicating that the balls were not released to the river. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) is required to report to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) when greater than 20% (1 .5 barrels or approximately 7,500) of the Amertap balls are not recovered. This is based on an agreement with the MPCA dated September 12, 2008. The MPCA was notified at 1648 CDT on 3/28/12."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On 3/28/2012, Xcel Energy Personnel determined that approximately 50% of the Amertap balls recently used were not recovered. A survey of the Mississippi River bank downstream of the plant by site personnel recovered an additional 3 Amertap balls, indicating that the balls were not released to the river. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) is required to report to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) when greater than 20% (1 .5 barrels or approximately 7,500) of the Amertap balls are not recovered. This is based on an agreement with the MPCA dated September 12, 2008. The MPCA was notified at 1648 CDT on 3/28/12."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47783
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM HOLLAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM HOLLAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED CONDITION IDENTIFIED IN THE B TRAIN CONTAINMENT COOLER UNITS
"At 1500 on March 28, 2012, Callaway Plant personnel discovered that the installation of a modification on the two 'B' train containment cooler units had inadvertently introduced a potential failure mechanism to the 'B' train containment coolers. Specifically, with the containment cooling fans initially in fast-speed operation, combined with certain initial plant conditions, thermal overload tripping of the coolers could occur.
"In such an event, during some postulated accidents, slow-speed restart of the containment coolers by the Load Shedding and Emergency Load Sequencing system could be prevented. As a result, the 'B' train containment coolers could be rendered unavailable for a portion of a postulated accident. Thus, the safety function of the 'B' train containment cooling fans cannot be assured when this degraded equipment condition is present and the containment cooling fans are run in fast-speed operation.
"This condition existed for the 'B' train containment cooling units since they were restored to service from maintenance at 0400 on March 15, 2012.
"Upon identification of this condition, the 'B' train containment cooling fans were switched from fast-speed to slow-speed operation and restored to operable status at 1515. This action precludes this degraded equipment condition from adversely affecting containment cooling fan function during an accident.
"Concurrent with this condition, the opposite train of containment coolers was removed from service for scheduled maintenance at 0505 on March 27, 2012. As a result, from 0505 on March 27, 2012 until 1515 on March 28, 2012, the safety function of the containment cooling system could not be assured for certain postulated accident conditions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1500 on March 28, 2012, Callaway Plant personnel discovered that the installation of a modification on the two 'B' train containment cooler units had inadvertently introduced a potential failure mechanism to the 'B' train containment coolers. Specifically, with the containment cooling fans initially in fast-speed operation, combined with certain initial plant conditions, thermal overload tripping of the coolers could occur.
"In such an event, during some postulated accidents, slow-speed restart of the containment coolers by the Load Shedding and Emergency Load Sequencing system could be prevented. As a result, the 'B' train containment coolers could be rendered unavailable for a portion of a postulated accident. Thus, the safety function of the 'B' train containment cooling fans cannot be assured when this degraded equipment condition is present and the containment cooling fans are run in fast-speed operation.
"This condition existed for the 'B' train containment cooling units since they were restored to service from maintenance at 0400 on March 15, 2012.
"Upon identification of this condition, the 'B' train containment cooling fans were switched from fast-speed to slow-speed operation and restored to operable status at 1515. This action precludes this degraded equipment condition from adversely affecting containment cooling fan function during an accident.
"Concurrent with this condition, the opposite train of containment coolers was removed from service for scheduled maintenance at 0505 on March 27, 2012. As a result, from 0505 on March 27, 2012 until 1515 on March 28, 2012, the safety function of the containment cooling system could not be assured for certain postulated accident conditions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47784
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 22:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 16:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 22:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 16:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DISCOVERED DURING NFPA 805 TRANSITION IMPACTING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING
"On March 14, 2012, it was determined that in the event of an Appendix R fire, fire damage to cables in Fire Area 2-4, 3-3, or 25-1 could cause a Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) pump to spuriously start. This unanalyzed condition was originally determined to be not reportable. However, during subsequent review on March 28, 2012, this condition was determined to be reportable since the additional load from the spurious start of the RHRSW pump on the associated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) could result in the design maximum loading of the EDG being exceeded. As a result of the EDG maximum loading being exceeded, the EDG credited in the Appendix R fire analysis to supply required Appendix R safe shutdown loads could fail. The issue has significant safety impact since the capability to supply power to the Appendix R safe shutdown equipment for the credited EDG is necessary to provide adequate core cooling and decay heat removal during performance of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Instructions in an Appendix R fire event."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On March 14, 2012, it was determined that in the event of an Appendix R fire, fire damage to cables in Fire Area 2-4, 3-3, or 25-1 could cause a Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) pump to spuriously start. This unanalyzed condition was originally determined to be not reportable. However, during subsequent review on March 28, 2012, this condition was determined to be reportable since the additional load from the spurious start of the RHRSW pump on the associated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) could result in the design maximum loading of the EDG being exceeded. As a result of the EDG maximum loading being exceeded, the EDG credited in the Appendix R fire analysis to supply required Appendix R safe shutdown loads could fail. The issue has significant safety impact since the capability to supply power to the Appendix R safe shutdown equipment for the credited EDG is necessary to provide adequate core cooling and decay heat removal during performance of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Instructions in an Appendix R fire event."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47792
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 13:35 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 13:35 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS FOUND IN BUILDING
The following information was received from the State of Arizona via email:
"At approximately 10:00 AM on March 28, 2012, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA)] was informed that radioactive material had been detected by the Tempe, AZ Fire Department in an old flour mill. The Agency [ARRA] dispatched a response team to the site to locate and confirm information. The response team determined that the isotope involved is Cesium-137 and based on the label information approximately 25 millicuries remain in the device. The device is labeled on the accessible surfaces as a Kay Ray Model 7107 gauge and also as a Model 7519B gauge assembly SN 13454. Based on the site history and the labels, it appears that the device was transferred to Bay State Milling in the 4th quarter of 1980 or the 1st quarter of 1981. The Agency [ARRA] did not issue a specific license for this site. We assume that the device was transferred as a GL (Generally Licensed) device and remained in use into 1998. Only about 10% of the site has been surveyed thus far. The site security is being maintained by the Tempe FD (Fire Department).
"The Agency [ARRA] is now searching historical records for information, including any other devices on site.
"The Agency [ARRA] continues its investigation."
Arizona Report #: 12-008
The following information was received from the State of Arizona via email:
"At approximately 10:00 AM on March 28, 2012, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency (ARRA)] was informed that radioactive material had been detected by the Tempe, AZ Fire Department in an old flour mill. The Agency [ARRA] dispatched a response team to the site to locate and confirm information. The response team determined that the isotope involved is Cesium-137 and based on the label information approximately 25 millicuries remain in the device. The device is labeled on the accessible surfaces as a Kay Ray Model 7107 gauge and also as a Model 7519B gauge assembly SN 13454. Based on the site history and the labels, it appears that the device was transferred to Bay State Milling in the 4th quarter of 1980 or the 1st quarter of 1981. The Agency [ARRA] did not issue a specific license for this site. We assume that the device was transferred as a GL (Generally Licensed) device and remained in use into 1998. Only about 10% of the site has been surveyed thus far. The site security is being maintained by the Tempe FD (Fire Department).
"The Agency [ARRA] is now searching historical records for information, including any other devices on site.
"The Agency [ARRA] continues its investigation."
Arizona Report #: 12-008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47778
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRED SCHIZAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRED SCHIZAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2012
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On March 27, 2012, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by the National Weather Service that the Shubert NOAA Transmitter will be down for maintenance starting at 1130 on March 28, 2012 with maintenance lasting until approximately 1400 on March 28, 2012. This affects the tone alert radios Cooper Nuclear Station provides to members of the public to notify them of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"State authorities and local county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ have been notified of the condition of the NOAA Transmitter and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize Local Route Notification (backup notification method). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the condition."
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW OHRABLO TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1636 EDT ON 3/28/12 * * *
At 1151 CDT the Shubert NOAA transmitter was removed from service. At time 1411 CDT the NOAA transmitter was restored to service. The State and local governments have been notified as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 27, 2012, Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by the National Weather Service that the Shubert NOAA Transmitter will be down for maintenance starting at 1130 on March 28, 2012 with maintenance lasting until approximately 1400 on March 28, 2012. This affects the tone alert radios Cooper Nuclear Station provides to members of the public to notify them of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"State authorities and local county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ have been notified of the condition of the NOAA Transmitter and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize Local Route Notification (backup notification method). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the condition."
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW OHRABLO TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1636 EDT ON 3/28/12 * * *
At 1151 CDT the Shubert NOAA transmitter was removed from service. At time 1411 CDT the NOAA transmitter was restored to service. The State and local governments have been notified as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.