Event Notification Report for March 27, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/26/2012 - 03/27/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47774
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: AMY BURKHART
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: AMY BURKHART
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/27/2012
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2012
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
"At 1145 CDT on 3/27/12, OPPD [Omaha Public Power District] was notified by Harrison County Emergency Management that the sirens in Harrison County, Iowa were inadvertently activated at 0950 CDT on 3/27/12. This activation occurred during an exercise at Fort Calhoun Station which included FEMA evaluation of local, State, and County participation. The sirens were activated by Iowa Emergency personnel for less than 5 seconds. An OPPD and State of Iowa joint media press release will be conducted following the termination of the Emergency Planning exercise."
The licensee notified the State of Iowa EMA and the Harrison County Sherriff's Dispatch. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1145 CDT on 3/27/12, OPPD [Omaha Public Power District] was notified by Harrison County Emergency Management that the sirens in Harrison County, Iowa were inadvertently activated at 0950 CDT on 3/27/12. This activation occurred during an exercise at Fort Calhoun Station which included FEMA evaluation of local, State, and County participation. The sirens were activated by Iowa Emergency personnel for less than 5 seconds. An OPPD and State of Iowa joint media press release will be conducted following the termination of the Emergency Planning exercise."
The licensee notified the State of Iowa EMA and the Harrison County Sherriff's Dispatch. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47775
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS BULLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS BULLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/27/2012
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2012
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HISTORICAL UNAVAILABILITY OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY VENTILATION DUE TO MAINTENANCE
"During a review of past maintenance that was performed on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation system, it was identified that there were three periods of time when the maintenance would have impacted the functionality of the facility and the ventilation system would not be able to be restored promptly. Site reporting guidance has been revised to assure accurate reporting.
"The periods of time where maintenance impacted the functionality of the EOF are as follows:
1. April 30 to May 1, 2009 for approximately 36 hours due to condenser and air handler replacement.
2. January 14 to 18, 2010 for approximately 96 hours due to damper and ductwork replacement.
3. November 17 to 19, 2010 for approximately 72 hours due to a compressor failure.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the work activities affected an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/30/2012 AT 0940 FROM JOHN CAVES TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *
"On several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation systems were in a degraded state and/or removed from service, for extended periods of time. There were no actual emergencies that occurred during those periods that required activation of the EOF.
"A calculation indicated that with the degraded air conditioning system during summer conditions, the temperature in the EOF could reach 87 degrees F. While there is no specific temperature limit for EOF habitability, an elevated temperature is of concern when emergency response organization members are under potential stress, as in emergency response situations.
"On January 25, 2010, Harris staff found a damper in the ventilation system stuck in the nearly closed condition. The damper was reopened on the day it was discovered. A calculation indicated that with the ventilation system in the normal mode and the damper stuck, the carbon dioxide concentration in the EOF could have exceeded 0.5%.
"The elevated carbon dioxide concentration due to the stuck damper, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility and temperatures of 87 degrees, had the potential to impair a key responder's ability to perform an assigned emergency response function."
The licensee has informed the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).
"During a review of past maintenance that was performed on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation system, it was identified that there were three periods of time when the maintenance would have impacted the functionality of the facility and the ventilation system would not be able to be restored promptly. Site reporting guidance has been revised to assure accurate reporting.
"The periods of time where maintenance impacted the functionality of the EOF are as follows:
1. April 30 to May 1, 2009 for approximately 36 hours due to condenser and air handler replacement.
2. January 14 to 18, 2010 for approximately 96 hours due to damper and ductwork replacement.
3. November 17 to 19, 2010 for approximately 72 hours due to a compressor failure.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the work activities affected an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/30/2012 AT 0940 FROM JOHN CAVES TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *
"On several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation systems were in a degraded state and/or removed from service, for extended periods of time. There were no actual emergencies that occurred during those periods that required activation of the EOF.
"A calculation indicated that with the degraded air conditioning system during summer conditions, the temperature in the EOF could reach 87 degrees F. While there is no specific temperature limit for EOF habitability, an elevated temperature is of concern when emergency response organization members are under potential stress, as in emergency response situations.
"On January 25, 2010, Harris staff found a damper in the ventilation system stuck in the nearly closed condition. The damper was reopened on the day it was discovered. A calculation indicated that with the ventilation system in the normal mode and the damper stuck, the carbon dioxide concentration in the EOF could have exceeded 0.5%.
"The elevated carbon dioxide concentration due to the stuck damper, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility and temperatures of 87 degrees, had the potential to impair a key responder's ability to perform an assigned emergency response function."
The licensee has informed the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47777
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRENT EFIRD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRENT EFIRD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/27/2012
Notification Time: 23:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 20:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2012
Notification Time: 23:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2012
Event Time: 20:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE NOT FULLY QUALIFIED FOR A SEISMIC EVENT
"The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.' Conservative engineering analysis has determined that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is not qualified in a design basis earthquake event. Current seismic analysis is indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine.
"The Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is currently parked and de-energized in a safe position and administratively prohibited from being moved over any irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. Until further engineering evaluation or modifications can occur the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) will remain in its current position and de-energized."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVEN COFFMAN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1104 EDT ON 5/23/12 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the previous Event Notification Report #47777 made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 on 03/27/2012. The initial report indicated that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) may not have been qualified during a design basis earthquake event due to seismic analysis indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine. 2H3 was parked and de-energized in a safe position, and the condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.'
"Since the initial report, Engineering has completed a new seismic analysis which demonstrates that the discovered conditions of the Spent Fuel Handling Machine structural parts were adequate to preclude structural failure of the machine in the area of the Spent Fuel Pool. References to the calculations that formulate the basis for this conclusion are documented in the Licensee's corrective action program.
"Based on the new seismic analysis, the condition initially reported in EN #47777 did not result in 'an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' and is therefore retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the seismic analysis results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
"The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.' Conservative engineering analysis has determined that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is not qualified in a design basis earthquake event. Current seismic analysis is indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine.
"The Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) is currently parked and de-energized in a safe position and administratively prohibited from being moved over any irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool. Until further engineering evaluation or modifications can occur the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) will remain in its current position and de-energized."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVEN COFFMAN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1104 EDT ON 5/23/12 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the previous Event Notification Report #47777 made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 on 03/27/2012. The initial report indicated that the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (2H-3) may not have been qualified during a design basis earthquake event due to seismic analysis indicating a lack of margin for several structural parts of the machine. 2H3 was parked and de-energized in a safe position, and the condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition.'
"Since the initial report, Engineering has completed a new seismic analysis which demonstrates that the discovered conditions of the Spent Fuel Handling Machine structural parts were adequate to preclude structural failure of the machine in the area of the Spent Fuel Pool. References to the calculations that formulate the basis for this conclusion are documented in the Licensee's corrective action program.
"Based on the new seismic analysis, the condition initially reported in EN #47777 did not result in 'an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' and is therefore retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the seismic analysis results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).