Event Notification Report for March 14, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/13/2012 - 03/14/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
477404774147742477434774447745482854776147867
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47740
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY FULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY FULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At approximately 0800 EDT on March 14, 2012, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal replacement, ventilation shaft seal and belt replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require activation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1735 EDT ON 03/14/2012 * * *
The preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was completed at 1730 EDT. The TSC is now fully functional.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0840 EDT ON 03/15/2012 * * *
"At approximately 0800 on March 14, 2012 preplanned maintenance will be performed on the TSC ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal inspections and ventilation fan belt inspections. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plant has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity reflects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1650 EDT ON 03/15/2012 * * *
"At approximately 1630 on March 15, 2012, all scheduled maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been restored to a fully functional status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie).
"At approximately 0800 EDT on March 14, 2012, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal replacement, ventilation shaft seal and belt replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require activation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1735 EDT ON 03/14/2012 * * *
The preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was completed at 1730 EDT. The TSC is now fully functional.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0840 EDT ON 03/15/2012 * * *
"At approximately 0800 on March 14, 2012 preplanned maintenance will be performed on the TSC ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for door seal inspections and ventilation fan belt inspections. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 10 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plant has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity reflects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD VANDENBERG TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1650 EDT ON 03/15/2012 * * *
"At approximately 1630 on March 15, 2012, all scheduled maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been restored to a fully functional status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie).
Part 21
Event Number: 47741
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP (EMAI)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP (EMAI)
PART 21 - POTENTIAL DEFECT ON ARVAN ELECTRICAL TERMINAL BLOCKS
The following information was provided by facsimile:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
Arvan electrical terminal blocks, part number MS27212-x-xx, Revision P, sizes -3-xx and -5-xx. any length; Ametek Solidstate Controls part number 03-120608-00. Only lots purchased from 2010 to present are of concern.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
A mottled or marbled appearance, vertical cracks and/or a slim void/flow line on a cut section of the terminal block,
"CAUSE:
The manufacturer's investigation revealed that an improper application of acetone agent, which ensures proper bonding/blending of materials, was not properly monitored and resulted in intermittent inadequate blending. Not every lot or complete batch run is affected.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
Cracks and/or voids in the material could be exploited should a seismic event occur.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
We have no known failures of these terminal block products in our systems. We believe the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
If you wish to replace the terminal blocks in your systems, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 614-846-7500 ext. 6260."
The nuclear sites identified by the licensee to have these potentially defective parts are: Beaver Valley, Ginna, Harris, Hatch, VC Summer, Watts Bar, Braidwood, Byron, Cook, Davis Besse, Prairie Island, Arkansas Nuclear One, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, and South Texas Project.
The following information was provided by facsimile:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
Arvan electrical terminal blocks, part number MS27212-x-xx, Revision P, sizes -3-xx and -5-xx. any length; Ametek Solidstate Controls part number 03-120608-00. Only lots purchased from 2010 to present are of concern.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
A mottled or marbled appearance, vertical cracks and/or a slim void/flow line on a cut section of the terminal block,
"CAUSE:
The manufacturer's investigation revealed that an improper application of acetone agent, which ensures proper bonding/blending of materials, was not properly monitored and resulted in intermittent inadequate blending. Not every lot or complete batch run is affected.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
Cracks and/or voids in the material could be exploited should a seismic event occur.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
We have no known failures of these terminal block products in our systems. We believe the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
If you wish to replace the terminal blocks in your systems, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 614-846-7500 ext. 6260."
The nuclear sites identified by the licensee to have these potentially defective parts are: Beaver Valley, Ginna, Harris, Hatch, VC Summer, Watts Bar, Braidwood, Byron, Cook, Davis Besse, Prairie Island, Arkansas Nuclear One, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, and South Texas Project.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47742
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE DE FILLIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE DE FILLIPPO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE
"At 1430 EDT on March 14, 2012, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1305 EDT.
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.
"This loss is believed to have been caused by a problem on a Verizon trunk line, which is currently being investigated.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."
Licensee also notified the state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1207 EDT ON 3/15/12 * * *
"On 03/15/2012 at 10:22, JAF was notified by Oswego County Emergency Management that the tone alert radio system had been restored to service 03/15/2012 at 09:33. The NRC Resident Inspector has been provided an update on status of the tone alert radio system."
Notified R1DO (Krohn).
"At 1430 EDT on March 14, 2012, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1305 EDT.
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.
"This loss is believed to have been caused by a problem on a Verizon trunk line, which is currently being investigated.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."
Licensee also notified the state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1207 EDT ON 3/15/12 * * *
"On 03/15/2012 at 10:22, JAF was notified by Oswego County Emergency Management that the tone alert radio system had been restored to service 03/15/2012 at 09:33. The NRC Resident Inspector has been provided an update on status of the tone alert radio system."
Notified R1DO (Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47743
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RYAN HAMILTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RYAN HAMILTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2012
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF THE TONE ALERT RADIO SYSTEM
"On Monday, March 12, 2012, at 1435 EDT, Oswego County Warning Point notified Nine Mile Point, and NYS [New York State] Warning Point, via the land line, of a loss of the Tone Alert System for greater than one hour from the National Weather Service as of 1305 hrs. Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of Tone Alert System for greater than one hour, as a significant loss of Emergency Communications (EPIP-EPP-30).
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the NMP [Nine Mile Point] and JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The County Alert Sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remained operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert System constitutes a significant loss of Emergency Off-Site Communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local law enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM NATHAN LILIENTHAL TO VINCE KLCO AT 1050 EDT ON 3/15/2012 * * *
"The tone alert system was restored Thursday, March 15, 2012 at 0933 EDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1421 EDT ON 03/16/2012 * * *
"Correction to original notification: In the description above, the date of event was incorrectly identified as Monday, March 12, 2012, the date should have been Wednesday, March 14, 2012."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
"On Monday, March 12, 2012, at 1435 EDT, Oswego County Warning Point notified Nine Mile Point, and NYS [New York State] Warning Point, via the land line, of a loss of the Tone Alert System for greater than one hour from the National Weather Service as of 1305 hrs. Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of Tone Alert System for greater than one hour, as a significant loss of Emergency Communications (EPIP-EPP-30).
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the NMP [Nine Mile Point] and JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The County Alert Sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remained operable.
"The loss of the Tone Alert System constitutes a significant loss of Emergency Off-Site Communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local law enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM NATHAN LILIENTHAL TO VINCE KLCO AT 1050 EDT ON 3/15/2012 * * *
"The tone alert system was restored Thursday, March 15, 2012 at 0933 EDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1421 EDT ON 03/16/2012 * * *
"Correction to original notification: In the description above, the date of event was incorrectly identified as Monday, March 12, 2012, the date should have been Wednesday, March 14, 2012."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47744
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREADWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREADWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/14/2012
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 11:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2012
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 11:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNIT 3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBES FAILED IN-SITU PRESSURE TESTING
"On January 31, 2012, Unit 3 was shut down due to detection of a tube leak in one Steam Generator (SG). The shutdown was previously reported on Event Notification # 47628. Southern California Edison (SCE) has been performing in-situ pressure testing with non-radioactive water on tubes with significant wear indications. On March 14, 2012, at approximately 1120 PDT, Unit 3 Steam Generator (SG) E088 Tube R106 C78 did not meet the target performance criteria because leakage exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at the maximum pressure achieved during the test (2,884 psig). This was the leaking tube that resulted in the Unit 3 shutdown.
"Subsequently, two additional tubes in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria as follows: at 1249 PDT, Tube R102 C78 exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at 3,268 psig and at 1425 PDT, Tube R104 C78 exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at 3,180 psig. These occurrences are reportable as an 8-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. A follow-up notification will be made for additional in-situ pressure test failures. The extent and cause of the condition will be addressed in the follow-up licensee event report that will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A). Defective tubes will be removed from service as required prior to Unit 3 plant startup.
"Unit 2 has been shut down since January 9, 2012 for a scheduled refueling outage. SCE previously performed in-situ pressure testing of the tube with the most wear in Unit 2. Results from this test demonstrated that the tube met the target performance criteria.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE FROM LEE KELLY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2108 EDT ON 3/15/2012 * * *
"In-situ pressure testing on Unit 3 steam generator tubes was started on March 14, 2012 and is ongoing. On March 15, 2012, four additional tubes in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria of three-times normal pressure conditions as follows: (1) At 1109 PDT, Tube R100 C80 failed at 4,739 psig; (2) at 1437 PDT, Tube R107 C77 failed at 5,160 psig; (3) at 1604 PDT, Tube R101 C81 failed at 4,889 psig; and (4) at 1734 PDT, Tube R98 C80 failed at 4,886 psig.
"Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. Follow-up notifications will be made for any additional in-situ pressure test failures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Cain).
* * * UPDATE FROM LEE KELLY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2115 EDT ON 3/16/12 * * *
"In-situ pressure testing on Unit 3 steam generator tubes was started on March 14, 2012 and is ongoing. On March 16, 2012, one additional tube in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria of three-times normal pressure conditions as follows: at 1216 PDT, Tube R99 C81 failed at 5,026 psig.
"Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. Follow-up notifications will be made for any additional in-situ pressure test failures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Cain).
"On January 31, 2012, Unit 3 was shut down due to detection of a tube leak in one Steam Generator (SG). The shutdown was previously reported on Event Notification # 47628. Southern California Edison (SCE) has been performing in-situ pressure testing with non-radioactive water on tubes with significant wear indications. On March 14, 2012, at approximately 1120 PDT, Unit 3 Steam Generator (SG) E088 Tube R106 C78 did not meet the target performance criteria because leakage exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at the maximum pressure achieved during the test (2,884 psig). This was the leaking tube that resulted in the Unit 3 shutdown.
"Subsequently, two additional tubes in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria as follows: at 1249 PDT, Tube R102 C78 exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at 3,268 psig and at 1425 PDT, Tube R104 C78 exceeded 0.5 gallons per minute at 3,180 psig. These occurrences are reportable as an 8-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. A follow-up notification will be made for additional in-situ pressure test failures. The extent and cause of the condition will be addressed in the follow-up licensee event report that will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A). Defective tubes will be removed from service as required prior to Unit 3 plant startup.
"Unit 2 has been shut down since January 9, 2012 for a scheduled refueling outage. SCE previously performed in-situ pressure testing of the tube with the most wear in Unit 2. Results from this test demonstrated that the tube met the target performance criteria.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE FROM LEE KELLY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2108 EDT ON 3/15/2012 * * *
"In-situ pressure testing on Unit 3 steam generator tubes was started on March 14, 2012 and is ongoing. On March 15, 2012, four additional tubes in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria of three-times normal pressure conditions as follows: (1) At 1109 PDT, Tube R100 C80 failed at 4,739 psig; (2) at 1437 PDT, Tube R107 C77 failed at 5,160 psig; (3) at 1604 PDT, Tube R101 C81 failed at 4,889 psig; and (4) at 1734 PDT, Tube R98 C80 failed at 4,886 psig.
"Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. Follow-up notifications will be made for any additional in-situ pressure test failures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Cain).
* * * UPDATE FROM LEE KELLY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2115 EDT ON 3/16/12 * * *
"In-situ pressure testing on Unit 3 steam generator tubes was started on March 14, 2012 and is ongoing. On March 16, 2012, one additional tube in Unit 3 SG E088 did not meet the target performance criteria of three-times normal pressure conditions as follows: at 1216 PDT, Tube R99 C81 failed at 5,026 psig.
"Testing and inspection of Unit 3 steam generator tubes is ongoing to determine the extent and cause of the observed wear. Follow-up notifications will be made for any additional in-situ pressure test failures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Cain).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47745
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/15/2012
Notification Time: 04:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 20:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Notification Time: 04:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 20:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE
"On March 14th, 2012 at 2034 EST the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond as expected to demanded position. With the HPCI system flow controller output signal at zero percent demand the governor valve traveled to the mid position and did not remain closed as expected when the oil system auxiliary pump was started. With this unexpected response the speed and flow control system for the turbine is inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned evolution for oil sampling.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable.
"The unit remains at 100% power.
"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified."
"On March 14th, 2012 at 2034 EST the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond as expected to demanded position. With the HPCI system flow controller output signal at zero percent demand the governor valve traveled to the mid position and did not remain closed as expected when the oil system auxiliary pump was started. With this unexpected response the speed and flow control system for the turbine is inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned evolution for oil sampling.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable.
"The unit remains at 100% power.
"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified."
Part 21
Event Number: 48285
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: AMETEK SOLDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/07/2012
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2012
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21 REACTOR GRP (EMAI)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21 REACTOR GRP (EMAI)
PART 21 - IMPROPER SELECTION OF INVERTER CAPACITORS
"PRODUCT: 10 KVA inverter Model 86VC0100-15, 3 phase 480 VAC output. Limited to systems supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood units. Capacitors C10 through C15 part number 03-040060-00.
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Suppression capacitors, Ametek part number 03-040060-00, used in positions C10 through C15 on Model 86-VC0100-15 only.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Capacitor could arc internally and open internally and externally.
"CAUSE: the manufacturer's investigation revealed that due to improper selection of capacitor used may fail due to a corona effect internally.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The capacitor may short internally and open circuit by forcing lead separation from the device.
"ACTION REQUIRED: Replace the capacitor(s) with Ametek part 03-040041-20. The replacement is rated at 370 VAC and used in a 277 VAC circuit.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: The defect is limited to the units supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood plants under Ametek joc C103552."
Both the Byron and Braidwood plants are already informed of this condition.
"PRODUCT: 10 KVA inverter Model 86VC0100-15, 3 phase 480 VAC output. Limited to systems supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood units. Capacitors C10 through C15 part number 03-040060-00.
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Suppression capacitors, Ametek part number 03-040060-00, used in positions C10 through C15 on Model 86-VC0100-15 only.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Capacitor could arc internally and open internally and externally.
"CAUSE: the manufacturer's investigation revealed that due to improper selection of capacitor used may fail due to a corona effect internally.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The capacitor may short internally and open circuit by forcing lead separation from the device.
"ACTION REQUIRED: Replace the capacitor(s) with Ametek part 03-040041-20. The replacement is rated at 370 VAC and used in a 277 VAC circuit.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: The defect is limited to the units supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood plants under Ametek joc C103552."
Both the Byron and Braidwood plants are already informed of this condition.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47761
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PROBE TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: 05112
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: PROBE TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: 05112
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/22/2012
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2012
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE LOST DURING TRANSPORT
The State of Texas provided the following information via email:
"On March 22, 2012, the Agency was notified by a licensee that a 350 millicurie (13 GBq) Americium 241-Beryllium source was lost during shipment. The source was picked up in Fort Worth, Texas by a common carrier for delivery to Houston, TX on March 14, 2012. When the source arrived in Houston, TX it was discovered that the source should have been delivered to the company's Corpus Christi, TX location. The common carrier contacted the licensee in Fort Worth and they agreed to have the source sent to the Corpus Christi location. On March 20, 2012, the licensee in Corpus Christi contacted the licensee in Fort Worth and stated that they had not received the source. The licensee in Fort Worth contacted the common carrier and was informed by them that they could not locate the source, but they were looking for it. On March 22, 2012, at 1420 hours the Fort Worth licensee contacted this Agency to report that they had decided to report the source as lost.
"The Agency contacted the carrier and they confirmed that the package was loaded on the truck going from Houston to Corpus Christi. They stated that the truck stopped in San Antonio, TX prior to going to Houston. The common carrier is still looking for the source. They stated that all of their transportation centers have been notified of the lost package. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
Texas Incident #: I-8941.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/29/12 AT 0918 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
The report should have stated "that the truck stopped in San Antonio,TX prior to going to Corpus Christi."
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz) and FSME (McIntosh) via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The State of Texas provided the following information via email:
"On March 22, 2012, the Agency was notified by a licensee that a 350 millicurie (13 GBq) Americium 241-Beryllium source was lost during shipment. The source was picked up in Fort Worth, Texas by a common carrier for delivery to Houston, TX on March 14, 2012. When the source arrived in Houston, TX it was discovered that the source should have been delivered to the company's Corpus Christi, TX location. The common carrier contacted the licensee in Fort Worth and they agreed to have the source sent to the Corpus Christi location. On March 20, 2012, the licensee in Corpus Christi contacted the licensee in Fort Worth and stated that they had not received the source. The licensee in Fort Worth contacted the common carrier and was informed by them that they could not locate the source, but they were looking for it. On March 22, 2012, at 1420 hours the Fort Worth licensee contacted this Agency to report that they had decided to report the source as lost.
"The Agency contacted the carrier and they confirmed that the package was loaded on the truck going from Houston to Corpus Christi. They stated that the truck stopped in San Antonio, TX prior to going to Houston. The common carrier is still looking for the source. They stated that all of their transportation centers have been notified of the lost package. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.
Texas Incident #: I-8941.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/29/12 AT 0918 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
The report should have stated "that the truck stopped in San Antonio,TX prior to going to Corpus Christi."
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz) and FSME (McIntosh) via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 47867
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LANTHEUS MEDICAL IMAGING
Region: 1
City: NORTH BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0088
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: LANTHEUS MEDICAL IMAGING
Region: 1
City: NORTH BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0088
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/26/2012
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2012
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB via email
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB via email
MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING THALLIUM-201 SHIPMENT
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"On 4/5/12, [the] licensee reported as missing a 1.78 GBq (48.1 mCi) Thallium-201 package that was shipped from its site on 3/12/12, was scanned in at the carrier's Nashville, TN, transportation hub on 3/13/12 and reported to the licensee as missing by the carrier on 3/13/12. Licensee in communication with the carrier in ongoing effort to locate missing package. After a reasonable search time had passed, licensee reported missing package to this Agency [MA Radiation Control Program].
"Last known location was in Nashville, TN. The subject radioactive material is 7 ml of liquid solution held within a vial inside a lead pig inside a sealed plastic container inside a styrofoam insert within a corrugated cardboard box. Subject radioactive material has a 73 hour (~3 days) half-life and has decayed well past 10 half-lives since its original shipping date.
"Licensee remains in communication with carrier in ongoing effort to locate missing RAM and has requested return of package to licensee if found.
"The Agency considers this event to be CLOSED."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"On 4/5/12, [the] licensee reported as missing a 1.78 GBq (48.1 mCi) Thallium-201 package that was shipped from its site on 3/12/12, was scanned in at the carrier's Nashville, TN, transportation hub on 3/13/12 and reported to the licensee as missing by the carrier on 3/13/12. Licensee in communication with the carrier in ongoing effort to locate missing package. After a reasonable search time had passed, licensee reported missing package to this Agency [MA Radiation Control Program].
"Last known location was in Nashville, TN. The subject radioactive material is 7 ml of liquid solution held within a vial inside a lead pig inside a sealed plastic container inside a styrofoam insert within a corrugated cardboard box. Subject radioactive material has a 73 hour (~3 days) half-life and has decayed well past 10 half-lives since its original shipping date.
"Licensee remains in communication with carrier in ongoing effort to locate missing RAM and has requested return of package to licensee if found.
"The Agency considers this event to be CLOSED."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source