Event Notification Report for March 06, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/05/2012 - 03/06/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47720
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/06/2012
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2012
Event Time: 06:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2012
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2012
Event Time: 06:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
HAROLD CHERNOFF (NRR)
JASON KOZAL (IRD)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
MARK RING (R3DO)
HAROLD CHERNOFF (NRR)
JASON KOZAL (IRD)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (R3)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM
"Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm [was indicated] due to changing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level. Investigation of the event indicates that the reactor vessel head vent spool piece was removed at the time the RCS level started decreasing. A vacuum existed in the RCS at the time of removal of the spool piece which caused air to enter the reactor vessel head. The RCS level decrease was due to this. The charging system was placed in service at 80 gpm to regain the RCS level back to the original level. A walk down of all plant areas where leakage could have occurred has been completed with no leakage found. The charging system has been secured and RCS level is stable at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Minnesota, the State of Wisconsin, and local authorities in both states. The licensee will be issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE SCHMIDT TO VINCE KLCO AT 1523 EST ON 3/6/2012 * * *
"NUE [Notification of Unusual Event] CU1.1, unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm that was entered at 0624 [CST] on 3/6/2012 at the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant has been terminated at 1136 on 3/6/2012. The entry criteria for CU 1.1 is no longer met as validated by a stable reactor coolant system level and no leakage found by plant walk downs."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Ring), NRR-EO (Chernoff), IRD (Kozal) and the following federal agencies: DHS-SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, EPA, NuclearSSA and DHS-NICC.
"Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm [was indicated] due to changing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level. Investigation of the event indicates that the reactor vessel head vent spool piece was removed at the time the RCS level started decreasing. A vacuum existed in the RCS at the time of removal of the spool piece which caused air to enter the reactor vessel head. The RCS level decrease was due to this. The charging system was placed in service at 80 gpm to regain the RCS level back to the original level. A walk down of all plant areas where leakage could have occurred has been completed with no leakage found. The charging system has been secured and RCS level is stable at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Minnesota, the State of Wisconsin, and local authorities in both states. The licensee will be issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE SCHMIDT TO VINCE KLCO AT 1523 EST ON 3/6/2012 * * *
"NUE [Notification of Unusual Event] CU1.1, unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm that was entered at 0624 [CST] on 3/6/2012 at the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant has been terminated at 1136 on 3/6/2012. The entry criteria for CU 1.1 is no longer met as validated by a stable reactor coolant system level and no leakage found by plant walk downs."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Ring), NRR-EO (Chernoff), IRD (Kozal) and the following federal agencies: DHS-SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, EPA, NuclearSSA and DHS-NICC.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47721
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/06/2012
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2012
Event Time: 16:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2012
Notification Time: 19:33 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2012
Event Time: 16:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO ROUTER POWER SUPPLY FAILURE
"At 1613 [CST], FCS [Fort Calhoun Station] Control Room was notified by corporate communications that 2 non-adjacent sirens out of 101 total sirens lost communication. These were Siren #1 at 1602 [CST] and Siren #50 at 1609 [CST] due to potential router issues. Required compensatory actions were established at 1630 [CST] for loss of the 2 sirens. Initial troubleshooting revealed radio communication failed at 1543 [CST] and manual testing of the remaining sirens was instituted.
"At 1643 [CST], corporate communications notified the Control Room initial testing on Siren #2 was not responding and indicative that all sirens were lost. Based on that report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed. Local Law Enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties to perform required actions in case of an emergency with the sirens unavailable. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public by local law enforcement in case of an actual emergency.
"Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router dual power supply had failed at 1539 [CST] and has been replaced. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren. As of 1750 [CST], all sirens [were] restored to functional status. The power supply failure resulted in 2.2 hours with the sirens being unavailable. Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured.
"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for, 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1613 [CST], FCS [Fort Calhoun Station] Control Room was notified by corporate communications that 2 non-adjacent sirens out of 101 total sirens lost communication. These were Siren #1 at 1602 [CST] and Siren #50 at 1609 [CST] due to potential router issues. Required compensatory actions were established at 1630 [CST] for loss of the 2 sirens. Initial troubleshooting revealed radio communication failed at 1543 [CST] and manual testing of the remaining sirens was instituted.
"At 1643 [CST], corporate communications notified the Control Room initial testing on Siren #2 was not responding and indicative that all sirens were lost. Based on that report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed. Local Law Enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties to perform required actions in case of an emergency with the sirens unavailable. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public by local law enforcement in case of an actual emergency.
"Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router dual power supply had failed at 1539 [CST] and has been replaced. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren. As of 1750 [CST], all sirens [were] restored to functional status. The power supply failure resulted in 2.2 hours with the sirens being unavailable. Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured.
"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for, 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.