Event Notification Report for February 29, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/28/2012 - 02/29/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47709
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47709
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/29/2012
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2012
Event Time: 12:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2012
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/29/2012
Event Time: 12:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DAMPERS FAIL TO CLOSE DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE
"On 2/29/2012 at 0905 [CST] during scheduled surveillance testing it was discovered that Secondary Containment isolation damper 1VAD017B3 would not fully isolate. 1VAD017B3 was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition A and an 8 hour action statement to isolate the affected flowpath via a closed and deactivated damper was entered. While performing subsequent actions to isolate the companion isolation damper, 1VAD017A3, it was found on 2/29/2012 at 1222 [CST] that this damper also failed to fully isolate. This left both Secondary Containment isolation dampers in the same flowpath unable to isolate, and Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition B was entered with a 4 hours action statement to isolate the affected flowpath. This condition is reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"Further actions to isolate the flowpath were successful and both 4 hour and 8 hour Technical Specification action statements were completed within the required time."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 2/29/2012 at 0905 [CST] during scheduled surveillance testing it was discovered that Secondary Containment isolation damper 1VAD017B3 would not fully isolate. 1VAD017B3 was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition A and an 8 hour action statement to isolate the affected flowpath via a closed and deactivated damper was entered. While performing subsequent actions to isolate the companion isolation damper, 1VAD017A3, it was found on 2/29/2012 at 1222 [CST] that this damper also failed to fully isolate. This left both Secondary Containment isolation dampers in the same flowpath unable to isolate, and Technical Specification 3.6.4.2 Condition B was entered with a 4 hours action statement to isolate the affected flowpath. This condition is reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"Further actions to isolate the flowpath were successful and both 4 hour and 8 hour Technical Specification action statements were completed within the required time."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.