Event Notification Report for February 14, 2012

STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"The S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control [SCDHEC] was notified on Tuesday, February 14, 2012, at 1115 [EST], that a Troxler Model 3411B gauge, s/n 9247, containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, was stolen from the truck bed of the vehicle driven by [an employee] while parked at his home overnight. [The employee] noticed that the gauge was missing at approximately 0700 [EST]. [The employee] called [the SCDHEC] to report the theft of the material. He stated that the Charleston County Sheriff's Department had been notified and was handling the incident. [The SCDHEC notified] the S.C. Fusion Center of the incident."

"The event is open pending the licensee's investigation and report to [the SCDHEC]. Updates will be made through the NMED system."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY INFORMATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MODIFICATION

"At 1240 EST, on February 14, 2012, power was removed to a major portion of the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) to perform a planned modification on Power Panel - 8. This work will install a new breaker in PP-8 requiring that the panel be de-energized for the maintenance. The expected duration of ERFIS inoperability is approximately 6 hours. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above-described functions. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS computer system is inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An additional message will be provided when the ERFIS is restored. It should also be noted that during the period of ERFIS inoperability, it is likely that the system could be restored within one hour to support Emergency Response Facility activation. This report is provided to conservatively cover the possibility that restoration within one hour may not be able to be accomplished if facility activation were to occur. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


* * * UPDATE FROM KEN BOYD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1516 EST ON 12/14/2012 * * *

"At 1240 EST, on February 14, 2012, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer system became inoperable. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). Actions were completed to restore the ERFIS computer system to an operable status at 1458 EST on February 14, 2012. Alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, were available for the above-described functions during the time that the ERFIS computer system was inoperable. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still have been made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS Computer system was inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Desai).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On February 14, 2012, the operator of the handheld unit notified the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that he just got a 'shutter not available' message on the unit. The RSO was at a different plant and he instructed the operator to turn off the unit, remove the battery pack, place the unit in the case, and secure the unit. Upon examination on February 15, 2012, the same message was displayed when the battery was installed. The RSO performed a survey indicating 40 microR/hr at a distance of 1ft. The employee was wearing extremity dosimetry at the time of the event which has been sent for evaluation. More details will follow when available.

"The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: Thermo Niton
Model: XLp 818 [The XLp is an x-ray fluorescence (XRF) analyzer.]
Serial #: 5917
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 30 mCi

"A local service provider has been contacted to try to close the shutter and package the device so it can be returned to the manufacturer. The RSO sent out the employee's dosimetry to be analyzed. Licensee has been made aware of the 30-day follow-up report requirement."

PA Event Report No.: PA120006

INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - MISALIGNED SEPARATORS IN LCR-25 STANDBY BATTERIES

The following is the summary portion of the report submitted by fax:

"Subject Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation Regarding Misaligned Separators in LCR-25 Standby Batteries

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On February 14, 2012 C&D Technologies, Inc. ('C&D') was informed by Entergy Operations that an LCR-25 battery installed at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant had shown signs of misaligned separators (also known as shifted separators) of between 1/8 to1/4 [inch]. This was identified by the Palisades plant on or about November 4, 2011. On January 16, 2012, three additional cells were identified as experiencing separator misalignment.

"C&D requested that Palisades return the affected batteries for evaluation of this anomaly and issued a Return Material Authorization for that purpose. But since voltage readings were acceptable for all units involved, Palisades determined that an operability issue did not exist and opted to keep the batteries in service until their refuel outage scheduled for Fall, 2013. C&D inadvertently closed the internal corrective action without providing an Interim Report as required by 10CFR, Part 21.

"C&D has not performed a root cause technical evaluation to determine if there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error.

"Thus, C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D LCR-25 batteries of this interim report, and is initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any U.S. licensee using such batteries.

"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
bmalley@cdtechno.com
(215) 619-7830"

The sites affected are:
Palisades - 65 x LCR-25 NUC Batteries and,
Crystal River - 4 x LCR-25 NUC Batteries

* * * UPDATE FROM LARRY CARSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1122 EDT ON 09/16/14 * * *

The following was excerpted from the final report received from C&D Technologies, Inc. via facsimile:

"Conclusion: The conclusion drawn from the return and analysis is that the misaligned separator was present from the time of assembly in the C&D facility through installation and initial operation.

"Recommendations: C&D recommends that operators of nuclear batteries perform an inspection of their batteries to detect misaligned separators. Inspection may be performed visually, and with the aid of mirrors as necessary.

"Corrective Actions: C&D has enhanced both in process and final battery inspection processes to detect and eliminate misaligned separators from shipment. C&D is also preparing an enhanced incoming inspection work form for nuclear battery operators that will better enable the operators to detect and segregate batteries with misaligned separators from use.

"Further Reporting: No further reporting is anticipated.

"C&D Contacts: Further information on this issue can be obtained from:

"Larry Carson- Nuclear Product Manager
Office Phone 215-775-1314
Email: lcarson@cdtechno.com

"Robert Malley-VP Quality and Process Engineering
Office Phone 215-619-7830
Email bmalley@cdtechno.com"

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Dickenson), and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM ROBERT MALLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1505 EDT ON 10/28/2014 * * *

The following information was excerpted from the revised final report submitted by email:

This update (dated 9/22/2014 and provided to NRC on 10/28/2014) is Revision 1 to Final Report from C&D Technologies originally submitted on 9/16/2014.

"An interim report was submitted 3/27/14 while the product was being returned for analysis.

"C&D has performed an analysis of the returned product, and is submitting this report to the NRC and notifying affected C&D customers to the possibility of separator misalignment in LCR, KCR, and LCY products [versus original report affecting LCR products only].

"U.S. Licensees using batteries possibly containing the potential defect are being notified of the filing of this final report with recommendations that they examine their batteries for any signs of similar problems.

"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

"Robert Malley, VP Quality and Process Engineering, bmalley@cdtechno.com, (215) 619-7830."

List of affected plants:

NRC Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Millstone, Indian Point, Vermont Yankee, Limerick, Three Mile Island, Beaver Valley, Susquehanna, Salem, Hope Creek, Crystal River

NRC Region 2: Oconee, St. Lucie, Harris, Robinson, Summer, Farley, Hatch, Vogtle, Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts Bar

NRC Region 3: Kewaunee, Fermi, Palisades, Braidwood, Byron, Clinton, LaSalle, Perry, Cook, Duane Arnold, Point Beach, Monticello, Prairie Island

NRC Region 4: Arkansas Nuclear One, Grand Gulf, Waterford, Cooper, Fort Calhoun, Diablo Canyon

Foreign: Bruce, Laguna Verde, Point Lepreau, Krsko, Darlington, Pickering, Chin Shan, Kuosheng, Maanshan, Lungmen

Other: Knoll Atomic Power Laboratory

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.


* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ROBERT MALLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1143 EDT ON 10/28/2014 * * *

The following was excerpted from the final report update received by fax:

"The purpose of this letter is to update a report provided to the NRC on 09/22/14 regarding misaligned separators in Class 1 E battery products. We are revising Section II for the models of the product affected, and Section VIII for the advice provided for customers. These revisions are provided below:
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"The products affected include LCUN and LCU model lines in addition to the previously reported LCR, KCR, and LCY products. [This did not add to the list of facilities affected]

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"Based on experience gained through site visits and review of products that completed product life C&D is changing the criteria for inclusion in the scope of this Part 21 report. The change increases the allowable separator misalignment.

"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

"Robert Malley, VP Quality and Process Engineering, bmalley@cdtechno.com, (215) 619-7830."

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.