Event Notification Report for February 13, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/12/2012 - 02/13/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47661480574799048379
Agreement State
Event Number: 47661
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: WAYPOINT ENTERPRISES, INC.
Region: 1
City: TUCKERTON State: NJ
County:
License #: RAD110001-507
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNY GOODMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: WAYPOINT ENTERPRISES, INC.
Region: 1
City: TUCKERTON State: NJ
County:
License #: RAD110001-507
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNY GOODMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/13/2012
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/13/2012
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CRUSHED TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was received via facsimile:
A dump truck ran over a Model 3440 Troxler portable gauge on the shoulder of the NJ Garden State Parkway at mile marker 54. The Troxler portable gauge was a model 3440 containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/15/12 AT 11:45 FROM JAMES McCULLOUGH TO KARL DIEDERICH VIA E-MAIL * * *
"NJDEP RMP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Radioactive Materials Program] staff responded to investigate the incident and observe the licensee's actions to recover the damaged device. Staff performed radiation area surveys and wipe tests to assess the situation. The licensee hired a consulting physicist who was observed (at about 9PM) while the device was recovered, shielded, and prepared for transport back to the licensee's office storage location."
Notified R1DO (Powell) and FSME EO (Giantelli).
The following information was received via facsimile:
A dump truck ran over a Model 3440 Troxler portable gauge on the shoulder of the NJ Garden State Parkway at mile marker 54. The Troxler portable gauge was a model 3440 containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/15/12 AT 11:45 FROM JAMES McCULLOUGH TO KARL DIEDERICH VIA E-MAIL * * *
"NJDEP RMP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Radioactive Materials Program] staff responded to investigate the incident and observe the licensee's actions to recover the damaged device. Staff performed radiation area surveys and wipe tests to assess the situation. The licensee hired a consulting physicist who was observed (at about 9PM) while the device was recovered, shielded, and prepared for transport back to the licensee's office storage location."
Notified R1DO (Powell) and FSME EO (Giantelli).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 48057
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 09:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 09:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
MASS CONTROL LIMIT EXCEEDED
"It was discovered on 2/13/12 that the mass control limit in the gadolinia pellet press operation was exceeded. An improperly installed valve allowed a total of 43 kg of uranium powder into the favorable geometry press feed tube, exceeding the 36 kg limit. This resulted in a failed item relied on for safety (IROFS) < 1 hour condition where a criticality control was not maintained. The press feed mass control is a sole IROFS for a fire accident sequence. Control indications functioned as designed and provided notification of the malfunction to the operator and the operation was secured. The other controls on geometry and moderation were maintained at all times.
"At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation was shut down and the powder was removed by 1000 on 2/13/2012.
"Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: At no time was an unsafe condition present
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: Equipment was shut down and powder removed
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented.
"This event is being communicated in order to administratively meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A."
The licensee has spoken with Region 2 (Thomas) regarding this issue, and discussed the issue in a Reply to Notice of Violation dated 6/29/2012 letter book number SPM12-030.
"It was discovered on 2/13/12 that the mass control limit in the gadolinia pellet press operation was exceeded. An improperly installed valve allowed a total of 43 kg of uranium powder into the favorable geometry press feed tube, exceeding the 36 kg limit. This resulted in a failed item relied on for safety (IROFS) < 1 hour condition where a criticality control was not maintained. The press feed mass control is a sole IROFS for a fire accident sequence. Control indications functioned as designed and provided notification of the malfunction to the operator and the operation was secured. The other controls on geometry and moderation were maintained at all times.
"At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation was shut down and the powder was removed by 1000 on 2/13/2012.
"Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: At no time was an unsafe condition present
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: Equipment was shut down and powder removed
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented.
"This event is being communicated in order to administratively meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A."
The licensee has spoken with Region 2 (Thomas) regarding this issue, and discussed the issue in a Reply to Notice of Violation dated 6/29/2012 letter book number SPM12-030.
Part 21
Event Number: 47990
Rep Org: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.
Licensee: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.
Region: 1
City: ARLINGTON State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.
Region: 1
City: ARLINGTON State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2012
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP (EMAIL)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP (EMAIL)
PART 21 - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WEAR ADJACENT TO RETAINER BARS
The following information was obtained from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD on April 19, 2012 was inadvertently added to Event Notification #47833 as an update to that event. The vendor's intent was to issue two interim reports; one for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2 and one for SONGS Unit 3. The information was obtained via fax:
"On January 31, 2012, San Onofre Unit 3 shut down due to indications of a steam generator tube leak. Steam generator tube inspections confirmed one small leak on one tube in one of the two steam generators. Continuing inspections of 100% of the steam generator tubes in both Unit 3 steam generators discovered unexpected wear, including tube to tube as well as tube to tube support structural wear. Inspection, testing, and analysis of SG tube integrity in both Unit 3 SGs is ongoing. In-situ pressure testing identified eight Unit 3 SG tubes that did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specification for tube integrity. One of the failed tubes was the leaking tube that required the Unit 3 shutdown.
"Discovery date: February 21, 2012
"Evaluation completion schedule date: August 31, 2012"
Interim Report: U21-019-IR
Reference Document: UET-20120105
Original notifications (per EN# 47833) were made to R1DO (Joustra), R2DO (Nease), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (O'Keefe), and Part 21 Group via email.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 6/4/12 AT 1145 EDT * * *
The vendor reported that eight Unit 3 SG tubes did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specifications for tube integrity.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDSUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 9/7/12 AT 1539 EDT * * *
"MHI evaluated that the deviation contains a reportable defect for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 and 3."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor Group.
The following information was obtained from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD on April 19, 2012 was inadvertently added to Event Notification #47833 as an update to that event. The vendor's intent was to issue two interim reports; one for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2 and one for SONGS Unit 3. The information was obtained via fax:
"On January 31, 2012, San Onofre Unit 3 shut down due to indications of a steam generator tube leak. Steam generator tube inspections confirmed one small leak on one tube in one of the two steam generators. Continuing inspections of 100% of the steam generator tubes in both Unit 3 steam generators discovered unexpected wear, including tube to tube as well as tube to tube support structural wear. Inspection, testing, and analysis of SG tube integrity in both Unit 3 SGs is ongoing. In-situ pressure testing identified eight Unit 3 SG tubes that did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specification for tube integrity. One of the failed tubes was the leaking tube that required the Unit 3 shutdown.
"Discovery date: February 21, 2012
"Evaluation completion schedule date: August 31, 2012"
Interim Report: U21-019-IR
Reference Document: UET-20120105
Original notifications (per EN# 47833) were made to R1DO (Joustra), R2DO (Nease), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (O'Keefe), and Part 21 Group via email.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 6/4/12 AT 1145 EDT * * *
The vendor reported that eight Unit 3 SG tubes did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specifications for tube integrity.
Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDSUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 9/7/12 AT 1539 EDT * * *
"MHI evaluated that the deviation contains a reportable defect for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 and 3."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor Group.
Part 21
Event Number: 48379
Rep Org: MITSUBISHI NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS
Licensee: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.
Region: 1
City: ARLINGTON State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH TAPIA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.
Region: 1
City: ARLINGTON State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH TAPIA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 07:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 07:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WEAR ADJACENT TO RETAINER BARS
The following information was received via email:
"Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD (MHI) has identified steam generator tube wear for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
"The Steam Generator tube wear adjacent to the retainer bars was identified as creating a potential safety hazard. The maximum wear depth is 90% of the tube thickness. The cause of the tube wear has been determined to be the retainer bars' random flow-induced vibration caused by the secondary fluid exiting the tube bundle. Since the retainer bar has a low natural frequency, the bar vibrates with a large amplitude. This type tube wear could have an adverse effect on the structural integrity of the tubes, which are part of the pressure boundary.
"The plugging of the tubes that are adjacent to the retainer bars was performed. MHI has recommended to the purchaser to remove the retainer bars that would have the possibility of vibration with large amplitude or to perform the plugging and stabilizing for the associated tubes."
The following information was received via email:
"Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD (MHI) has identified steam generator tube wear for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
"The Steam Generator tube wear adjacent to the retainer bars was identified as creating a potential safety hazard. The maximum wear depth is 90% of the tube thickness. The cause of the tube wear has been determined to be the retainer bars' random flow-induced vibration caused by the secondary fluid exiting the tube bundle. Since the retainer bar has a low natural frequency, the bar vibrates with a large amplitude. This type tube wear could have an adverse effect on the structural integrity of the tubes, which are part of the pressure boundary.
"The plugging of the tubes that are adjacent to the retainer bars was performed. MHI has recommended to the purchaser to remove the retainer bars that would have the possibility of vibration with large amplitude or to perform the plugging and stabilizing for the associated tubes."