Event Notification Report for February 09, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/08/2012 - 02/09/2012
Agreement State
Event Number: 47659
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC.
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: L00254
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC.
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: L00254
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/11/2012
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2012
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INDUSTRIAL GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was received by email:
"On February 10, 2012, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that the shutter on an Ohmart model SH-LG 2 nuclear gauge containing 8.5 curies of Cesium-137 was found to be stuck in the open position. Open is the normal position for the shutter and the failure does not pose any additional exposure risk. The licensee is trying to lubricate the operating arm in an effort to free the shutter. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer for assistance. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-8932
The following information was received by email:
"On February 10, 2012, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that the shutter on an Ohmart model SH-LG 2 nuclear gauge containing 8.5 curies of Cesium-137 was found to be stuck in the open position. Open is the normal position for the shutter and the failure does not pose any additional exposure risk. The licensee is trying to lubricate the operating arm in an effort to free the shutter. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer for assistance. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-8932
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47655
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TED SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TED SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HABITABILITY
"The dose calculation of record documents is that the assumed inleakage to the technical support center (TSC) is 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM), The calculation does not provide a documented validation of why the 60 CFM value is conservative and acceptable. Engineering judgment supports the likely validity of the 60 CFM value. However, if the inleakage value is not valid by a sufficient margin, the TSC would not meet the habitability design basis requirements. This report is submitted based upon a potential loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability in accordance º 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Existing procedures require monitoring habitability of the TSC and taking action in the event radiological conditions preclude occupancy. The on-duty TSC Site Emergency Coordinator, TSC Radiological Control Director, and Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Response Manager have been informed of the condition and the protocol for utilization of alternate facilities. A walkthrough of the process will be held for others holding those positions in a timely manner.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
"The dose calculation of record documents is that the assumed inleakage to the technical support center (TSC) is 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM), The calculation does not provide a documented validation of why the 60 CFM value is conservative and acceptable. Engineering judgment supports the likely validity of the 60 CFM value. However, if the inleakage value is not valid by a sufficient margin, the TSC would not meet the habitability design basis requirements. This report is submitted based upon a potential loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability in accordance º 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Existing procedures require monitoring habitability of the TSC and taking action in the event radiological conditions preclude occupancy. The on-duty TSC Site Emergency Coordinator, TSC Radiological Control Director, and Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Response Manager have been informed of the condition and the protocol for utilization of alternate facilities. A walkthrough of the process will be held for others holding those positions in a timely manner.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47656
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRETT NICHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRETT NICHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 22:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 22:21 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2012
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS FOUND INOPERABLE
"A condition was discovered on February 9, 2012 that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"During maintenance performed on the main steam line pressure transmitters on both trains, the one-time use only EEQ seals were not replaced rendering the transmitters inoperable. These transmitters initiate safety injection and main steam isolation functions in the event of a main steam line break. Since all transmitters were inoperable this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D)."
The condition existed for about a week.
"Subsequently the required number of transmitters have been repaired and are operable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and was present in the control room during the repair activity."
The licensee also notified the State of Connecticut.
"A condition was discovered on February 9, 2012 that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"During maintenance performed on the main steam line pressure transmitters on both trains, the one-time use only EEQ seals were not replaced rendering the transmitters inoperable. These transmitters initiate safety injection and main steam isolation functions in the event of a main steam line break. Since all transmitters were inoperable this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D)."
The condition existed for about a week.
"Subsequently the required number of transmitters have been repaired and are operable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and was present in the control room during the repair activity."
The licensee also notified the State of Connecticut.