Event Notification Report for February 08, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/07/2012 - 02/08/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47651476524765347645
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47651
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN RIDINGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN RIDINGER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/08/2012
Notification Time: 19:31 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 13:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2012
Notification Time: 19:31 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 13:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SCRAM FUNCTIONALITY MAY BE DEGRADED IN A APPENDIX R FIRE
"During BFNP NFPA 805 transition review, it was determined in the vent of an Appendix-R fire, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function could be rendered not functional. The current Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis states: "The safe shutdown function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is to initiate reactor scram through actuation of the control rod drives. The RPS includes the RPS motor-generator power supplies and associated control and indicating devices, sensors, relays, bypass circuitry, and switches that initiate rapid insertion of control rods (scram) to shutdown the reactor. The RPS utilizes a fail-safe design so that device failures or a loss of power will result in control rod insertion. The scram function will remain available despite any fire-induced spurious signals that may be generated due to the effects of a postulated fire in any fire area. This system is expected to perform its function automatically, however credit is taken only for manual scram. No additional analysis is needed to ensure the availability of reactor scram in the even of a fire.
"Due to lack of physical separation with 120 volt AC lighting circuitry, the RPS system potentially could remain energized due to a postulated hot short circuit during a fire which could potentially prevent the control rods from inserting. Therefore, the fail-safe design of the RPS system would not be maintained. Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.
"This event is reportable as an 8-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER 503304."
"During BFNP NFPA 805 transition review, it was determined in the vent of an Appendix-R fire, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function could be rendered not functional. The current Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis states: "The safe shutdown function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is to initiate reactor scram through actuation of the control rod drives. The RPS includes the RPS motor-generator power supplies and associated control and indicating devices, sensors, relays, bypass circuitry, and switches that initiate rapid insertion of control rods (scram) to shutdown the reactor. The RPS utilizes a fail-safe design so that device failures or a loss of power will result in control rod insertion. The scram function will remain available despite any fire-induced spurious signals that may be generated due to the effects of a postulated fire in any fire area. This system is expected to perform its function automatically, however credit is taken only for manual scram. No additional analysis is needed to ensure the availability of reactor scram in the even of a fire.
"Due to lack of physical separation with 120 volt AC lighting circuitry, the RPS system potentially could remain energized due to a postulated hot short circuit during a fire which could potentially prevent the control rods from inserting. Therefore, the fail-safe design of the RPS system would not be maintained. Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.
"This event is reportable as an 8-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as PER 503304."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47652
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JACK MORRISON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JACK MORRISON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 09:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 10:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 09:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 10:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during random testing. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated and his badge deactivated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during random testing. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated and his badge deactivated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47653
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: LIDIA LITINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: LIDIA LITINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES MEDICAL ATTENTION ONSITE
"On February 8, 2012, at 1630 [CDT] Honeywell employee was admitted to the plant's Dispensary for treatment of a thermal burn to the neck from a steam line. The plant's nurse treated this individual at the Dispensary. Health Physics staff performed whole body survey after treatment and discovered that employee's boots contamination exceeded 8000 dpm/100cm2. The employee was not transported off site."
The source of the contamination was uranium and uranium ore concentrate. Contaminated areas of the plant were surveyed for remediation.
"On February 8, 2012, at 1630 [CDT] Honeywell employee was admitted to the plant's Dispensary for treatment of a thermal burn to the neck from a steam line. The plant's nurse treated this individual at the Dispensary. Health Physics staff performed whole body survey after treatment and discovered that employee's boots contamination exceeded 8000 dpm/100cm2. The employee was not transported off site."
The source of the contamination was uranium and uranium ore concentrate. Contaminated areas of the plant were surveyed for remediation.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 47645
Rep Org: CHASE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP
Licensee: NUCOR STEEL COMPANY
Region: 3
City: CRAWFORDSVILLE State: IN
County:
License #: 13-25975-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS ECHTERLING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: NUCOR STEEL COMPANY
Region: 3
City: CRAWFORDSVILLE State: IN
County:
License #: 13-25975-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS ECHTERLING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/08/2012
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2012
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
SHUTTER ON THICKNESS GAUGE STUCK OPEN
"Chase Environmental Group employees discovered an abnormally high radiation reading on contact with a sealed source gauge at approximately 8:30 a.m. EST. Contact readings were 150 mR/hr with the window of the gauge. The shutter indicator light on the C-Frame indicated that the shutter was closed. Cycling the shutter controls did not change the radiation measurements on contact with the window, however the indicator lights cycled from closed to open to closed again.
"The manufacturer was notified and the manufacturer advised that air pressure should be disconnected to cause the shutter to close. After removing air, no changes to radiation levels were found. Nucor employees are arranging for the manufacturer to come on site to repair the gauge as soon as possible.
"Because the shutter will not close, Nucor has locked out air and electrical power to the device to prevent inadvertent operation, and cordoned off the area to prevent anyone from accessing the gauge. Measurements at one foot from the window of the gauge were less than 2 mR/hr. The area is posted as a Radiation Area. Chase Environmental Group employees made all radiation measurements and were wearing dosimetry. No overexposures are expected.
"The gauge involved is at the Nucor Steel company in Crawfordsville, IN. The Nucor NRC License number is 13-25975-01 and the RSO is Dave Sulc. The gauge is a DMC Am-5A, serial# BS21645. The source is Am-241, activity of 1 Ci, and serial# 1979LQ. This is a C-frame thickness gauge to measure steel in a pickling process in the Cold Mill facility of Nucor Steel. The previous leak test of the gauge was August of 2011.
"Chase Environmental Group (licensed in the state of TN, R-01108-E19) is a contractor to Nucor for consulting, training, and leak testing."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS ECHTERLING TO JOE O'HARA AT 1608 EST ON 02/09/12 * * *
The following was received via e-mail.
"On February 8th, 2012, a sealed source gauge abnormal event was reported, event# 47645. Today, a representative from Advanced Gauging Technologies, LLC arrived at Nucor Steel Crawfordsville and was able to repair the gauge successfully. The shutter and indicator lights are now operating appropriately."
Notified R3DO(Giessner) and FSME EO(Michalak).
"Chase Environmental Group employees discovered an abnormally high radiation reading on contact with a sealed source gauge at approximately 8:30 a.m. EST. Contact readings were 150 mR/hr with the window of the gauge. The shutter indicator light on the C-Frame indicated that the shutter was closed. Cycling the shutter controls did not change the radiation measurements on contact with the window, however the indicator lights cycled from closed to open to closed again.
"The manufacturer was notified and the manufacturer advised that air pressure should be disconnected to cause the shutter to close. After removing air, no changes to radiation levels were found. Nucor employees are arranging for the manufacturer to come on site to repair the gauge as soon as possible.
"Because the shutter will not close, Nucor has locked out air and electrical power to the device to prevent inadvertent operation, and cordoned off the area to prevent anyone from accessing the gauge. Measurements at one foot from the window of the gauge were less than 2 mR/hr. The area is posted as a Radiation Area. Chase Environmental Group employees made all radiation measurements and were wearing dosimetry. No overexposures are expected.
"The gauge involved is at the Nucor Steel company in Crawfordsville, IN. The Nucor NRC License number is 13-25975-01 and the RSO is Dave Sulc. The gauge is a DMC Am-5A, serial# BS21645. The source is Am-241, activity of 1 Ci, and serial# 1979LQ. This is a C-frame thickness gauge to measure steel in a pickling process in the Cold Mill facility of Nucor Steel. The previous leak test of the gauge was August of 2011.
"Chase Environmental Group (licensed in the state of TN, R-01108-E19) is a contractor to Nucor for consulting, training, and leak testing."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS ECHTERLING TO JOE O'HARA AT 1608 EST ON 02/09/12 * * *
The following was received via e-mail.
"On February 8th, 2012, a sealed source gauge abnormal event was reported, event# 47645. Today, a representative from Advanced Gauging Technologies, LLC arrived at Nucor Steel Crawfordsville and was able to repair the gauge successfully. The shutter and indicator lights are now operating appropriately."
Notified R3DO(Giessner) and FSME EO(Michalak).