Event Notification Report for February 06, 2012

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO UNPERMITTED RELEASE

"The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) was notified of a release of 27 gallons from the condensate system. The release contained the following chemicals:

1) 11.2 ppm of methoxy propylamine (MPA);
2) 8.1ppm of ammonia;
3) 11.2 ppb of hydrazine;
4) 1.50 E-5 microCi/mL (15,000 pCi/L) of tritium.

"The condensate was released from parts Warehouse #1 heating steam system overflow vent. Condensate return pumps failed to operate causing 27 gallons of condensate to backup and overflow onto the ground. A catch basin has been installed and the steam inlet valve has been closed preventing the addition of steam into the system.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. "

The licensee also notified the Prairie Island Dakota Indian Community.

PACKAGE SURFACE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF REPORTING LIMITS

"Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d), [The Department of Veterans Affairs is] reporting receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits.

"The package was received today (February 6, 2012) at around 12:15 PM ET by VA Medical Center, West Palm Beach, Florida. The VA Medical Center, West Palm Beach, Florida, holds permit number 09-25328-01 under the master materials license. A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 962 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2.

"The package contained Technetium-99m labeled radiopharmaceuticals and was shipped from Cardinal Health in Jupiter, Florida.

"The vendor/shipper serves as the final delivery carrier.

"The VA facility Radiation Safety Officer immediately notified the vendor about the contaminated package at about 12:30 PM ET. As corrective action, the package was set aside in a restricted area at the VA Medical Center to provide time for decay. The permittee does not plan to use the dosage."

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE PLUG INSULATORS

The following report was received via fax:

"This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface.

"The affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified today.

Ralph a. Hiller; PO: NUC7505, Item 1, 15 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 19JAN2012.
Bruce Power, PO: 00168187, Item 1, 20 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [12-14], Lot BA59961) supplied 13DEC2011.
Dominion - Surry, PO: 45886290, Item 1, 22 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011.
Dominion - Surry, PO: 45897749, Item 2, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA67711) supplied 01FEB2012.
Ringhals AB, PO: 621728-053, Item 10, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011.
Ringhals, PO: 620625-066, Item 10, 300 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lots BA59961/BA67711) supplied 30JAN2012.
Ringhals, PO: 620996-066, Item 50, 1 Kit (P/N: GB-1A [16-18], Lot BA59961) supplied 29NOV2011.
OKG, PO: 4113847, Item 4, 86 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lot BA59961) supplied 30NOV2011.

"It is requested that all affected parts be returned for replacement to QualTech NP; 330 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customers can contact Cindy Tidwell at (256) 895-7250 ext. 229 for freight collect shipping instructions.

"Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting:"

Tony Gill
Quality Assurance Supervisor
QualTech NP, Huntsville
A business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company
Office 256-722-8500 ext. 1
Cell 256-426-4558
tgill@curtisswright.com

* * * UPDATE FROM TONY GILL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 02/03/2013 AT 17:55 EST* * *

"This letter provides for the formal closeout of notification 10CFR21-2012-01. The initial notification was made on February 06, 2012. All corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and all affected parts listed on the initial notification have been returned by our customers and replacement items supplied. All affected parts in inventory at our facility were removed and discarded.

"The initial corrective action was to retrieve all affected parts both in our inventory and those provided to our customers as safety-related. As stated above, all affected parts have been returned and/or retrieved from inventory and discarded.

"There were four primary root causes identified that allowed the defective items to be manufactured and accepted. The causes are listed below:

1. Mold sections/mold inserts for the two different size plug insulators (regular and oversized) are used in the same mold assembly. Not all required mold parts were removed when changing from the manufacture of oversized to regular boots causing the defective parts to be manufactured.

2. Vendor did not verify the affected dimension prior to shipment of the parts to QualTech.

3. The inspection drawing in the QualTech dedication guidelines was not clear as to the required dimension to be verified.

4. The QualTech Inspector incorrectly interpreted the inspection drawing and verified the wrong dimension thus accepting the defective parts.

"The corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and include the following:

1. An additional mold was purchased from our supplier to prevent mixing of inserts. Now there are no mold parts utilized in the manufacture of different sized plug insulators (regular vs. oversized). This issue was one of the primary causes of the defect.

2. Notification was made to our supplier and corrective actions implemented at their facility.

3. The QualTech inspection drawing in the affected dedication guidelines was revised to better define the required dimension.

4. The error was discussed with the QualTech Inspector to ensure understanding of the critical dimension.

"Based on the above information and corrective actions this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this information further please contact the undersigned at 256-722-8500 ext. 131 (office), 256-426-4558 (cell), or tgill@curtisswright.com.

Tony Gill
Quality Assurance Manager
QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations
a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company

Notified R2DO (Haig) and the Part 21 Group via email.

MANUAL RPS ACTUATION DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"Unit 2 had been connected to the grid at 1431 CST today following a recent forced outage and was in the process of power ascension in accordance with plant procedures. At approximately 25% reactor power (approximately 240 MWe), the operators were transferring main feed flow to the steam generator lower nozzle through the feedwater isolation valves, (i.e. 2FW009A, B, C, D).

"2FW009C was the first valve to be opened due to previously experienced problems with this valve being stuck in the seat. No issues were experienced during the opening of 2FW009C. Upon opening of 2FW009C, the 2C steam generator level began to rise as expected. The operators throttled back feedwater flow to control steam generator level. However, the 2C steam generator level increased to the High-High level setpoint of 80.8% (p-14). Since the reactor was below 30% (P-8), no automatic reactor trip signal was generated. However, the turbine automatically tripped, a feedwater isolation signal was initiated, and 2C Main Feedwater pump trip occurred as designed. With no main feedwater flow available, the operators manually tripped the reactor and entry into procedure 2BEP 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Unit 2 was entered. The operators then manually started the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps to supply water to the steam generators prior to reaching the Low-Low steam generator level setpoint of 36.3%.

"Transition from 2BEP 0 to 2BEP ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, was completed and the emergency procedures were exited. Unit 2 is being maintained in a stable condition in Mode 3."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.