Event Notification Report for February 03, 2012

LOSS OF PLANT COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

"Calvert Cliffs will be implementing scheduled maintenance to the plant data network to install a data diode to meet the new cyber security requirements listed in 10 CFR 5.71. This work will require the TSC, OSC and subsequently the EOF to lose normal data flow from the plant data network for a period of approximately 6 to 8 hours. ERDS will also be unavailable during this maintenance. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency response Facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On February 3, 2012, at 1035 hours [CST], the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time.

"The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The LCO places the plant in a 30-day action statement.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

VOLUNTARY REPORT - DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN 4.16kV BUS UNDER-VOLTAGE SCHEME

"On January 30, 2012, a design vulnerability was discovered at Byron and Braidwood stations in the Engineered Safety Feature 4.16kV bus under-voltage protection scheme for Byron Station Units 1 and 2. Specifically a voltage unbalance created by an open circuit of either the A or C phase from the offsite grid to the System Auxiliary Transformers (SAT) is not designed to actuate the protective relays on the 4.16kV safety bus that provides isolation from the offsite grid and the automatic start and loading of the emergency onsite diesel generators.

"Two under-voltage relays are provided on each 4.16kV safety bus, which are combined in a two out of two logic to generate a loss of power signal. The relays are sensing voltage between two phases (i.e., A&B and B&C). An open circuit condition on the C phase or the A phase would not satisfy the two out of two logic. This condition results in both 4.16kV safety buses remaining energized with a bus undervoltage situation and results in equipment protective devices actuating from over-current conditions.

"This configuration is a non-conforming condition in that the design of the under-voltage relays and logic was intended to identify degraded grid conditions, not loss of a single phase. With an open circuit on the A or C phase from the grid to the SATs, during normal operations, operators have to diagnose the condition and manually isolate safety buses from offsite power which would automatically start and load the emergency diesel generators. During a design basis event concurrent with an open circuit on A or C phase from the grid to the SATs, analysis performed to date indicates that starting of the ECCS loads would have caused the bus voltage to decrease sufficiently to actuate the under-voltage protective relays and restore cooling with emergency onsite power without challenging fuel design limits.

"The 4.16kV safety bus under-voltage protection scheme at Byron and Braidwood is believed to be a typical industry design. This design issue is being evaluated at the other Exelon stations. The results of this evaluation will be shared with the NRC. Therefore, this condition is being reported as a voluntary notification due to its potential generic industry applicability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

VOLUNTARY REPORT - DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN 4.16kV BUS UNDER-VOLTAGE SCHEME

"On January 30, 2012, a design vulnerability was discovered at Byron and Braidwood stations in the Engineered Safety Feature 4.16kV bus under-voltage protection scheme for Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2. Specifically a voltage unbalance created by an open circuit of either the A or C phase from the offsite grid to the System Auxiliary Transformers (SAT) is not designed to actuate the protective relays on the 4.16kV safety bus that provides isolation from the offsite grid and the automatic start and loading of the emergency onsite diesel generators.

"Two under-voltage relays are provided on each 4.16kV safety bus, which are combined in a two out of two logic to generate a loss of power signal. The relays are sensing voltage between two phases (i.e., A&B and B&C). An open circuit condition on the C phase or the A phase would not satisfy the two out of two logic. This condition results in both 4.16kV safety buses remaining energized with a bus undervoltage situation and results in equipment protective devices actuating from over-current conditions.

"This configuration is a non-conforming condition in that the design of the under-voltage relays and logic was intended to identify degraded grid conditions, not loss of a single phase. With an open circuit on the A or C phase from the grid to the SATs, during normal operations, operators have to diagnose the condition and manually isolate safety buses from offsite power which would automatically start and load the emergency diesel generators. During a design basis event concurrent with an open circuit on A or C phase from the grid to the SATs, analysis performed to date indicates that starting of the ECCS loads would have caused the bus voltage to decrease sufficiently to actuate the under-voltage protective relays and restore cooling with emergency onsite power without challenging fuel design limits.

"The 4.16kV safety bus under-voltage protection scheme at Byron and Braidwood is believed to be a typical industry design. This design issue is being evaluated at the other Exelon stations. The results of this evaluation will be shared with the NRC. Therefore, this condition is being reported as a voluntary notification due to its potential generic industry applicability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.