Event Notification Report for December 08, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/07/2011 - 12/08/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47512
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 00:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2012
Notification Time: 00:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE COMMON CONTROL ROOM
"At 1755 on 12/8/11, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the common Control Room for both Units. A high energy line break (HELB) barrier issue was discovered while performing a fire barrier surveillance and the condition is believed to have existed from initial plant construction. A HELB barrier was found to have a significant breach in it that could allow steam from a HELB in the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown system to potentially impact equipment in the Control Room. The Control Room is not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the Control Room. At 1803 on 12/8/11, Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown was secured to eliminate the potential for a HELB in the affected area which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. Therefore, an 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the Control Room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown in service. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION AT 0059 EST ON 2/7/12 FROM KENT MILLS TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Engineering performed an evaluation to address the impact of the degraded condition on the barrier's design functions. The evaluation concluded that the barrier remained capable of performing its design function with the degraded seal present. Therefore, this condition does not represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified.
"At 1755 on 12/8/11, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the common Control Room for both Units. A high energy line break (HELB) barrier issue was discovered while performing a fire barrier surveillance and the condition is believed to have existed from initial plant construction. A HELB barrier was found to have a significant breach in it that could allow steam from a HELB in the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown system to potentially impact equipment in the Control Room. The Control Room is not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the Control Room. At 1803 on 12/8/11, Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown was secured to eliminate the potential for a HELB in the affected area which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. Therefore, an 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the Control Room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown in service. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION AT 0059 EST ON 2/7/12 FROM KENT MILLS TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Engineering performed an evaluation to address the impact of the degraded condition on the barrier's design functions. The evaluation concluded that the barrier remained capable of performing its design function with the degraded seal present. Therefore, this condition does not represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47518
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: RENOWN SOUTH MEADOWS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 16-12-0566-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: RENOWN SOUTH MEADOWS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 16-12-0566-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/12/2011
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2011
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- LINEN TRANSPORT TRUCK DETAINED AFTER SETTING OFF RADIATION ALARM
The following information was provided via email:
"On 12/8/11 at 1430 PST, the Nevada Radiation Control Program (NRCP) received a call from the Alternate Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) for Renown South Meadows Medical Center, that a truck carrying linen had been detained by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) at the Truckee inspection station after setting off a radiation alarm. The ARSO explained that the truck was not carrying any materials from the Nuclear Medicine Department or decay room and she knew of no reason that it would be radioactive. She provided the name and number for the CHP at Truckee.
"The NRCP contacted the CHP and were told that they had surveyed the truck with a Ludlum meter and measured .400 millirem per hour (or 400 microR/hour) outside the trailer. The CHP said that their protocols dictate that anything above three times background is treated as a hazmat incident and must have proper packaging and manifest. They had not run an identification spectrum on the truck. They had no capability to unload a trailer on site for further investigation. They were holding the vehicle pending instructions from their departmental radiation specialist and agreed to call [the NRCP] when they had a decision.
"The Aramark (linen service) representative confirmed that the vehicle in question was a tractor trailer and was carrying only linen from Renown.
"At approximately 1545 PST, the CHP called and indicated that they had released the trailer with orders to return to Renown Medical Center. They were unable to identify the radioisotope present and the dose rate reading was now .100 millirem per hour (100 micro R/hr).
"The NRCP Incident Response Supervisor arrived at Renown Medical center at approximately 1645 PST, shortly after the truck, and met with Renown staff. After conducting a radiation survey on the outside of the truck, he determined the general location of the high radiation and identified Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) as a suspected isotope. Linens are transported in large plastic bins, which were removed with a pallet jack, by the staff at Renown. When the radioactive bin was identified, it was segregated, a thorough survey was done and the radioisotope was positively identified as Tc-99m. The bin was placed in Renown's decay room where it will remain for 2 to10 days until the Tc-99m decays.
"The most likely cause of this contamination was that a recently treated patient soiled the sheets and the possibility of radioactive contamination was not recognized by floor staff. Linens are not routinely screened for radiation. Aramark recently began transporting linens to Sacramento, rather than processing locally, so they are now subject to inspection upon entering California. The RCP will assist Renown with some procedure changes that will minimize the chances of this happening in the future.
"Dose rate readings were one order of magnitude lower than what CHP reported. It is unknown why CHP was unable to obtain an accurate identification of the isotope.
"Radiation readings: RadEye - Background 6 uR/hr; at bin 48 uR/hr; Ortec MicroDetective - Background 65 counts per second; at bin 1800 counts per second; Renown 451P Ion Chamber - Background 6 uR/hr; at bin 52 uR/hr; Ludlum 14c with pancake G-M detector - at bin 1800 counts per minute."
Nevada Report Number: NV110024
The following information was provided via email:
"On 12/8/11 at 1430 PST, the Nevada Radiation Control Program (NRCP) received a call from the Alternate Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) for Renown South Meadows Medical Center, that a truck carrying linen had been detained by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) at the Truckee inspection station after setting off a radiation alarm. The ARSO explained that the truck was not carrying any materials from the Nuclear Medicine Department or decay room and she knew of no reason that it would be radioactive. She provided the name and number for the CHP at Truckee.
"The NRCP contacted the CHP and were told that they had surveyed the truck with a Ludlum meter and measured .400 millirem per hour (or 400 microR/hour) outside the trailer. The CHP said that their protocols dictate that anything above three times background is treated as a hazmat incident and must have proper packaging and manifest. They had not run an identification spectrum on the truck. They had no capability to unload a trailer on site for further investigation. They were holding the vehicle pending instructions from their departmental radiation specialist and agreed to call [the NRCP] when they had a decision.
"The Aramark (linen service) representative confirmed that the vehicle in question was a tractor trailer and was carrying only linen from Renown.
"At approximately 1545 PST, the CHP called and indicated that they had released the trailer with orders to return to Renown Medical Center. They were unable to identify the radioisotope present and the dose rate reading was now .100 millirem per hour (100 micro R/hr).
"The NRCP Incident Response Supervisor arrived at Renown Medical center at approximately 1645 PST, shortly after the truck, and met with Renown staff. After conducting a radiation survey on the outside of the truck, he determined the general location of the high radiation and identified Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) as a suspected isotope. Linens are transported in large plastic bins, which were removed with a pallet jack, by the staff at Renown. When the radioactive bin was identified, it was segregated, a thorough survey was done and the radioisotope was positively identified as Tc-99m. The bin was placed in Renown's decay room where it will remain for 2 to10 days until the Tc-99m decays.
"The most likely cause of this contamination was that a recently treated patient soiled the sheets and the possibility of radioactive contamination was not recognized by floor staff. Linens are not routinely screened for radiation. Aramark recently began transporting linens to Sacramento, rather than processing locally, so they are now subject to inspection upon entering California. The RCP will assist Renown with some procedure changes that will minimize the chances of this happening in the future.
"Dose rate readings were one order of magnitude lower than what CHP reported. It is unknown why CHP was unable to obtain an accurate identification of the isotope.
"Radiation readings: RadEye - Background 6 uR/hr; at bin 48 uR/hr; Ortec MicroDetective - Background 65 counts per second; at bin 1800 counts per second; Renown 451P Ion Chamber - Background 6 uR/hr; at bin 52 uR/hr; Ludlum 14c with pancake G-M detector - at bin 1800 counts per minute."
Nevada Report Number: NV110024
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47510
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ED TIEDENMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ED TIEDENMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/08/2011
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2011
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - NON FUSED DC BUS AMMETERS COULD SHORT AND CAUSE A FIRE
"During Operating Experience (OPEX) review of Browns Ferry Fire Protection ENS 47374, 'Deficiency Identified in Transition to Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection,' a similar condition was identified at Clinton Power Station.
"During site review, it was determined that original plant wiring design for the station battery ammeter contains a 'shunt' in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses, and if one of these ammeter wires shorts to ground at the same time another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery also shorts to ground, a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable could occur. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that a fire in the raceway system or MCR could occur wherever the cable is routed.
"This design condition exists in Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' Compensatory fire watch measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"During Operating Experience (OPEX) review of Browns Ferry Fire Protection ENS 47374, 'Deficiency Identified in Transition to Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection,' a similar condition was identified at Clinton Power Station.
"During site review, it was determined that original plant wiring design for the station battery ammeter contains a 'shunt' in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses, and if one of these ammeter wires shorts to ground at the same time another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery also shorts to ground, a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable could occur. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that a fire in the raceway system or MCR could occur wherever the cable is routed.
"This design condition exists in Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' Compensatory fire watch measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."