Event Notification Report for December 07, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/06/2011 - 12/07/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47509
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 14:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2011
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 14:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the Unit 1 VR DP controller was left in manual per the troubleshooting steps. It was noted at 1458 CST, on 12/7/11, that building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 required value of -0.25" H20. This rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Reactor building DP was returned to within the TS requirements within 14 minutes, and following system walkdowns, secondary containment was declared operable at 1615 [CST, on] 12/7/11. Troubleshooting will continue with other excursions above -0.25" H2O possible until repairs are complete (anticipated being complete week of 12/12/11)."
This condition requires the licensee to comply with technical specifications values within 4 hours or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. DRAPER TO P. SNYDER ON 12/22/11 AT 1440 EST * * *
"On December 7, 2011, following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 value of -0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The secondary containment was declared inoperable and determined to be a loss of safety function. During the investigation it was determined that the event occurred due to a failure in the non-safety reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop. The safety related function of the secondary containment and the non-safely reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop are completely independent from one another. It is recognized that reactor building DP may exceed the TS SR [Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 value due to non-safety related component failures such as system fan trips, pressure controller malfunctions, rapid air temperature changes due to blast heater trips, or station heat recovery coil issues. A failure of a non-safety component does not result in a loss of safety function. The safely function of the secondary containment is maintained by adequate leak tightness and the operable ventilation equipment required to maintain the negative pressure requirements of TS SR 3.6.4.1.1. The safety related Stand-By Gas Treatment (SGT) ventilation system performs the negative pressure safety function. The secondary containment isolation safety function, isolation dampers and SGT systems remained operable throughout the event. Therefore this event did not constitute a loss of safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the Unit 1 VR DP controller was left in manual per the troubleshooting steps. It was noted at 1458 CST, on 12/7/11, that building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 required value of -0.25" H20. This rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Reactor building DP was returned to within the TS requirements within 14 minutes, and following system walkdowns, secondary containment was declared operable at 1615 [CST, on] 12/7/11. Troubleshooting will continue with other excursions above -0.25" H2O possible until repairs are complete (anticipated being complete week of 12/12/11)."
This condition requires the licensee to comply with technical specifications values within 4 hours or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. DRAPER TO P. SNYDER ON 12/22/11 AT 1440 EST * * *
"On December 7, 2011, following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 value of -0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The secondary containment was declared inoperable and determined to be a loss of safety function. During the investigation it was determined that the event occurred due to a failure in the non-safety reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop. The safety related function of the secondary containment and the non-safely reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop are completely independent from one another. It is recognized that reactor building DP may exceed the TS SR [Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 value due to non-safety related component failures such as system fan trips, pressure controller malfunctions, rapid air temperature changes due to blast heater trips, or station heat recovery coil issues. A failure of a non-safety component does not result in a loss of safety function. The safely function of the secondary containment is maintained by adequate leak tightness and the operable ventilation equipment required to maintain the negative pressure requirements of TS SR 3.6.4.1.1. The safety related Stand-By Gas Treatment (SGT) ventilation system performs the negative pressure safety function. The secondary containment isolation safety function, isolation dampers and SGT systems remained operable throughout the event. Therefore this event did not constitute a loss of safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47506
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLEGHENY LUDLUM STEEL PLANT; BAGDAD PLANT
Region: 1
City: LEECHBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0114
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: ALLEGHENY LUDLUM STEEL PLANT; BAGDAD PLANT
Region: 1
City: LEECHBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0114
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - SHUTTER FAILURE
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"On December 6, 2011, the Department's Southwest Regional Office [Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (PBRP)] received notification via email about an event that took place on December 2, 2011. It is reportable within 24 hours under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"A radiological consultant was completing the six month leak testing and shutter checks of thickness gauges. During the testing, it was discovered that the pneumatic system for this gauge did not completely close the shutter. The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: DMC
Model: AM-5A
Serial #: 0404LV
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi
"CAUSE OF EVENT: Failure of the pneumatic system to completely close the shutter.
"ACTIONS: Maintenance personnel were able to drain the air line of accumulated moisture and close the shutter later that day. The Bagdad facility shall investigate this matter and determine what is necessary to prevent recurrence. The Department [PBRP] plans to conduct a reactive inspection."
Event Report ID No: PA11039
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"On December 6, 2011, the Department's Southwest Regional Office [Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (PBRP)] received notification via email about an event that took place on December 2, 2011. It is reportable within 24 hours under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"A radiological consultant was completing the six month leak testing and shutter checks of thickness gauges. During the testing, it was discovered that the pneumatic system for this gauge did not completely close the shutter. The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: DMC
Model: AM-5A
Serial #: 0404LV
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi
"CAUSE OF EVENT: Failure of the pneumatic system to completely close the shutter.
"ACTIONS: Maintenance personnel were able to drain the air line of accumulated moisture and close the shutter later that day. The Bagdad facility shall investigate this matter and determine what is necessary to prevent recurrence. The Department [PBRP] plans to conduct a reactive inspection."
Event Report ID No: PA11039