Event Notification Report for December 05, 2011

DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION - UNUSUAL EVENT

"At approximately 0847 EST, Unit 1 Letdown Pressure Control Valve, 1-CH-PCV-1145, began acting erratically which resulted in the Letdown Relief Valve, 1-CH-RV-1203, lifting and flowing to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.

"At 0848 EST, the relief valve reseated and the leakage stopped. Approximately 42 gpm leakage resulted from the relief valve lifting.

"This identified flow rate exceeded the threshold for entry into a Notice of Unusual Event under EAL tab SU6.1 due to identified leakage greater than 25 gpm."

The licensee is troubleshooting the Letdown Pressure Control Valve. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify State and local agencies.

PART 21 INVOLVING DEFECTIVE SPRING CLIPS USED AS SEISMIC RESTRAINTS ON TWO SCIENTIFIC MODULES

The following information was received via fax:

"The purpose of this letter is to notify you of a defect in spring clips that form part of the seismic restraint for Scientech CON2000-701 and RTD2100-7403 modules. Details of the defect are provided below and in the attached Technical Bulletin Volume 38, CON2000 and RTD2100 Spring Clips, dated December 2011.

"The written report shall include, but need not be limited to, the following information, to the extent known:

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Michael Weinstein
Director of Quality Operations
Scientech, a business of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
44 Shelter Rock Road
Danbury, CT 06810

Scott Robuck
General Manager
Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
200 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

PID controller, manufactured by Scientech, Model CON2000-701, Part No. NUS-A056PA
RTD converter, manufactured by Scientech, Model RTD2100-7403, Part No. NUS-A121PA

(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow control Corporation
200 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

The CON2000-701 is replacement for the obsolete Bailey Meter Company 701 PID controller. It is a panel mounted module that is retained in the panel during seismic events by a spring clip on the top of the modules (part number NUS-P089DB-13) that engages a detent in the panel. The module can be pulled out about one inch out of the rack before the spring clip prevents further movement; full removal requires pressure on the spring clip to disengage the detent.

The module was seismically tested as documented in Qualification Report NUS-A056QA Rev 2. During the CON2000 test, a minor anomaly occurred and was accepted by Scientech as not affecting the qualification results. Recently a client questioned Scientech's acceptance of the anomaly and requested a retest. Scientech agreed to retest the module; the RRS used is attached. During the retest, the spring clip failed to adequately restrain the module.

The balance of the replacements for the Bailey 7000 series - the NUSI 2000 series - are cabinet mounted modules. When they are reconfigured for shelf or panel mounting they become part of the NUSI 2100 series, and the seismically qualified units use the same spring clip. The RTD2100-7403 is the only safety related panel mounted module sold as of December 2011 with the deficient spring clip.

Investigation revealed that the original clip was made of 0.025" thick spring steel. After the seismic qualification test was performed, Revision 4 to NUS-F089DB-13 altered the characteristics of the retaining clip, reducing the force required to disengage the detent. The metal was changed to SS301 stainless steel and the thickness reduced to 0.015" thick. Scientech's design change process required an evaluation of the impact of the change; the evaluation was complet4ed, but did not address the impact on seismic qualification adequately.

These controllers could be mounted in the in the main control room control panels. The failure of the seismic clip could result in the controllers coming out of the panels, impacting other safety related equipment or personnel, and failing to properly control their actuated devices during a seismic event.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

Submitted for evaluation 11/30/11; evaluation completed 12/2/11.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

PLANT CON2000-701 RTD2100-7403

Clinton 4 0
Davis Besse 8 0
Monticello 2 0
Perry 4 0
Susquehanna 20 7

TOTALS 38 7

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

1. All five plants were notified and provided with a technical bulletin addressing the problem and the proposed solution.
2. Scientech is expedition procurement of the correct spring clips and will supply them to all affected plants. They can be readily changed out on site.
3. Scientech had previously strengthened its design review process to specifically remind reviewers to evaluate the impact on and need for additional qualifications testing.
4. Scientech will review this event with all engineering staff and emphasize the need for correct reviews.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

See attached Technical Bulletin. (provided separately)

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

Not applicable.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Robert Queenan, Operations Manager, Scientech/NUS Instruments, at (208) 524-9311."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING THORIUM-229 SOURCE

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"UCLA notified RHB on December 5, 2011 that they discovered a single missing Thorium-229 source. Its activity is approximately 4.73 microcuries and is contained in a flame sealed ampoule. The responsible researcher claims that they transferred the source to EH&S for storage, but a search of EH&S records showed it was returned to the researcher in June 2011. A continued search of the Principal Investigator's lab and EH&S storage locations is ongoing.

"10 CFR 20 Appendix C for Th-229 = 0.001 uCi, and 10CFR 20. 2201(a) requires reporting losses that exceed 1000 times the Appendix C level. Activity of > 1 microcuries is a reportable quantity.

"No serial number was reported to RHB [Radiologic Health Branch]. Potential exposure to individuals is expected to be extremely low.

"This investigation is on-going."

CA 5010 Number: 120511

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

LIMITORQUE PART 21 NOTIFICATION INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECTIVE PART IN SMB-0 HEAVY SPRING PACK

The following information was received via fax:

Background: During in-house production testing of Limitorque SMB-0 actuators, test lab personnel
reported an inability to maintain consistent torque output at the various torque switch settings. Investigation revealed that the actuator torque spring pack assembly had lost preload during the test. Component inspection determined that the loss of preload was due to disc springs that had experienced an excessive permanent relaxation of free height during actuator testing.

Components Affected: Only SMB/SB/SBD-0 actuators with heavy spring pack assemblies shipped between September 15, 2011 and November 7, 2011 could possibly be affected. No parts orders for SMB/SB/SBD-0 replacement heavy spring packs were built in this time period.

Potential Impact on Safety Related Operation: A significant loss of preload on the actuator torque spring pack assembly could result in the actuator producing insufficient output torque thereby affecting proper valve function.

Cause and Corrective Action: Communications with the spring manufacturer revealed that Limitorque was shipped a single lot of springs that were not in accordance with our parts requirements. These springs were incorrectly shipped to Limitorque due to a manufacturer backorder on our normally requested product. Vendor controls have been implemented to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. Limitorque has identified the problem springs and purged them from inventory.

On November 14, 2011 Limitorque notified all affected customers who received the actuators which shipped during the time period identified above. The serial numbers and locations of the potentially affected actuators are provided in the table below. Limitorque has requested that the actuator spring packs be returned for detailed inspection and replacement if needed.

After inspection of the spring pack assembly of all actuators listed below, Flowserve-Limitorque will issue a follow-up to this interim report on or before February 3, 2012.

Affected Customers/Locations:

Customer - Velan Valve Corp.
Location of Actuator - Velan Valve, Montreal
Limitorque Order No. 110309.001
Quantity - 6
Actuator Serial # 909476-909481

Customer - Velan Valve Corp.
Location of Actuator - Velan Valve, Montreal
Limitorque Order No. 115055.001
Quantity - 1
Actuator Serial # 926332

Customer - Weir Valve Corp.
Location of Actuator - Weir Valve, Ipswich, MA
Limitorque Order No. 106839.008
Quantity - 4
Actuator Serial # 911621-911624

Customer - Weir Valve Corp.
Location of Actuator - Weir Valve, Ipswich, MA
Limitorque Order No. 106839.009
Quantity - 4
Actuator Serial # 911625-911628

Customer - Weir Valve Corp.
Location of Actuator - Weir Valve, Ipswich, MA
Limitorque Order No. 106930.012
Quantity - 4
Actuator Serial # 912769-912772

Customer - Areva NP
Location of Actuator - Exelon, Braidwood NGS
Limitorque Order No. 112724.001
Quantity - 1
Actuator Serial # 917953

* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF MCCONKEY TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/27/12 AT 1714 EDT * * *

The following update was received via fax:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21, Flowserve Corp is providing notification of the identification of a defect. This information was originally reported to the NRC Operations Center on 12/6/2011 (Event # 47505). This document is a follow-up to the interim Part 21 report.

"Nineteen of the twenty actuators identified in the interim report as potentially suspect have been returned to Limitorque for inspection of the spring pack. All nineteen of these actuators were returned from two different valve manufacturer's facilities and bad not been shipped to any utilities for installation. Six of the actuators returned from Velan Valve Corporation were found to contain defective springs. The spring packs were replaced and the actuators were returned to Velan Valve. The actuators returned from Weir Valve Corporation did not contain defective springs.

"The remaining actuator (serial number 917953) identified in the interim report which has not been returned to Limitorque is at Exelon Braidwood NGS. Exelon reported the following with regards to this actuator. The actuator is installed on a 36" quarter-turn MOV that is normally open and de-energized. This MOV has no safety related function to close. The MOV is position limit controlled and the valve functioned properly during operational testing after installation. Exelon Braidwood NGS is aware of the potential spring defect and plans to change the spring pack on this MOV at the first available maintenance cycle.

"Flowserve's investigation of this issue concluded that this was an isolated incident and that all defective components have been identified."

Notified R3DO (Valos) and Part 21 Group (e-mail).

UNAVAILABILITY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) FOR SCHEDULED UPGRADE

"At approximately 0945 hours on December 5, 2011, the Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 & 2 (BVPS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) electronic data link to the NRC will be taken out of service to implement planned system upgrades which include the improvements requested by Regulatory Information Summary 2009-13. The duration of the upgrade work is expected to be approximately 5 days.

"During the upgrade, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data link to the NRC will not be available ERDS parameters will be available to be monitored by control board indications or plant computer systems. An emergency plan procedure has instructions for providing data to the NRC, if needed, when ERDS is out of service.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. An update will be provided when the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service."

[The above report was originally logged by the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer at approximately 0935 on December 5, 2011 and was converted to an event report upon receipt of the updated information below]

* * * UPDATE FROM SHARBAUGH TO HUFFMAN ON 12/9/11 AT 0948 EST * * *

"Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) upgrade has been completed and the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident has been notified."

R1DO (Cahill) notified. NRC ERDS Program Manager (Alemu) and ERDS Help Desk informed via e-mail.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

"Per the general license requirements stipulated in 10 CFR 31.5 (5), this letter is being sent to report a damaged Forever Lite model SLXTU1GB20 self-illuminating exit sign and the loss of one of its elements. The exit sign is owned by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) and is possessed under a general license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The general license requires the NRC to be notified of any damaged devices. A verbal notification was made to MDE [Maryland Department of the Environment] in a phone call on December 6, 2001 at 1:45 PM.

"It has been determined that the damaged sign was removed from its mounted location during the demolition phase of a renovation project in Building 13 that started in May 2011. However, it along with three other signs from that project were not brought to JHU/APL's Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Building 10A) until Friday, December 2, 2011. The damaged sign was identified Monday, December 5, 2011 at 2:15 PM. It appears that the sign was damaged during removal from its mounted location and the missing element, along with the outer frame, was disposed of in the construction debris earlier this summer.

"The total estimated tritium activity contained within the missing element is approximately 640 mCi of which about 90% (576 mCi) may be in the form of tritium gas and about 10% (64 mCi) may be in the form of tritiated water vapor. Contamination monitoring did not reveal any tritium contamination. This could be an indication that the tube did not break during the removal of the sign nor when it was caught up in the construction debris. Bioassay sampling of the potentially exposed personnel is unfortunately not possible due to the amount of time that has transpired since the removal of the sign (the most likely time when an exposure could have occurred). However, the possibility of an exposure is extremely unlikely since there is no indication of a broken element. In addition, the nature of a construction work environment and the use of personal protective equipment (work gloves, eyewear, ...) also minimizes the possibility of inhalation, ingestion and puncture wounds which are potential tritium exposure pathways from a broken element.

"The damaged sign has been doubly sealed in plastic bags and is stored in JHU/APL's Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site awaiting proper disposal.

"JHU/APL improved its control and oversight of the self-illuminating exit sign after the last damaged sign that was found in June 2007. Based on the current investigation, the following improvements will be made to improve JHU/APL control and accountability of the generally licensed exit signs:
--Annual refresher training with revised self-illuminating exit sign handling and control procedures will be provided to all JHU/APL Technical Service Department (TSD) personnel. This will help ensure a greater awareness, particularly among managers and supervisors, of the handling and control requirements. Training up to this point has been provided to maintenance personnel, electricians and others on an as needed basis.
--The training will place particular emphasis on the care required to remove these signs and the need to bring them to JHU/APL's Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site in a timely manner.
--For better documentation of which signs are being turned in for disposal, a log will be maintained that documents such things as make, model serial number, former mount location (Bldg, Floor ...), person disposing the sign, date disposed, and the general condition of the sign.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source