Event Notification Report for December 01, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/30/2011 - 12/01/2011
Part 21
Event Number: 47635
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/03/2012
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2012
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP by Email
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP by Email
PART 21 REPORT - FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR HIGH PRESSURE FUEL HOSE
Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) returned one high pressure fuel hose to Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) because CNS had found foreign material within the hose during receipt inspection. This fuel hose was one of four fuel hoses that had been supplied to CNS by ESI in October 2011. ESI performed an evaluation and found very small pieces of the elastomer tube internal to the hose. Apparently these pieces were introduced during assembly of the end fittings onto the hose during fabrication of the hose assembly.
When installed, this fuel hose would be located after the engine fuel filter and before the fuel injection pumps. Foreign material within this hose could migrate to the fuel injection pumps. The entrance of foreign material could impact operability of one or more fuel injection pumps and therefore affect fuel delivery to one or more engine cylinders. This could impact the load carrying capability of the diesel engine or possibly cause complete engine shutdown. Either scenario has the potential to prevent the emergency diesel generator from performing its safety related function.
These hoses were supplied only to CNS.
Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) returned one high pressure fuel hose to Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) because CNS had found foreign material within the hose during receipt inspection. This fuel hose was one of four fuel hoses that had been supplied to CNS by ESI in October 2011. ESI performed an evaluation and found very small pieces of the elastomer tube internal to the hose. Apparently these pieces were introduced during assembly of the end fittings onto the hose during fabrication of the hose assembly.
When installed, this fuel hose would be located after the engine fuel filter and before the fuel injection pumps. Foreign material within this hose could migrate to the fuel injection pumps. The entrance of foreign material could impact operability of one or more fuel injection pumps and therefore affect fuel delivery to one or more engine cylinders. This could impact the load carrying capability of the diesel engine or possibly cause complete engine shutdown. Either scenario has the potential to prevent the emergency diesel generator from performing its safety related function.
These hoses were supplied only to CNS.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47493
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE ODELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE ODELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/01/2011
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2011
Event Time: 13:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2011
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2011
Event Time: 13:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 5 | Startup | 5 | Startup |
CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
"At 1344 hours (EST) on December 1, 2011, the Control Building Instrument Air Dryer failed resulting in loss of control air. As a result, the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System,' and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation [CREV] subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,' became inoperable. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1, for two CREV subsystems inoperable (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours) and TS 3.7.4, Required Action E.1, for three Control Room AC subsystems inoperable (i.e., enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately).
"Operability of two Control Room AC subsystems and one CREV subsystem was restored and LCO 3.0.3 was exited, at 1410 hours, when the Instrument Air Dryer was bypassed.
"No power reduction took place as a result of the LCO 3.0.3 entry. This report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 26 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 68 degrees F. Troubleshooting activities are under way to determine the cause of the Instrument Air Dryer failure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1344 hours (EST) on December 1, 2011, the Control Building Instrument Air Dryer failed resulting in loss of control air. As a result, the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System,' and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation [CREV] subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,' became inoperable. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1, for two CREV subsystems inoperable (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours) and TS 3.7.4, Required Action E.1, for three Control Room AC subsystems inoperable (i.e., enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately).
"Operability of two Control Room AC subsystems and one CREV subsystem was restored and LCO 3.0.3 was exited, at 1410 hours, when the Instrument Air Dryer was bypassed.
"No power reduction took place as a result of the LCO 3.0.3 entry. This report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 26 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 68 degrees F. Troubleshooting activities are under way to determine the cause of the Instrument Air Dryer failure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.