Event Notification Report for November 27, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/26/2011 - 11/27/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47478
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK ROBBINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/27/2011
Notification Time: 04:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2011
Event Time: 02:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2011
Notification Time: 04:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2011
Event Time: 02:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2011
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
JENNIFER UHLE (R3)
DAN GATES (DHS)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
JENNIFER UHLE (R3)
DAN GATES (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DURING SWITCHING OPERATIONS
"At 0238, Point Beach Unit 1, classified an Unusual Event based on CU3.1, loss of power to or from the 1X-04 transformer that results in a loss of all offsite power to both safety-related busses 1A-05 and 1A-06 for greater than 15 minutes and at least one emergency [diesel] generator is supplying power to an emergency bus."
The licensee was restoring transformer 1X-03 when the upset occurred that tripped the 1X-04 transformer. The 1X-03 transformer converts 345kV to 13.8kV. The 1X-04 transformer converts 13.8kV to 4160V. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running supplying the safety-related busses.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KARL COSSEY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0843 EST ON 11/27/11 * * *
"Off-site power to Unit 1A-05 and 1A-06 Safeguards Busses has been restored via Unit 2 2X-03 High Voltage Station Transformer and 1X-04 Low Voltage Station Transformer.
"During the transient, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as expected with G-01 EDG supplying the Unit 1 1A-05 Safeguards Bus and G-03 EDG supplying 1A-06 Safeguards Bus. Off-site power to the Unit 2 Safeguards Buses was not affected. The start of the EDGs is also reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"All systems responded as designed during the transient and operators performed in accordance with procedures and their training. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 5 within normal operating bands. Unit 2 remains operating at 100% power. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 [CST] on November 27, 2011. A press release is planned."
The licensee has notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara), IRD MOC (Jane Marshall), NRR EO (Sher Bahadur), DHS (Rickerson), and FEMA (Hollis).
"At 0238, Point Beach Unit 1, classified an Unusual Event based on CU3.1, loss of power to or from the 1X-04 transformer that results in a loss of all offsite power to both safety-related busses 1A-05 and 1A-06 for greater than 15 minutes and at least one emergency [diesel] generator is supplying power to an emergency bus."
The licensee was restoring transformer 1X-03 when the upset occurred that tripped the 1X-04 transformer. The 1X-03 transformer converts 345kV to 13.8kV. The 1X-04 transformer converts 13.8kV to 4160V. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running supplying the safety-related busses.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KARL COSSEY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0843 EST ON 11/27/11 * * *
"Off-site power to Unit 1A-05 and 1A-06 Safeguards Busses has been restored via Unit 2 2X-03 High Voltage Station Transformer and 1X-04 Low Voltage Station Transformer.
"During the transient, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as expected with G-01 EDG supplying the Unit 1 1A-05 Safeguards Bus and G-03 EDG supplying 1A-06 Safeguards Bus. Off-site power to the Unit 2 Safeguards Buses was not affected. The start of the EDGs is also reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"All systems responded as designed during the transient and operators performed in accordance with procedures and their training. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 5 within normal operating bands. Unit 2 remains operating at 100% power. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 [CST] on November 27, 2011. A press release is planned."
The licensee has notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara), IRD MOC (Jane Marshall), NRR EO (Sher Bahadur), DHS (Rickerson), and FEMA (Hollis).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47479
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KIRK DUEA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KIRK DUEA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/28/2011
Notification Time: 01:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2011
Event Time: 16:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2011
Notification Time: 01:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2011
Event Time: 16:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup |
ROD WORTH MINIMIZER CONTROL SWITCH FOUND OUT OF REQUIRED POSITION
"After transitioning to Mode 2 from Mode 4, while performing the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) operability test, it was discovered that the RWM control switch was in the BYPASS position. The RWM enforces predetermined control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences. Complying with these predetermined sequences ensures a Control Rod Drop Accident does not exceed analytical limits. With the control switch in the BYPASS position, the RWM was inoperable and would not have enforced the predetermined control rod withdrawal sequence. The RWM control switch was restored to the OPERATE position and the RWM was verified to be operable.
"This issue is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the RWM, which is a system needed to mitigate the consequences of the Control Rod Drop Accident."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
"After transitioning to Mode 2 from Mode 4, while performing the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) operability test, it was discovered that the RWM control switch was in the BYPASS position. The RWM enforces predetermined control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences. Complying with these predetermined sequences ensures a Control Rod Drop Accident does not exceed analytical limits. With the control switch in the BYPASS position, the RWM was inoperable and would not have enforced the predetermined control rod withdrawal sequence. The RWM control switch was restored to the OPERATE position and the RWM was verified to be operable.
"This issue is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the RWM, which is a system needed to mitigate the consequences of the Control Rod Drop Accident."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.