Event Notification Report for November 09, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/08/2011 - 11/09/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
47426474234742447465
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47426
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/09/2011
Notification Time: 21:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 17:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2011
Notification Time: 21:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 17:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
POTENTIAL FAILURE OF HIGH DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PIPING IN ESW SYSTEM
"On November 9, 2011 at 1715, Callaway Plant staff determined that a postulated design basis fire event in Fire Area C-1, (Control Building, elevation 1974, ESW Pipe Space, Room 3101) could result in failure of the High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) piping in the Essential Service Water (ESW) system.
"In 2008-2009 timeframe, Callaway Plant implemented a modification which replaced underground large bore carbon steel ESW piping with HDPE piping. Four short sections of this HDPE piping enter the Control Building and interface with steel piping in Room 3101. During the design of the modification, it was not recognized that a fire barrier should be installed to protect the HDPE piping from the consequences of a fire. As a result of the missing fire barrier, a postulated fire could cause a failure of one train of the large bore HDPE piping located within the fire area. The resultant pipe failure could lead to flooding in the fire area that could adversely affect both trains of ESW equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
"An hourly fire watch has been imposed as a compensatory measure for this condition in accordance with the approved fire protection program.
"This condition is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On November 9, 2011 at 1715, Callaway Plant staff determined that a postulated design basis fire event in Fire Area C-1, (Control Building, elevation 1974, ESW Pipe Space, Room 3101) could result in failure of the High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) piping in the Essential Service Water (ESW) system.
"In 2008-2009 timeframe, Callaway Plant implemented a modification which replaced underground large bore carbon steel ESW piping with HDPE piping. Four short sections of this HDPE piping enter the Control Building and interface with steel piping in Room 3101. During the design of the modification, it was not recognized that a fire barrier should be installed to protect the HDPE piping from the consequences of a fire. As a result of the missing fire barrier, a postulated fire could cause a failure of one train of the large bore HDPE piping located within the fire area. The resultant pipe failure could lead to flooding in the fire area that could adversely affect both trains of ESW equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
"An hourly fire watch has been imposed as a compensatory measure for this condition in accordance with the approved fire protection program.
"This condition is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 47423
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: HALEY AND ALDRICH, INC.
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 20-8251
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: HALEY AND ALDRICH, INC.
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 20-8251
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/09/2011
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2012
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOURCE ROD ON MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the state via email:
"On 11/9/11 [EST], the licensee reported to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] that a portable moisture density gauge had been damaged by a construction vehicle at a temporary job site. The source rod was bent and extended outside of the shielded gauge body so that it could not be returned to the closed position. The extended rod was left within the measuring hole so that the surrounding soil could provide shielding. A 15-plus-foot radius area was segregated around the damaged gauge. The licensee's radiation safety officer and radiation safety consultant were en route to the site to conduct and oversee the source recovery operation at the time of this report.
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this event to be open and ongoing.
"Manufacturer: Humboldt Scientific Inc, 5001 Series; Isotopes: Cs-137/ .011 Ci; Am-241/ .044 Ci."
* * * UPDATE ON 1/26/2012 AT 1307 EST FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"The consultant and licensee submitted follow-up reports. An authorized gauge user was attending to the gauge and could not get the attention of the driver of the vehicle being driven in reverse just before gauge damage occurred. The source rod retracted into the gauge body successfully and the gauge was returned in its transport case to the licensee's facility on 11/9/11. A post-retrieval survey determined no residual contamination in the area. Personnel dosimeters worn during retrieval indicated minimal personnel exposure. The licensee presented employees retraining related to construction site safety on 11/10/11. Leak test results indicated no sealed source leakage. The gauge was returned to manufacturer for repairs.
Manufacturer : Humboldt Scientific, inc.
Model Number : 5001 EZ
Serial Number : 3544
Cesium-137 Source Serial Number : 9433GQ
Americium-241 Be Source Serial Number : NJ03832
"The Agency considers this event to be CLOSED."
Notified the R1DO (Dentel) and FSME (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE ON 2/15/12 AT 0921 EST FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"The Cesium-137 source is an AEA Technology/QSA Model CDC.805, Capsule Type X8.
"The Americium-241 source is an AEA Technology/QSA Model AMN.V997, Capsule Type X1.
"The Agency still considers this event to be CLOSED."
Notified FSME (McIntosh) and R1DO (Powell).
The following information was provided by the state via email:
"On 11/9/11 [EST], the licensee reported to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] that a portable moisture density gauge had been damaged by a construction vehicle at a temporary job site. The source rod was bent and extended outside of the shielded gauge body so that it could not be returned to the closed position. The extended rod was left within the measuring hole so that the surrounding soil could provide shielding. A 15-plus-foot radius area was segregated around the damaged gauge. The licensee's radiation safety officer and radiation safety consultant were en route to the site to conduct and oversee the source recovery operation at the time of this report.
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this event to be open and ongoing.
"Manufacturer: Humboldt Scientific Inc, 5001 Series; Isotopes: Cs-137/ .011 Ci; Am-241/ .044 Ci."
* * * UPDATE ON 1/26/2012 AT 1307 EST FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"The consultant and licensee submitted follow-up reports. An authorized gauge user was attending to the gauge and could not get the attention of the driver of the vehicle being driven in reverse just before gauge damage occurred. The source rod retracted into the gauge body successfully and the gauge was returned in its transport case to the licensee's facility on 11/9/11. A post-retrieval survey determined no residual contamination in the area. Personnel dosimeters worn during retrieval indicated minimal personnel exposure. The licensee presented employees retraining related to construction site safety on 11/10/11. Leak test results indicated no sealed source leakage. The gauge was returned to manufacturer for repairs.
Manufacturer : Humboldt Scientific, inc.
Model Number : 5001 EZ
Serial Number : 3544
Cesium-137 Source Serial Number : 9433GQ
Americium-241 Be Source Serial Number : NJ03832
"The Agency considers this event to be CLOSED."
Notified the R1DO (Dentel) and FSME (McIntosh).
* * * UPDATE ON 2/15/12 AT 0921 EST FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"The Cesium-137 source is an AEA Technology/QSA Model CDC.805, Capsule Type X8.
"The Americium-241 source is an AEA Technology/QSA Model AMN.V997, Capsule Type X1.
"The Agency still considers this event to be CLOSED."
Notified FSME (McIntosh) and R1DO (Powell).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47424
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MEDIPHYSICS
Region: 3
City: MILWAUKEE State: WI
County:
License #: 079-1168-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMILY EGGERS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: MEDIPHYSICS
Region: 3
City: MILWAUKEE State: WI
County:
License #: 079-1168-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMILY EGGERS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/09/2011
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 05:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2011
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 05:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL RADIATION READINGS ON SHIPPED PACKAGE EXCEEDED LIMITS
The following information was received via fax:
"Medi-Physics, Inc. d/b/a GE Healthcare reported they had received a package from Lantheus Medical Imaging containing a Mo-99/Tc-99m generator (serial #M312111D60), which had a contact radiation reading of >200 mR/hour. The Transport Index (TI) on the labeling was stated at 4.2, while the actual TI upon receiving the package was 8. Contamination wipes were completed with no contamination on the outside of the package. When the package was opened, contamination wipes were completed with no contamination on the inside of the package. The generator was manufactured on 11/8/11 and delivered to GE Healthcare on 11/9/11. The packaging surrounding the generator was entirely composed of styrofoam. At this point, it was determined the secondary lead shielding surrounding the generator was absent. The generator was removed from the packaging and eluted, there was no damage to the generator and the eluted material passed all quality control testing.
"The Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) followed up with the licensee by phone, and also contacted the State of Massachusetts to notify them of the event."
Wisconsin Report ID: WI110019
The following information was received via fax:
"Medi-Physics, Inc. d/b/a GE Healthcare reported they had received a package from Lantheus Medical Imaging containing a Mo-99/Tc-99m generator (serial #M312111D60), which had a contact radiation reading of >200 mR/hour. The Transport Index (TI) on the labeling was stated at 4.2, while the actual TI upon receiving the package was 8. Contamination wipes were completed with no contamination on the outside of the package. When the package was opened, contamination wipes were completed with no contamination on the inside of the package. The generator was manufactured on 11/8/11 and delivered to GE Healthcare on 11/9/11. The packaging surrounding the generator was entirely composed of styrofoam. At this point, it was determined the secondary lead shielding surrounding the generator was absent. The generator was removed from the packaging and eluted, there was no damage to the generator and the eluted material passed all quality control testing.
"The Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) followed up with the licensee by phone, and also contacted the State of Massachusetts to notify them of the event."
Wisconsin Report ID: WI110019
Agreement State
Event Number: 47465
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: SHAW NAPTECH, INC.
Region: 4
City: CLEARFIELD State: UT
County:
License #: 0600332
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SHAW NAPTECH, INC.
Region: 4
City: CLEARFIELD State: UT
County:
License #: 0600332
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/21/2011
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 08:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2011
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2011
Event Time: 08:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
UTAH AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - AUTOMATIC LOCKING MECHANISM FAILED ON RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was obtained from the State of Utah via facsimile:
"On November 9, 2011 at about 8:30 AM [MST], [the licensee RSO] was contacted by one of [their] radiographers and told that the self locking mechanism on one of [their] cameras was not working. The camera was SN D7217 manufactured by Sentinel. The model is a 880 Delta which was purchased new in January of this year and put into service February 4, 2011. Though the camera did not automatically lock when the source had been returned to the shielded position, the lock slide had been manually returned to the locked position after retracting the source and a survey by the radiographer showed that the source was shielded and the camera was then locked. [The radiographer] is a level II IRRSP [Industrial Radiography and Radiation Safety Personnel] certified radiographer who was working in [the facility's] permanent installation B cell when the incident occurred. The entrance and area alarm for B cell were working properly at the time of the event and confirmed what the survey showed which was that the source was in the shielded position. [The radiographer] demonstrated that the lock slide was not coming back over to lock the camera automatically when the source was returned to the camera as it was designed to do. After the demonstration, the camera was surveyed to ensure the source was in the shielded position, the slide lock was then slid to the lock position manually, the camera locked and [was] removed from service. The radiographer did not receive any radiation exposure associated with the failure of the slide lock mechanism.
"[The RSO] contacted the manufacturer the same day and was instructed to return the camera for repair. The camera had a 13.7 Ci Ir-192 source in it. The camera was sent overnight to Sentinel/QSA Global in Baton Rouge, La.. [The RSO] was contacted by the service technician the next afternoon, November 10, 2011. He informed [the RSO] that one of the springs had broken and that was the cause of the malfunction of the slide lock. A new rear plate assembly was installed by Sentinel and the camera was then returned to [the licensee] facility with a new Ir-192 source of 97 curies. The camera was put back into service on Monday November 14, 2011 and has been operating properly since."
The following information was obtained from the State of Utah via facsimile:
"On November 9, 2011 at about 8:30 AM [MST], [the licensee RSO] was contacted by one of [their] radiographers and told that the self locking mechanism on one of [their] cameras was not working. The camera was SN D7217 manufactured by Sentinel. The model is a 880 Delta which was purchased new in January of this year and put into service February 4, 2011. Though the camera did not automatically lock when the source had been returned to the shielded position, the lock slide had been manually returned to the locked position after retracting the source and a survey by the radiographer showed that the source was shielded and the camera was then locked. [The radiographer] is a level II IRRSP [Industrial Radiography and Radiation Safety Personnel] certified radiographer who was working in [the facility's] permanent installation B cell when the incident occurred. The entrance and area alarm for B cell were working properly at the time of the event and confirmed what the survey showed which was that the source was in the shielded position. [The radiographer] demonstrated that the lock slide was not coming back over to lock the camera automatically when the source was returned to the camera as it was designed to do. After the demonstration, the camera was surveyed to ensure the source was in the shielded position, the slide lock was then slid to the lock position manually, the camera locked and [was] removed from service. The radiographer did not receive any radiation exposure associated with the failure of the slide lock mechanism.
"[The RSO] contacted the manufacturer the same day and was instructed to return the camera for repair. The camera had a 13.7 Ci Ir-192 source in it. The camera was sent overnight to Sentinel/QSA Global in Baton Rouge, La.. [The RSO] was contacted by the service technician the next afternoon, November 10, 2011. He informed [the RSO] that one of the springs had broken and that was the cause of the malfunction of the slide lock. A new rear plate assembly was installed by Sentinel and the camera was then returned to [the licensee] facility with a new Ir-192 source of 97 curies. The camera was put back into service on Monday November 14, 2011 and has been operating properly since."