Event Notification Report for November 07, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/06/2011 - 11/07/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47572
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/05/2012
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2011
Event Time: 09:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2012
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2011
Event Time: 09:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY REPORT INVOLVING AN INVALID EDG ACTUATION DUE TO TECHNICIAN ERROR
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made pursuant to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report due to invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system while removed from service for testing.
"On November 7, 2011 with the Station at 100% power, the Emergency Diesel Generator 'B' (EDG 'B') output breaker closed unexpectedly resulting in the EDG being paralleled to the grid out of phase during the performance of the semi-annual fast start test required by Technical Specifications.
"The actuation of the EDG 'B' output breaker to close was determined to be invalid as it occurred while a technician was performing a required voltage check across a set of contacts in the output breaker circuit. The individual switched an analog multi-meter from the DC voltage range to resistance range while test leads were still in place across the test points. This action actuated the breaker closure relay, which caused the output breaker to close, placing the EDG 'B' in parallel to the grid. The EDG picked up load as expected until the output breaker was opened approximately 52 seconds later by an operator in the control room. A review of data from the event verified that the maximum rating of the EDG was not exceeded.
"Subsequent inspection and testing of the EDG 'B' and output breaker found no abnormalities as a result of the out of phase paralleling of the EDG 'B' to the grid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made pursuant to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report due to invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system while removed from service for testing.
"On November 7, 2011 with the Station at 100% power, the Emergency Diesel Generator 'B' (EDG 'B') output breaker closed unexpectedly resulting in the EDG being paralleled to the grid out of phase during the performance of the semi-annual fast start test required by Technical Specifications.
"The actuation of the EDG 'B' output breaker to close was determined to be invalid as it occurred while a technician was performing a required voltage check across a set of contacts in the output breaker circuit. The individual switched an analog multi-meter from the DC voltage range to resistance range while test leads were still in place across the test points. This action actuated the breaker closure relay, which caused the output breaker to close, placing the EDG 'B' in parallel to the grid. The EDG picked up load as expected until the output breaker was opened approximately 52 seconds later by an operator in the control room. A review of data from the event verified that the maximum rating of the EDG was not exceeded.
"Subsequent inspection and testing of the EDG 'B' and output breaker found no abnormalities as a result of the out of phase paralleling of the EDG 'B' to the grid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47547
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PATRICK WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PATRICK WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/23/2011
Notification Time: 03:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2011
Event Time: 22:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011
Notification Time: 03:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2011
Event Time: 22:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO A POSSIBLE FAULTY TEMPERATURE SWITCH
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On November 7, 2011, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal, which resulted in closure of isolation valves in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, and the residual heat removal (RHR) system (isolation valve groups 5, 6, 7, and 10). All affected isolation valves responded as designed.
"The Division reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal was generated by a new NUS/Scientech ambient temperature indicating switch that had recently been installed as a replacement for the original Riley temperature switch, which is no longer being manufactured. Two temperature switches (one for Division 1 and one for Division 2) monitor the reactor building pipe chase area to detect a rise in area temperature, which is indicative of a leak in the RWCU, RCIC, or RHR system piping that exists in the area. At the time of the event, operations personnel confirmed that conditions requiring isolation of the RWCU, RCIC, and RHR systems did not exist, based on a check of the Division 1 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature channel and area radiation monitors. Therefore, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid. The NUS/Scientech temperature switch was subsequently removed and the original Riley temperature switch was re-installed. The apparent cause for generation of the trip signal from the new temperature indicating switch was determined to be the presence of signal noise that was not adequately filtered.
"This event was entered into the [Nine Mile Point] corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2011-010062. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On November 7, 2011, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal, which resulted in closure of isolation valves in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, and the residual heat removal (RHR) system (isolation valve groups 5, 6, 7, and 10). All affected isolation valves responded as designed.
"The Division reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature isolation signal was generated by a new NUS/Scientech ambient temperature indicating switch that had recently been installed as a replacement for the original Riley temperature switch, which is no longer being manufactured. Two temperature switches (one for Division 1 and one for Division 2) monitor the reactor building pipe chase area to detect a rise in area temperature, which is indicative of a leak in the RWCU, RCIC, or RHR system piping that exists in the area. At the time of the event, operations personnel confirmed that conditions requiring isolation of the RWCU, RCIC, and RHR systems did not exist, based on a check of the Division 1 reactor building pipe chase high ambient temperature channel and area radiation monitors. Therefore, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid. The NUS/Scientech temperature switch was subsequently removed and the original Riley temperature switch was re-installed. The apparent cause for generation of the trip signal from the new temperature indicating switch was determined to be the presence of signal noise that was not adequately filtered.
"This event was entered into the [Nine Mile Point] corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2011-010062. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.