Event Notification Report for October 26, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/25/2011 - 10/26/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4737947380473764738247400
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47379
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 11:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 11:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION
"On 10/26/11 at approximately 11:25 a.m., while performing siren encoder maintenance and testing, the siren vendor inadvertently activated the EPZ sirens. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont and local emergency management directors were notified of the event."
"On 10/26/11 at approximately 11:25 a.m., while performing siren encoder maintenance and testing, the siren vendor inadvertently activated the EPZ sirens. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont and local emergency management directors were notified of the event."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47380
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
"On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained.
"There are no uranium cans of this particular material type currently in these storage locations and no unsafe condition is present. All movement of this material type to these designated storage locations has been suspended.
"Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.
"This event is being reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements due to a loss of double contingency."
The licensee will notify Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
"On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained.
"There are no uranium cans of this particular material type currently in these storage locations and no unsafe condition is present. All movement of this material type to these designated storage locations has been suspended.
"Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.
"This event is being reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements due to a loss of double contingency."
The licensee will notify Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47376
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JOE BARLETTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JOE BARLETTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/26/2011
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 13:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT DUE TO DETECTION OF LINEAR DEFECT IN SURGE VOLUME ACCUMULATOR
"At 1320 CDT, on 10-26-11 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-310 Side Accumulator had a linear defect in the vessel shell that caused a UF6 release on 10-21-2011. The UF6 liquid accumulators serve the product withdrawal system. The side accumulator is a monel tank used in the product withdrawal system to provide a surge volume. The safety function of the side accumulator is to provide UF6 primary system integrity for the withdrawal process that contains a gaseous and liquid UF6. TSR 2.3.5.6 is a design feature that requires the withdrawal area UF6 condensers and accumulator vessels to have a minimum required metal thickness in accordance with ASME requirements to prevent UF6 releases. There are no LCO actions associated with this TSR but there is a 5 year surveillance requirement to perform a visual inspection including thickness measurements. The side accumulator was in service when a small UF6 release occurred on 10-21-2011. The release was contained to the immediate area and the side accumulator was taken out of service for investigation and subsequent repairs.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-11-2856; PDGP Event Report No. PAD-2011-19. "
"At 1320 CDT, on 10-26-11 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-310 Side Accumulator had a linear defect in the vessel shell that caused a UF6 release on 10-21-2011. The UF6 liquid accumulators serve the product withdrawal system. The side accumulator is a monel tank used in the product withdrawal system to provide a surge volume. The safety function of the side accumulator is to provide UF6 primary system integrity for the withdrawal process that contains a gaseous and liquid UF6. TSR 2.3.5.6 is a design feature that requires the withdrawal area UF6 condensers and accumulator vessels to have a minimum required metal thickness in accordance with ASME requirements to prevent UF6 releases. There are no LCO actions associated with this TSR but there is a 5 year surveillance requirement to perform a visual inspection including thickness measurements. The side accumulator was in service when a small UF6 release occurred on 10-21-2011. The release was contained to the immediate area and the side accumulator was taken out of service for investigation and subsequent repairs.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-11-2856; PDGP Event Report No. PAD-2011-19. "
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47382
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN NEWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN NEWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 20:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 20:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-SUPERVISORY TECHNICIAN TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-supervisory technician (vendor) had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Plant access for the individual involved has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-supervisory technician (vendor) had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Plant access for the individual involved has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47400
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TC INSPECTION, LLC
Region: 4
City: RODEO State: CA
County:
License #: CA 5299-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: TC INSPECTION, LLC
Region: 4
City: RODEO State: CA
County:
License #: CA 5299-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/01/2011
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
The following information was received by e-mail:
"On 10/31/11, the ARSO [Alternate Radiation Safety Officer] at TC Inspection informed RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] via email of an incident occurring on 10/26/11 at Valero Refinery in Benicia, CA during one of their radiography operations. The email written by the ARSO is as follows:
"On October 26, 2011, there was an incident involving RAM material; one of [the licensee's crew was] performing radiography at the Valero refinery when, while cranking out the source, the trainer noticed the crank handle started free-spinning. When he tried to crank the source back in it was still free spinning so the source was stuck out of the shielded position. When the trainer called, [the licensee] advised him to loosen one of the nuts on the crank assembly, pull back the tube and then grab the cable and pull the source back into the exposure device and into the shielded position and that [the licensee was on his way]. When [the trainer] did this he noticed that the end of the cable was inside the tube, he was able to grab it with a pair of needle nose pliers and retrieve the source back into the shielded position.
"Two things happened here, the first; the trainer or assistant (still not sure which one) did not fully connect the guide tube to the camera. This allowed the source and cable to go out of the camera into air, thus allowing the cable to reach the end where the stop at the end of the cable did not stop the cable from coming out of the crank assembly. After further investigation [the licensee] found that the aluminum body of the crank assembly was worn right at the exit hole thus allowing the stop to go through. [The licensee] just did a maintenance inspection on those cranks on 10/1/11 and saw some wear on it but not as much as was there this time. [The licensee has] been in the process of replacing the aluminum body on all of [the licensee's] INC crank assemblies with stainless steel bodies when the techs tell [the ARSO] their cranks are getting hard to crank (That is usually the first sign that the aluminum body is wearing). [The apparent cause of the event is a technician forgetting to connect all of the equipment pieces due to production pressures or] equipment failure."
CA 5010 Number: 103111
* * * UPDATE FROM KEN PRENDERGAST TO CHARLES TEAL ON 11/3/11 AT 1513 EDT * * *
The following was received via email:
"On the day of the event, the operators pocket dosimeters indicated 10 mR.
"Camera information: INC IR-100, S/N 4301, with a source activity of 40.8 Ci.
"The crank assembly has been sent to INC and we'll be visiting INC today.
"We requested written statements from the trainer assistant. The ARSO already received them and he'll be sending a copy to RHB today.
"TC was requested to process the dosimetry badges worn by trainer and the assistant."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and FSME EO (Camper).
The following information was received by e-mail:
"On 10/31/11, the ARSO [Alternate Radiation Safety Officer] at TC Inspection informed RHB [California Radiation Health Branch] via email of an incident occurring on 10/26/11 at Valero Refinery in Benicia, CA during one of their radiography operations. The email written by the ARSO is as follows:
"On October 26, 2011, there was an incident involving RAM material; one of [the licensee's crew was] performing radiography at the Valero refinery when, while cranking out the source, the trainer noticed the crank handle started free-spinning. When he tried to crank the source back in it was still free spinning so the source was stuck out of the shielded position. When the trainer called, [the licensee] advised him to loosen one of the nuts on the crank assembly, pull back the tube and then grab the cable and pull the source back into the exposure device and into the shielded position and that [the licensee was on his way]. When [the trainer] did this he noticed that the end of the cable was inside the tube, he was able to grab it with a pair of needle nose pliers and retrieve the source back into the shielded position.
"Two things happened here, the first; the trainer or assistant (still not sure which one) did not fully connect the guide tube to the camera. This allowed the source and cable to go out of the camera into air, thus allowing the cable to reach the end where the stop at the end of the cable did not stop the cable from coming out of the crank assembly. After further investigation [the licensee] found that the aluminum body of the crank assembly was worn right at the exit hole thus allowing the stop to go through. [The licensee] just did a maintenance inspection on those cranks on 10/1/11 and saw some wear on it but not as much as was there this time. [The licensee has] been in the process of replacing the aluminum body on all of [the licensee's] INC crank assemblies with stainless steel bodies when the techs tell [the ARSO] their cranks are getting hard to crank (That is usually the first sign that the aluminum body is wearing). [The apparent cause of the event is a technician forgetting to connect all of the equipment pieces due to production pressures or] equipment failure."
CA 5010 Number: 103111
* * * UPDATE FROM KEN PRENDERGAST TO CHARLES TEAL ON 11/3/11 AT 1513 EDT * * *
The following was received via email:
"On the day of the event, the operators pocket dosimeters indicated 10 mR.
"Camera information: INC IR-100, S/N 4301, with a source activity of 40.8 Ci.
"The crank assembly has been sent to INC and we'll be visiting INC today.
"We requested written statements from the trainer assistant. The ARSO already received them and he'll be sending a copy to RHB today.
"TC was requested to process the dosimetry badges worn by trainer and the assistant."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and FSME EO (Camper).