Event Notification Report for October 19, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/18/2011 - 10/19/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
473534735447355473564735747373
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47353
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE FIELDS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE FIELDS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 07:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 05:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 07:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 05:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 86 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
"On October 19, 2011, at 0528, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to rising condenser backpressure. All (Control Element Assembly) CEAs fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat Removal is from Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. The cause of the rising backpressure was an unplanned trip the Circulating Water Pump 1A1, which degraded the Circulating Water System performance. At the time of the trip, an additional Circulating Water Pump 1A2 was secured for planned maintenance.
"The cause of the Circulating Water Pump 1A1 trip is under investigation.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip."
The plant is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 19, 2011, at 0528, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to rising condenser backpressure. All (Control Element Assembly) CEAs fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat Removal is from Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. The cause of the rising backpressure was an unplanned trip the Circulating Water Pump 1A1, which degraded the Circulating Water System performance. At the time of the trip, an additional Circulating Water Pump 1A2 was secured for planned maintenance.
"The cause of the Circulating Water Pump 1A1 trip is under investigation.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip."
The plant is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47354
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2011
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY DIESEL NON-FUNCTIONAL
"At 1000 (CDT), on October 19, 2011, the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was declared non-functional due to its failure to maintain required voltage during routine testing. The plant is currently in the process of determining the cause of the failure. Normal power to the TSC is currently available."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN HUBER TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/21/2011 AT 1502 EDT * * *
"The TSC Emergency Diesel Generator failure has been identified and corrected. The unit has been successfully tested, restoring the TSC Emergency Diesel Generator and TSC to a functional status."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Hills).
"At 1000 (CDT), on October 19, 2011, the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was declared non-functional due to its failure to maintain required voltage during routine testing. The plant is currently in the process of determining the cause of the failure. Normal power to the TSC is currently available."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN HUBER TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/21/2011 AT 1502 EDT * * *
"The TSC Emergency Diesel Generator failure has been identified and corrected. The unit has been successfully tested, restoring the TSC Emergency Diesel Generator and TSC to a functional status."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Hills).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47355
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 12:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 12:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OPENED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTAINER IN PROTECTED AREA
"At 1244 CST a prohibited substance (can of beer) was discovered open in the protected area. The non-supervisory, non-licensed individual involved did not consume any alcohol and was tested under the FFD program. The prohibited substance (alcohol) has been confiscated and FFD test results were negative for consumption. The can of beer was inadvertently brought in the person's lunch box and opened before the individual realized the error.
"This report is being made in accordance Significant Fitness-Far-Duty Events 10 CFR 26.719 (b) Significant FFD policy violations or programmatic failures. The following significant FFD policy violations and programmatic failures must be reported to the NRC Operations Center by telephone within 24 hours after the licensee or other entity discovers the violation: '(1) The use, sale, distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area.'
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"At 1244 CST a prohibited substance (can of beer) was discovered open in the protected area. The non-supervisory, non-licensed individual involved did not consume any alcohol and was tested under the FFD program. The prohibited substance (alcohol) has been confiscated and FFD test results were negative for consumption. The can of beer was inadvertently brought in the person's lunch box and opened before the individual realized the error.
"This report is being made in accordance Significant Fitness-Far-Duty Events 10 CFR 26.719 (b) Significant FFD policy violations or programmatic failures. The following significant FFD policy violations and programmatic failures must be reported to the NRC Operations Center by telephone within 24 hours after the licensee or other entity discovers the violation: '(1) The use, sale, distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area.'
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 47356
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING INC.
Licensee: FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING INC.
Region: 4
City: FAIRBANKS State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29098-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN MCDARIS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING INC.
Region: 4
City: FAIRBANKS State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29098-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN MCDARIS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
SHUTTER STUCK OPEN ON DENSITY GAUGE
Fairbanks Gold Mining Inc. discovered a density gauge for the number 2 South Cyclo-Pac Area of its Fort Knox Gold Mine had its shutter stuck open. There is no personnel radiation hazard with the situation of the gauge. The gauge is a Ronan Model SA1-C5 with a 1000 millicurie Cs-137 source. The source serial number is 0606GK. All on-contact readings were less than 5 millirem per hour.
Fairbanks Gold Mining has contacted Ronan who will send a representative to the site to repair the gauge.
Fairbanks Gold Mining Inc. discovered a density gauge for the number 2 South Cyclo-Pac Area of its Fort Knox Gold Mine had its shutter stuck open. There is no personnel radiation hazard with the situation of the gauge. The gauge is a Ronan Model SA1-C5 with a 1000 millicurie Cs-137 source. The source serial number is 0606GK. All on-contact readings were less than 5 millirem per hour.
Fairbanks Gold Mining has contacted Ronan who will send a representative to the site to repair the gauge.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47357
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 20:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 20:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS CONTAINING ALUMINUM MATERIAL
"With Unit 1 in Mode 4 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 an issue was identified with the body material of existing installed pressure instruments for both the Personnel and Emergency Airlocks of both units. The pressure instruments were determined to have an aluminum body which is not suited for safety related use in containment.
"Aluminum is a restricted/limited material in containment because it is not compatible with accident conditions and has failures with multiple adverse effects. Due to this condition, the pressure instruments would potentially lose pressure integrity during a LOCA with containment spray actuation.
"These pressure instruments are located inside containment and are connected to tubing that penetrates the airlock barrel. In event of a failure of any pressure instrument the integrity of the airlock would be compromised. The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and, as such, a loss of pressure boundary integrity would no longer meet general design criteria.
"Compensatory measures have been taken to prevent a failure of the airlock integrity due to containment spray actuation and at this time the airlock is operable.
"Luminant power determined this to be reportable at 2002 [CDT] on 10/19/11 per 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"With Unit 1 in Mode 4 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 an issue was identified with the body material of existing installed pressure instruments for both the Personnel and Emergency Airlocks of both units. The pressure instruments were determined to have an aluminum body which is not suited for safety related use in containment.
"Aluminum is a restricted/limited material in containment because it is not compatible with accident conditions and has failures with multiple adverse effects. Due to this condition, the pressure instruments would potentially lose pressure integrity during a LOCA with containment spray actuation.
"These pressure instruments are located inside containment and are connected to tubing that penetrates the airlock barrel. In event of a failure of any pressure instrument the integrity of the airlock would be compromised. The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and, as such, a loss of pressure boundary integrity would no longer meet general design criteria.
"Compensatory measures have been taken to prevent a failure of the airlock integrity due to containment spray actuation and at this time the airlock is operable.
"Luminant power determined this to be reportable at 2002 [CDT] on 10/19/11 per 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47373
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NATIONAL CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS
Region: 4
City: SAN FRANCISCO State: CA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENE FORRER II
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: NATIONAL CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS
Region: 4
City: SAN FRANCISCO State: CA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENE FORRER II
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/25/2011
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 15:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2011
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 15:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
LYDIA CHANG (FSME)
ILTAB via email
MEXICO via fax
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
LYDIA CHANG (FSME)
ILTAB via email
MEXICO via fax
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FOUR MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following report was received from the California Radiation Control Program via email:
"During a inspection/inventory, by NCIS [National Center for International Schools] personnel, of tritium exit signs it was discovered that 4 of the signs had been vandalized and the EXIT portion and /or the tritium tubes had been removed from the unit with the mounting bracket still attached to the wall."
The initial notification was forwarded to the California Radiation Control Program by the NRC State Programs Office on 10/19/11. The actual event date is unknown.
CA 5010 Number (Date Notified): 102011
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
The following report was received from the California Radiation Control Program via email:
"During a inspection/inventory, by NCIS [National Center for International Schools] personnel, of tritium exit signs it was discovered that 4 of the signs had been vandalized and the EXIT portion and /or the tritium tubes had been removed from the unit with the mounting bracket still attached to the wall."
The initial notification was forwarded to the California Radiation Control Program by the NRC State Programs Office on 10/19/11. The actual event date is unknown.
CA 5010 Number (Date Notified): 102011
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.