Event Notification Report for October 11, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/10/2011 - 10/11/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
47338473474734347500
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47338
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/12/2011
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2011
Notification Time: 02:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 23:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE AUTO STOP VALVE CLOSURE
"Automatic Reactor Trip due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System.
"At 2328 on 10/11/2011, the reactor tripped due to a RPS actuation Signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a Turbine Auto Stop signal. All control rods inserted on the trip, RCS pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable, and RCS average temperature is 547 degrees and stable. Decay heat removal is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected and steam generator atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is investigating the cause of the Auto Stop Signal. The plant will be maintained in MODE 3 until the cause of trip is determined.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
There is no primary to secondary leakage. Offsite power is normal and all EDG's are available.
"Automatic Reactor Trip due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System.
"At 2328 on 10/11/2011, the reactor tripped due to a RPS actuation Signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a Turbine Auto Stop signal. All control rods inserted on the trip, RCS pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable, and RCS average temperature is 547 degrees and stable. Decay heat removal is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected and steam generator atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is investigating the cause of the Auto Stop Signal. The plant will be maintained in MODE 3 until the cause of trip is determined.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
There is no primary to secondary leakage. Offsite power is normal and all EDG's are available.
Part 21
Event Number: 47347
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/17/2011
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2011
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PART21 GP via e-mail
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART21 GP via e-mail
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR PISTON DELAMINATION
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 08/12/11 upon receipt of four piston assemblies returned from Perry Nuclear Plant. It was reported that Perry had performed a maintenance activity whereby they replaced four of their piston assemblies with four refurbished pistons provided by ESI. Following installation of the replacement pistons, it was found that large portions of the tin plating were flaking or smearing off.
"The evaluation was concluded on 10/11/11 and determined the piston tin plating delamination to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21 . The delamination was attributed to residual oil impregnated in the ductile cast iron base material of the skirts. The piston assemblies had previously been in service on the emergency diesel generators and were later refurbished by ESI in 2007. A portion of the refurbishment activity consisted of re-tin plating the piston skirts.
"ESI is not aware of any absolute methods for ensuring all oils have been removed (or at least to the point that it will not interfere with tin plating adhesion). As a result of this finding, it is ESI's recommendation that piston skirts which have been in service should no longer be re-tin plated."
ESI Internal Report Number: 10CFR21-0103, Rev. 0
Potentially affected power plants: Perry, River Bend, Comanche Peak, and Catawba
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 08/12/11 upon receipt of four piston assemblies returned from Perry Nuclear Plant. It was reported that Perry had performed a maintenance activity whereby they replaced four of their piston assemblies with four refurbished pistons provided by ESI. Following installation of the replacement pistons, it was found that large portions of the tin plating were flaking or smearing off.
"The evaluation was concluded on 10/11/11 and determined the piston tin plating delamination to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21 . The delamination was attributed to residual oil impregnated in the ductile cast iron base material of the skirts. The piston assemblies had previously been in service on the emergency diesel generators and were later refurbished by ESI in 2007. A portion of the refurbishment activity consisted of re-tin plating the piston skirts.
"ESI is not aware of any absolute methods for ensuring all oils have been removed (or at least to the point that it will not interfere with tin plating adhesion). As a result of this finding, it is ESI's recommendation that piston skirts which have been in service should no longer be re-tin plated."
ESI Internal Report Number: 10CFR21-0103, Rev. 0
Potentially affected power plants: Perry, River Bend, Comanche Peak, and Catawba
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47343
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICHARD GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/13/2011
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 09:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2011
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 09:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 0915 on 10-11-2011, Columbia Generating Station's (CGS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) system was taken out of service for planned maintenance activities. Assessment of the ERDS outage considered the anticipated duration of the outage along with the knowledge that the system would not be recoverable within an hour of a declared event (Alert or higher) during this maintenance period. Station personnel concluded the planned maintenance to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' To that end, a call was made to the NRC's Headquarters Operational Office (HOO) at 09:22 PDT on 10-11-2011. Feedback received during that call was that the event was a loggable entry but not recordable and no EN number was assigned.
"Efforts to fully restore ERDS following the maintenance have not yet been successful and the actual duration of the work has substantially exceeded initial estimates for planned duration. Work is ongoing to restore the system to full capability. Restoration plans include a functional test coordinated with the NRC ERDS center to demonstrate the system performs as required.
"This follow-up call is made to update the original call placed 10-11-2011 and to affirm that the current lack of a functional ERDS system represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability consistent with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Previously credited compensatory measures remain in effect and rely on existing CGS Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data via the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Members of the CGS Emergency Response Organization have been trained on contingencies required during an Emergency Plan activation with loss of ERDS capability. No other emergency response functions are impacted by this ongoing work. The resident inspector has been briefed. A follow up notification will be made when the maintenance work has been completed."
* * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HUGO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0601 EDT ON 10/16/2011 * * *
The licensee returned ERDS to service at 0245 PDT on 10/16/2011.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Whitten).
"At 0915 on 10-11-2011, Columbia Generating Station's (CGS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) system was taken out of service for planned maintenance activities. Assessment of the ERDS outage considered the anticipated duration of the outage along with the knowledge that the system would not be recoverable within an hour of a declared event (Alert or higher) during this maintenance period. Station personnel concluded the planned maintenance to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' To that end, a call was made to the NRC's Headquarters Operational Office (HOO) at 09:22 PDT on 10-11-2011. Feedback received during that call was that the event was a loggable entry but not recordable and no EN number was assigned.
"Efforts to fully restore ERDS following the maintenance have not yet been successful and the actual duration of the work has substantially exceeded initial estimates for planned duration. Work is ongoing to restore the system to full capability. Restoration plans include a functional test coordinated with the NRC ERDS center to demonstrate the system performs as required.
"This follow-up call is made to update the original call placed 10-11-2011 and to affirm that the current lack of a functional ERDS system represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability consistent with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Previously credited compensatory measures remain in effect and rely on existing CGS Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data via the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Members of the CGS Emergency Response Organization have been trained on contingencies required during an Emergency Plan activation with loss of ERDS capability. No other emergency response functions are impacted by this ongoing work. The resident inspector has been briefed. A follow up notification will be made when the maintenance work has been completed."
* * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HUGO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0601 EDT ON 10/16/2011 * * *
The licensee returned ERDS to service at 0245 PDT on 10/16/2011.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Whitten).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47500
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 16:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2011
Event Time: 16:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF VITAL AC POWER WHILE SHUTDOWN
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment heat removal system.
"On October 11, 2011, with the reactor shutdown for refueling, a partial loss of vital AC power was experienced which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling as well as PCIS group 2, 3, 4, and 5 half isolations. The actuation was determined to be invalid as it occurred because a breaker supplying power to the 'A' vital AC was manually opened, resulting in actuation of the associated PCIS logic circuitry. The Group 4 actuation resulted in a complete isolation of the single train Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction path. The shutdown cooling path was isolated for approximately 12 minutes resulting in a coolant temperature increase of approximately 2 degrees F. At the time of the event, the reactor cavity was flooded with the spent fuel pool gates removed and the normal fuel pool cooling system in operation to provide reactor cavity cooling. Based on this, there was no impact on public health and safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment heat removal system.
"On October 11, 2011, with the reactor shutdown for refueling, a partial loss of vital AC power was experienced which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling as well as PCIS group 2, 3, 4, and 5 half isolations. The actuation was determined to be invalid as it occurred because a breaker supplying power to the 'A' vital AC was manually opened, resulting in actuation of the associated PCIS logic circuitry. The Group 4 actuation resulted in a complete isolation of the single train Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction path. The shutdown cooling path was isolated for approximately 12 minutes resulting in a coolant temperature increase of approximately 2 degrees F. At the time of the event, the reactor cavity was flooded with the spent fuel pool gates removed and the normal fuel pool cooling system in operation to provide reactor cavity cooling. Based on this, there was no impact on public health and safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.