Event Notification Report for October 06, 2011

PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MOORE PROCESS CONTROLLERS

The following information was received from ATC Nuclear via facsimile:

"This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21(a)(3)(ii)(b).

"Exelon Corporation Clinton and LaSalle Stations have identified common mode failures associated with Moore 535 Controllers (Part Number 535-000000HOST-SSTRV) provided through ATC Nuclear Tennessee. These items were provided as safety related components to Exelon under Clinton Purchase Order 00461980 and LaSalle Purchase Order 00462363. All safety related failures to date appear to originate from these specific purchase orders. The failures have been evaluated with the original equipment manufacturer and appear to be isolated to controllers containing a main processor board containing 'Revision F' labeling manufactured in early 2010 (Date Code 1310). These items all passed an extended burn-in during testing. The failures may manifest themselves as process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (less than 1 year) following installation.

"Because the end-use application of each item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to the customer. The Licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."

* * * UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONG PARK AT 1638 EDT ON 7/2/12 VIA FACSIMILE * * *

"A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MII) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (<1 year) following installation. These controllers passed all Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU [Micro-Processing Unit] Board and identified the cause as 'Indeterminate.'

"Completion of a rigorous analysis by the OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer] and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit. Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated."

The orders were delivered to the following facilities: Clinton, LaSalle, Byron, Callaway, Fermi 2.

Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen), and Part 21 Group via e-mail..

* * * UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX 1141 EDT ON 7/7/12 * * *

"During the ATC root cause investigation, a technical error in the original qualification document S2000-RP-03, Revision 0, issued on February 7, 2000 was identified. The qualification test report identified the Moore 535 SLP controller's ability to withstand a total integrated dose (TID) of 1E5 Rad. This information is in error and is related to the original report creator's misunderstanding of the relationship between the presence of semiconductor materials and a citation from an EPRI report on the effects of radiation. The Moore 535 controllers have been tested for a TID of 1E3 Rad without failure. A report revision will be issued to clarify this item. No orders reviewed were provided for IEEE 323 harsh environment applications.

"Because the end-use application of each specific item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to customers. The licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."

Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen) and Part 21 group via email.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL

"At 1226 [EDT] today, Seabrook experienced an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator water levels. The low steam generator levels resulted following a trip of one of the two operating main feed pumps. Main feed pump 'A' tripped on low suction pressure while a condensate pump was being returned to service following maintenance on the pump. The emergency feedwater system actuated automatically and recovered steam generator levels. All systems actuated and functioned as designed. The wide range level indication on steam generator 'C' indicated erratically and was declared inoperable. The plant is stable and being maintained in Mode 3. The station plans to cool the plant to Mode 5 for a previously planned forced outage.

"This notification provides a four-hour report for an actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor is critical and an eight-hour report for a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system."

All rods fully inserted. Emergency feedwater has been secured and placed in standby and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical systems are in a normal shutdown alignment. There is nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as required.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On 10/06/2011 the control room was notified of an oscillation occurring on the output of Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump electronic governor. These oscillations are occurring while the system is in standby and is an early indication of potential governor failure. The governor oscillations were discovered on 10/06/2011 at 1140 EDT by the system engineer while performing system trending analysis via plant computer points.

"HPCI was declared inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 was entered at 1140 EDT on 10/06/2011.

"An investigation is in progress. Unit 1 HPCI and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) systems are unaffected as the electronic governor outputs for this equipment is stable and trending as expected.

"This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(V)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MEDICAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES WITH CONTAMINATION ON CLOTHING

"Two maintenance employees were exposed to anhydrous hydrogen fluoride while working on a chemical storage tank. The two employees were taken to the plant dispensary for first aid treatment. Both employees were treated and released to return to work. Radiological surveys of the employees in the dispensary showed contamination on both of the employees work shoes and one of the employee coveralls.

"[The contamination was from] U3O8 Uranium Ore Concentrate, Natural Uranium.

"[This event is reportable under] 40.60(b)(3) - Unplanned Medical Treatment at a Medical Facility of an individual with spreadable contamination."

The licensee has notified appropriate local authorities and NRC Region 2.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FETUS EXPOSED TO RADIATION DURING THYROID THERAPY TREATMENT

The following was received from the state via facsimile:

"The patient took a pregnancy test on October 5, 2011 and the results were negative. The patient was then treated with 73.7mCi of I-131 thyroid therapy treatment on October 6, 2011. The patient discovered she was pregnant and contacted the licensee on October 26, 2011. The estimated dose to the fetus is 17.4 Rads. It has been determined that the fetus was 10 days old when the therapy was given to the patient.

"The licensee will be submitting a written report within 15 days. The Department plans to do a reactive inspection to review licensee's procedures and response to this ME."

Event Report ID No. PA110031

WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM CLASS ONE SEISMIC SUPPORT INOPERABLE

"The Waste Disposal System [WDS] Class 1 piping requires operable seismic supports downstream of the isolation valve class break. Currently, eight (8) INC [International Nuclear Safety, Corp.] snubbers have been degraded to [Non Nuclear System] NNS Class 4 ridged struts. The snubbers original design function was to allow thermal motion but restrain seismic motion.

"The snubbers have been identified as potential to create an unanalyzed condition that over stresses the safety class 1 drain pipe upstream of the isolation valve if the snubbers on the drain pipe downstream of the isolation valve were in a locked condition (acting as a strut). Per NRC bulletin 81-01, these snubbers are assumed to be frozen and do not allow movement of the pipe; thus, they have been degraded to rigid struts as they are not in the snubber program and are not tested. They still provide a seismic safety function for [class] II/I issues and act as a strut to provide horizontal restraint to the WDS piping.

"The snubbers were removed from the piping system and tested to determine their performance and if they would have moved to allow thermal growth. Six snubbers failed the test and were either in a locked condition or their movement was dimensionally small relative to the required movement. The [Reactor Coolant System] RCS is within acceptable stress values with the snubbers removed.

"The 8-hour regulatory reporting time has been exceeded."

An initial Reportability Evaluation was completed on March 26, 2012 and had determined the supports were operable. A second Reportability Evaluation later determined the supports have been inoperable since October 6, 2011. The WDS is used to drain the RCS.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *

"Additional review and testing demonstrated that [there was] no degradation of the RCS from thermal fatigue. The analysis demonstrates adequate past performance of the snubbers with regard to thermal fatigue. The impact of the snubber has been analyzed and determined to have not resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion has been entered into the corrective action system."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).