Event Notification Report for October 05, 2011

PAGING SYSTEM IS OUT OF SERVICE

"At 0812 EDT on October 5, 2011, Millstone Power Station determined that a condition exists affecting Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a major loss of offsite communications capability. Specifically, Millstone Power Station was notified by an offsite vendor that the system relied upon for offsite communications in accordance with the Millstone Emergency Plan using a pager system is not functioning reliably. The Millstone Emergency Plan will be implemented by the approved, pre-existing alternate notification method.

"Appropriate officials are being notified that the alternate method is being employed until the primary means is restored.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The paging system is being repaired and the utility has an alternate communication method in place.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified as well as Waterford local government and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.

IRF Number: 2011066

TWO LOOPS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE

"Unit 2 was shut down at 1048 CDT on October 4, 2011 due to 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) low seal leak off flow. At 0727 CDT on October 5, 2011 with Unit 2 in Mode 4 and 22 RCP secured, 21 RCP was also secured due to low seal leak off flow.

"It was determined that the station would not consider RHR [residual heat removal] available for decay heat removal per Technical Specification (TS) due to a procedural issue related to component cooling shutdown lineups. RCS temperature is being maintained stable in Mode 4 between 320 and 340 degrees Fahrenheit using natural circulation and the steam dump to the condenser. No operations were permitted that would have caused introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the Shutdown Margin.

"At approximately 1329 CDT, 21 RCP was restarted after the flow transmitters were vented and 21 RCP seal leak off flow was determined to be acceptable. The RHR procedural issue has been resolved.

"Per TS LCO 3.4.6, 'Two loops consisting of any combination of RCS loops and residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and one loop shall be in operation.' This condition is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."

During this event, RHR could not be credited because the utility was not able to valve in component cooling water to a SFP heat exchanger due to procedural issues. With the restart of 21 RCP and shutdown cooling water alignment, TS 3.6.4 A and B statements have been met and exited. 21 RCP loop in operation and 22 RHR is operable and can be aligned for shutdown cooling. Both Unit 2 EDG's are available and offsite power is normal electrical lineup. The licensee is no longer in any TS LCO statements.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION ON 10/7/11 AT 1146 EDT FROM DAMMANN TO SNYDER * * *

"An eight hour report (EN #47321) per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) was conservatively reported because both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and both trains of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) were thought to be unavailable.

"Additional review indicated that 21 RCP and 22 RCP were undamaged, functional, and available for loop operation; therefore, there was no loss of safety function as RCPs were available.

"The station evaluated 21 and 22 RCP seal leak off flow performance and subsequently restarted 21 RCP and restored forced cooling. The 21 RCP seal leak off flow has remained stable in the acceptable range. 21 RCP was available throughout this evolution. If needed in Mode 4, 22 RCP was also available.

"The procedures that were in place and available to the operators prior to 1320 CDT on October 5, 2011, would have allowed RHR operation; however, to supply RHR to Unit 2, Unit 1 would have entered an LCO (for supplying Component Cooling (CC) water to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchangers) to maintain RHR's safety function. After 1320 CDT, procedure revisions allowed operation of RHR without an associated Unit 1 LCO entry. RHR remained operable throughout this evolution.

"In summary, a loss of safety function for both trains of RHR and RCS did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) report (EN # 47321) is retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

R3DO(Phillips) notified.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO POTENTIAL CHEMICAL SPILL IN THE DELAWARE RIVER

"At 0930 on 10/5/11, a fuse failure in a 1E to non - 1E interface failed causing a false run signal to the water treatment system for a standby station service water pump. The water treatment system responded by opening the injection valve for the out of service pump. With the associated pump out of service, the sodium hypochlorite can communicate with the Delaware river. This was discovered at 1553 and immediately terminated. This resulted in the discharge of approximately 195 gallons of 15% sodium hypochlorite to SSW intake which communicates with the Delaware river. The associated service water pump was started thus withdrawing residual product from the intake. A portion of the discharged sodium hypochlorite may have entered the Delaware river. A sample was obtained from the Delaware river just outside the intake structure and there was no detectable chlorine in the sample and there were no abnormal conditions noted on the river. Based on Environmental Licensing review, this was reportable to the state of NJ within 15 minutes. The report to the state was initiated at 1608 on 10/5/11.

"Subsequent calls were made to the Hope Creek Senior NRC Resident, the National Response Center and the US Coast Guard. Affected systems are limited to the Station Service Water (SSW) system and the sodium hypochlorite water treatment system. There was no impact on plant operations and these systems remain fully operable. Evaluation is underway to fully understand the impacts of the fuse failure to prevent reoccurrence. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment continues to function as required. There were no injuries or reported wildlife impact."

ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY NOT AS DESCRIBED IN THE INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

"During a review of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for a 3-gallon can elevator used in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area, it was determined that the ISA incorrectly describes the IROFS used to control movement of SNM. The system is composed of two sequential can elevators that are used to move SNM to different floors. A Fuel Business System (FBS) automated control and associated gate controls are designated as one of the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). In the ISA, this IROFS is incorrectly attributed to the 2nd can elevator instead of the 1st can elevator. Based on a review of this condition, determined at approximately 1400 on October 5, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.

"The FBS and associated gate control were in place at all times on the 1st can elevator, was operating correctly, and supported by management measures. No unsafe condition existed. The ISA and associated documentation are being updated to designate the correct can elevator and associated controls.

"Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.

"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."

The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and State and local authorities.