Event Notification Report for September 12, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2011 - 09/12/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
47256472574725847267
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47256
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LEENERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LEENERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 75 | Power Operation | 75 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION (TDEC)
"On August 25, 2011, it was discovered that a hazardous waste drum containing x-ray fixer waste was not shipped to the permitted Hazardous Waste Storage Facility within the timeframe required by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regulations. The drum was shipped to the permitted Hazardous Waste Storage Facility on September 01, 2011. The written notification to TDEC was signed on September 12, 2011."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 25, 2011, it was discovered that a hazardous waste drum containing x-ray fixer waste was not shipped to the permitted Hazardous Waste Storage Facility within the timeframe required by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regulations. The drum was shipped to the permitted Hazardous Waste Storage Facility on September 01, 2011. The written notification to TDEC was signed on September 12, 2011."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 47257
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/12/2011
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
MISSING/UNACCOUNTED FOR AM-241 SPECIAL FORM SEALED SOURCE IN A M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR
A Michigan National Guard Unit in Lansing, MI while preparing for deployment identified that a 250 microcurie Am-241 special form sealed source (S/N Z03-C-36663) was missing from a M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector. The detector was last confirmed intact in 2008 prior to the Unit's last deployment to Iraq.
The licensee has initiated a formal investigation and notified the State of Michigan of the incident.
* * * UPDATE AT 1332 EDT ON 09/13/11 FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
"Description of the event: On September 12, 2011 the Michigan Army National Guard, United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) warehouse, Lansing, MI reported to the licensee of a missing Am-241 cell from a M43A1 chemical agent detector. The Am-241 cell is a sealed source, special form that contains 250 microcuries of Am-241. The Am-241 cell (s/n C-36663) belonged to detector s/n D-36025. Detector is NSN 6665-01-081-8140 and SSDR no. NR-1129-D-102-S (inactive).
"The detector with Am-241 cell belongs to 'A' Co. 125th Infantry. A physical inventory was performed by 'A' Co. in January 2008 at which time the unit was deployed to Kuwait for 1 year. The unit was getting ready for redeployment to Kuwait in the next several weeks and performed an inspection of all equipment needing to be shipped. It was at this time that cell C-36663 was discovered missing from the detector. The USPFO warehouse was searched wall to wall and the missing cell was not found. The Michigan National Guard is conducting a formal investigation regarding the lost radioactive cell. Exposure to personnel is not likely to occur in an unrestricted area since the Am-241 source is contained in a cell module that is sealed source special form."
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Whitney) via e-mail.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1148 EDT ON 09/22/11 FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO PETE SNYDER * * *
The item identified as lost was located on post therefore this report is retracted.
Notified R3DO (Stone) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Allston) via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
A Michigan National Guard Unit in Lansing, MI while preparing for deployment identified that a 250 microcurie Am-241 special form sealed source (S/N Z03-C-36663) was missing from a M43A1 Chemical Agent Detector. The detector was last confirmed intact in 2008 prior to the Unit's last deployment to Iraq.
The licensee has initiated a formal investigation and notified the State of Michigan of the incident.
* * * UPDATE AT 1332 EDT ON 09/13/11 FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *
"Description of the event: On September 12, 2011 the Michigan Army National Guard, United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) warehouse, Lansing, MI reported to the licensee of a missing Am-241 cell from a M43A1 chemical agent detector. The Am-241 cell is a sealed source, special form that contains 250 microcuries of Am-241. The Am-241 cell (s/n C-36663) belonged to detector s/n D-36025. Detector is NSN 6665-01-081-8140 and SSDR no. NR-1129-D-102-S (inactive).
"The detector with Am-241 cell belongs to 'A' Co. 125th Infantry. A physical inventory was performed by 'A' Co. in January 2008 at which time the unit was deployed to Kuwait for 1 year. The unit was getting ready for redeployment to Kuwait in the next several weeks and performed an inspection of all equipment needing to be shipped. It was at this time that cell C-36663 was discovered missing from the detector. The USPFO warehouse was searched wall to wall and the missing cell was not found. The Michigan National Guard is conducting a formal investigation regarding the lost radioactive cell. Exposure to personnel is not likely to occur in an unrestricted area since the Am-241 source is contained in a cell module that is sealed source special form."
Notified R3DO (Lipa) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Whitney) via e-mail.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1148 EDT ON 09/22/11 FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO PETE SNYDER * * *
The item identified as lost was located on post therefore this report is retracted.
Notified R3DO (Stone) and FSME (McIntosh). Provided to ILTAB (Allston) via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47258
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KLINE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KLINE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/13/2011
Notification Time: 01:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 17:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 01:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 17:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On September 12, 2011, at 1745 PDT operators declared the control room envelope (CRE) inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10 Action B. This was due to discovery of inadequately documented CRE in-leakage test data.
"On September 12, 2011, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] personnel reviewing the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 determined that the test report provided inadequate information to conclude that the most limiting alignment for control room pressurization would result in zero cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage into the CRE, contrary to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis for the most limiting design basis accident. Three of the four ventilation alignments tested had reported values of in-leakage greater than zero CFM.
"Plant staff implemented compensatory measures by placing the control room ventilation system into its pressurization accident alignment at 1828 PDT using the alignment from the test which had a reported value of zero CFM in-leakage. Additionally, administrative controls are being established to maintain post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System leakage at a rate that would ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the test.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL KENNEDY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1816 EDT ON 09/16/2011 * * *
"On 9/13/11 procedure revisions were approved with reduced limits for post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage. These reduced limits ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the CRE in-leakage test. Plant staff have since determined that the potential benefit of operating the control room ventilation system in its pressurization alignment was unnecessary with the ECCS leakage restriction and on 9/16/11 operators restored the control room ventilation system into its normal operating alignment."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Greg Pick)
* * * UPDATE FROM SHANE GUESS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0042 EDT ON 10/19/2011 * * *
"This is an update to EN #47258 reported on 9/13/11 where it was reported that operators had declared the Control Room Envelope inoperable. [This report was subsequently] updated on 9/16/2011.
"On 10/18/11 at 16:45 PDT, plant staff determined that the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 was not performed using a bounding configuration which would result in greatest consequence to the control room operators. The recorded in-leakage from the test was therefore considered to be non-bounding.
"[As a result of this determination, plant staff have] implemented additional compensatory measures by issuing a shift order requiring the use of self-contained breathing apparatus and potassium iodide tablets under certain accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.196 and NEI 99-03.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Campbell).
"On September 12, 2011, at 1745 PDT operators declared the control room envelope (CRE) inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10 Action B. This was due to discovery of inadequately documented CRE in-leakage test data.
"On September 12, 2011, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] personnel reviewing the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 determined that the test report provided inadequate information to conclude that the most limiting alignment for control room pressurization would result in zero cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage into the CRE, contrary to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis for the most limiting design basis accident. Three of the four ventilation alignments tested had reported values of in-leakage greater than zero CFM.
"Plant staff implemented compensatory measures by placing the control room ventilation system into its pressurization accident alignment at 1828 PDT using the alignment from the test which had a reported value of zero CFM in-leakage. Additionally, administrative controls are being established to maintain post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System leakage at a rate that would ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the test.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL KENNEDY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1816 EDT ON 09/16/2011 * * *
"On 9/13/11 procedure revisions were approved with reduced limits for post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage. These reduced limits ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the CRE in-leakage test. Plant staff have since determined that the potential benefit of operating the control room ventilation system in its pressurization alignment was unnecessary with the ECCS leakage restriction and on 9/16/11 operators restored the control room ventilation system into its normal operating alignment."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Greg Pick)
* * * UPDATE FROM SHANE GUESS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0042 EDT ON 10/19/2011 * * *
"This is an update to EN #47258 reported on 9/13/11 where it was reported that operators had declared the Control Room Envelope inoperable. [This report was subsequently] updated on 9/16/2011.
"On 10/18/11 at 16:45 PDT, plant staff determined that the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 was not performed using a bounding configuration which would result in greatest consequence to the control room operators. The recorded in-leakage from the test was therefore considered to be non-bounding.
"[As a result of this determination, plant staff have] implemented additional compensatory measures by issuing a shift order requiring the use of self-contained breathing apparatus and potassium iodide tablets under certain accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.196 and NEI 99-03.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Campbell).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47267
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WELD SPEC INC
Region: 4
City: LUMBERTON State: TX
County:
License #: 05426
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WELD SPEC INC
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: WELD SPEC INC
Region: 4
City: LUMBERTON State: TX
County:
License #: 05426
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WELD SPEC INC
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/14/2011
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2011
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
ADELAIDE GIANTELLI (FSME)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
ADELAIDE GIANTELLI (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER EXCEEDS FIVE REM TEDE FOR YEAR
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On September 14, 2011, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a radiographer had exceeded 5 REM TEDE for the year. On September 12, 2011, while operating an INC IR102 camera, serial number 4843, containing a 67 Curie Iridium (IR) 192 source, the radiographer failed to fully retract the source into the camera after completing three shots on a weld. This was discovered when the trainee discovered that safety lock was already in the open/unlock position when he was going to unlock the source for the first exposure on the second weld. The radiation survey meter was turned off and no radiation pagers alarmed. Both radiographers noted that their 0-200 mR pocket dosimeters were off scale. They stopped work, fully retracted the source in the camera, and reported the incident to the RSO. Their Landauer badges were sent off for emergency processing and the results were received on September 14, 2011. The trainer received 3.361 Rem deep dose equivalent whole body dose. The trainee received 2.787 Rem. The total exposure for the year of the trainer is at 5.152 Rem and the RSO is still awaiting his August 2011 dose report to add to his total dose for the year. The trainer has been removed from duty. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA300."
This event occurred at Total Refinery, Highway 366 and 32nd St., Port Arthur, Texas, 77642.
Texas Incident Number: I-8884.
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On September 14, 2011, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a radiographer had exceeded 5 REM TEDE for the year. On September 12, 2011, while operating an INC IR102 camera, serial number 4843, containing a 67 Curie Iridium (IR) 192 source, the radiographer failed to fully retract the source into the camera after completing three shots on a weld. This was discovered when the trainee discovered that safety lock was already in the open/unlock position when he was going to unlock the source for the first exposure on the second weld. The radiation survey meter was turned off and no radiation pagers alarmed. Both radiographers noted that their 0-200 mR pocket dosimeters were off scale. They stopped work, fully retracted the source in the camera, and reported the incident to the RSO. Their Landauer badges were sent off for emergency processing and the results were received on September 14, 2011. The trainer received 3.361 Rem deep dose equivalent whole body dose. The trainee received 2.787 Rem. The total exposure for the year of the trainer is at 5.152 Rem and the RSO is still awaiting his August 2011 dose report to add to his total dose for the year. The trainer has been removed from duty. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA300."
This event occurred at Total Refinery, Highway 366 and 32nd St., Port Arthur, Texas, 77642.
Texas Incident Number: I-8884.