Event Notification Report for August 29, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/28/2011 - 08/29/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4722347215472164721847219472204722147212
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47223
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN GOELZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN GOELZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 17:24 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 17:24 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAINTENANCE INADVERTENTLY RENDERS CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On August 29, 2011, at 1724 PDT, plant operators discovered that the Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10, 'Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS),' lost its integrity. This was due to maintenance personnel removing a blank flange on the line to Unit 2 CRVS dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A with the dampers inoperable.
"On August 29, 2011, at approximately 1400 PDT, plant personnel completed maintenance on Unit 2 control room dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A and planned to perform static testing of the CRE on the morning of August 30, 2011. Prior to reporting off the clearance, maintenance personnel removed a blank flange from the upstream side of the dampers. This blank flange was maintaining the integrity of the CRE boundary while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were inoperable during the maintenance. Upon completion of maintenance on the dampers, the blank flange was removed with shift foreman authorization. Later, personnel recognized that the flange had been removed prematurely while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were still inoperable. Personnel took required actions associated with TS 3.7.10 and re-installed the blank flange on August 30, 2011, at 0110 PDT.
"The loss of the CRE boundary rendered the CRVS incapable of performing its specified safety function of mitigating the exposure of control room personnel to the consequences of an accident.
"The cause of the event was inadequate coordination between maintenance personnel and plant operators to maintain the integrity of the CRE boundary.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On August 29, 2011, at 1724 PDT, plant operators discovered that the Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10, 'Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS),' lost its integrity. This was due to maintenance personnel removing a blank flange on the line to Unit 2 CRVS dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A with the dampers inoperable.
"On August 29, 2011, at approximately 1400 PDT, plant personnel completed maintenance on Unit 2 control room dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A and planned to perform static testing of the CRE on the morning of August 30, 2011. Prior to reporting off the clearance, maintenance personnel removed a blank flange from the upstream side of the dampers. This blank flange was maintaining the integrity of the CRE boundary while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were inoperable during the maintenance. Upon completion of maintenance on the dampers, the blank flange was removed with shift foreman authorization. Later, personnel recognized that the flange had been removed prematurely while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were still inoperable. Personnel took required actions associated with TS 3.7.10 and re-installed the blank flange on August 30, 2011, at 0110 PDT.
"The loss of the CRE boundary rendered the CRVS incapable of performing its specified safety function of mitigating the exposure of control room personnel to the consequences of an accident.
"The cause of the event was inadequate coordination between maintenance personnel and plant operators to maintain the integrity of the CRE boundary.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47215
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK DIXON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK DIXON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/29/2011
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"At 1200 hours on 08/29/11, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) was removed from service for a planned maintenance outage on a site network server. The duration of work, which affects ERDS for Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2, is expected to be approximately four (4) hours. Since the ERDS will be unavailable during this maintenance activity, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). An update will be provided when the scheduled work has been completed and ERDS has been restored.
"ERDS is a direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters from the Brunswick Plant installed onsite computer system in the event of an emergency. During the time ERDS is unavailable, emergency plan contingency measures are in place to transmit data, if required.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified of this evolution and the planned return to service of the system."
* * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 8/29/11 FROM MILLER TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reports that the ERDS server replacement maintenance has been completed and ERDS capability was re-established at 2147 EDT on 8/29/11. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Widmann) notified.
"At 1200 hours on 08/29/11, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) was removed from service for a planned maintenance outage on a site network server. The duration of work, which affects ERDS for Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2, is expected to be approximately four (4) hours. Since the ERDS will be unavailable during this maintenance activity, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). An update will be provided when the scheduled work has been completed and ERDS has been restored.
"ERDS is a direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters from the Brunswick Plant installed onsite computer system in the event of an emergency. During the time ERDS is unavailable, emergency plan contingency measures are in place to transmit data, if required.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified of this evolution and the planned return to service of the system."
* * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 8/29/11 FROM MILLER TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reports that the ERDS server replacement maintenance has been completed and ERDS capability was re-established at 2147 EDT on 8/29/11. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Widmann) notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47216
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
Region: 4
City: BOULDER State: CO
County:
License #: 082-08
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
Region: 4
City: BOULDER State: CO
County:
License #: 082-08
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/29/2011
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
AGREEMENT STATE - LOST IODINE-129 CALIBRATION SOURCE
The following report was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via facsimile:
"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received telephone notification of a lost Iodine-129 sealed source (~24.8 microCuries; Assay date: 6/1/1992) on 8/29/2011 at approximately 4:00 p.m. The University of Colorado, a research licensee, reported that a campus inspection conducted on 8/12/2011 identified a missing gamma counter calibration source. As of 8/29/2011, all efforts to locate the source have failed. It is suspected that the source was discarded with an entire sample rack that was removed from the counter for disposal at some time within the last six months. The source was used for reference in a gamma counter and was an epoxy sealed type source with a small vial geometry.
"The licensee will submit a written report with more detail within the next few days.
"No other details are available at this time."
Colorado Report: CO11-I11-13
The following report was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via facsimile:
"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received telephone notification of a lost Iodine-129 sealed source (~24.8 microCuries; Assay date: 6/1/1992) on 8/29/2011 at approximately 4:00 p.m. The University of Colorado, a research licensee, reported that a campus inspection conducted on 8/12/2011 identified a missing gamma counter calibration source. As of 8/29/2011, all efforts to locate the source have failed. It is suspected that the source was discarded with an entire sample rack that was removed from the counter for disposal at some time within the last six months. The source was used for reference in a gamma counter and was an epoxy sealed type source with a small vial geometry.
"The licensee will submit a written report with more detail within the next few days.
"No other details are available at this time."
Colorado Report: CO11-I11-13
Agreement State
Event Number: 47218
Rep Org: NEW JERSEY DEPT OF ENVIRONMENT PROT
Licensee: TRINITAS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: Elizabeth State: NJ
County:
License #: 332163
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: TRINITAS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: Elizabeth State: NJ
County:
License #: 332163
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE - LOST GADOLINIUM CAMERA SOURCES
The following report was received via facsimile.
"The (New Jersey) (Bureau of Emergency Response) BER received a call from the (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO at Trinitas Hospital at 1500 (EDT) on Monday August 29, 2011. This past Friday, while performing an inventory of their sealed sources, it was discovered that two (Gadolinium) Gd-153 camera sources were missing. These sources were dated March 2002, with an initial activity of 250 mCi apiece. (The half-life of Gd-153 is 241 days, therefore each source had decayed to ~0.01 mCi). The RSO stated that these sources were never used on the camera, and had been in storage since 2002. During the last routine inventory (July 2011) the sources were accounted for. Friday's inventory was being conducted as a result of a recent cleanup of the storage area. The RSO indicated that hospital staff conducted thorough searches of the hospital on Friday, as well as over the weekend, but have not found the sources. It was also indicated that the chief nuclear medicine technologist, who was involved in the cleanup, is currently overseas until September 7. When he returns, the RSO will discuss with him to see if he has knowledge of the location of these sources."
The search and investigation is still ongoing.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following report was received via facsimile.
"The (New Jersey) (Bureau of Emergency Response) BER received a call from the (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO at Trinitas Hospital at 1500 (EDT) on Monday August 29, 2011. This past Friday, while performing an inventory of their sealed sources, it was discovered that two (Gadolinium) Gd-153 camera sources were missing. These sources were dated March 2002, with an initial activity of 250 mCi apiece. (The half-life of Gd-153 is 241 days, therefore each source had decayed to ~0.01 mCi). The RSO stated that these sources were never used on the camera, and had been in storage since 2002. During the last routine inventory (July 2011) the sources were accounted for. Friday's inventory was being conducted as a result of a recent cleanup of the storage area. The RSO indicated that hospital staff conducted thorough searches of the hospital on Friday, as well as over the weekend, but have not found the sources. It was also indicated that the chief nuclear medicine technologist, who was involved in the cleanup, is currently overseas until September 7. When he returns, the RSO will discuss with him to see if he has knowledge of the location of these sources."
The search and investigation is still ongoing.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47219
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 09:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2011
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 09:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(4) - NAT PHENOM AFFECTING SAFETY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(4) - NAT PHENOM AFFECTING SAFETY
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS)
24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO FAILURE OF A GAMMA MONITORING SYSTEM
"On 8/28/11 at 0920 hrs. PDT, electrical storms in the area caused power surges. The site backup power generators activated as designed. However, it was later discovered that a gamma monitor associated with the waste water treatment process was damaged. When the gamma monitoring system failed, the system interlocks shut the system down as designed. The system has remained down since that time and will remain down until repaired.
"This report is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(b)(4), (24-hr. report criteria), 'Any natural phenomenon that has affected the availability or reliability of one or more Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS)'.
"An updated report with additional timeline information will be provided as the information becomes available.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low. The waste water treatment system was shut down as designed.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: The only potential pathway is gradual accumulation of uranium in the waste water treatment equipment over an extended period of time.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Concentration is controlled. Maximum concentration in the equipment is estimated to be less than 1.5 grams of uranium per liter based on gamma monitor reading when the system shut down.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT/ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Facility is licensed for 5 wt% U-235. Normal system clean out results in about 120 grams of uranium. A minimum critical mass assuming spherical geometry is [much greater than normal system content].
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: System automatically shut down as designed and will remain down until the equipment is repaired and returned to service.
* * * UPDATE AT 1214 EDT ON 09/02/11 FROM CALVIN MANNING TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received via email:
"At approximately 0920 local time, 8/28/2011 and closely associated in time with both a thunderstorm and a test of various internal backup power generators, an operator at the Waste Water Treatment (WWT) facility noticed that the gamma monitors on two sand filters had ceased to function correctly. Apparently as an immediate result of this failure to function, the associated flows to the sand filters shut down automatically (normal fail-safe shutdown). The system has remained down since that time and will remain down until the gamma monitoring system is repaired.
"This plant condition was brought to the attention of the HRR EHS&L staff on Tuesday 8/30/2011 at 0800 by an engineer responsible for the gamma monitoring system who was soliciting potential options to restore the system to service.
"At 0901 local time AREVA's HRR EHS&L notified the NRC Operation's Center of this condition per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (b) (4) (24 hour report) which requires reporting of any natural phenomenon that has or may have affected the intended safety function or availability or reliability of one or more items relied on for safety.
"Safety Significance of Event: The safety significance of this event is low. The feed and discharge to and from the waste water treatment sand filters were shut down as designed when the gamma detectors failed.
"Potential Nuclear Criticality Pathways Involved: The only potential pathway is for gradual build up / accumulation of uranium in the WWT equipment over an extended period of time (many years).
"Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, Etc.): Uranium concentration is controlled. The maximum concentration of uranium in the equipment is estimated to be less than 1.5 g U/L based on gamma monitor readings just prior to the system being shut down.
"Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of License material (Includes process limit and % worst case critical mass): The facility is licensed for 5 wt.% U-235. Normal system clean out results in about 120 grams of uranium. A minimum critical mass of uranium at 5 wt.% U-235 assuming spherical geometry is about 38,000 grams.
"Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and description of the failures or deficiencies: No control system failures occurred.
"Corrective Actions to Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was Implemented: The system automatically shut down as designed and will remain down until the equipment is repaired, functionally tested, and returned to service."
Notified R2DO (Sykes) and NMSS (Pstrak).
"On 8/28/11 at 0920 hrs. PDT, electrical storms in the area caused power surges. The site backup power generators activated as designed. However, it was later discovered that a gamma monitor associated with the waste water treatment process was damaged. When the gamma monitoring system failed, the system interlocks shut the system down as designed. The system has remained down since that time and will remain down until repaired.
"This report is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(b)(4), (24-hr. report criteria), 'Any natural phenomenon that has affected the availability or reliability of one or more Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS)'.
"An updated report with additional timeline information will be provided as the information becomes available.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low. The waste water treatment system was shut down as designed.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: The only potential pathway is gradual accumulation of uranium in the waste water treatment equipment over an extended period of time.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Concentration is controlled. Maximum concentration in the equipment is estimated to be less than 1.5 grams of uranium per liter based on gamma monitor reading when the system shut down.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT/ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Facility is licensed for 5 wt% U-235. Normal system clean out results in about 120 grams of uranium. A minimum critical mass assuming spherical geometry is [much greater than normal system content].
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: System automatically shut down as designed and will remain down until the equipment is repaired and returned to service.
* * * UPDATE AT 1214 EDT ON 09/02/11 FROM CALVIN MANNING TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was received via email:
"At approximately 0920 local time, 8/28/2011 and closely associated in time with both a thunderstorm and a test of various internal backup power generators, an operator at the Waste Water Treatment (WWT) facility noticed that the gamma monitors on two sand filters had ceased to function correctly. Apparently as an immediate result of this failure to function, the associated flows to the sand filters shut down automatically (normal fail-safe shutdown). The system has remained down since that time and will remain down until the gamma monitoring system is repaired.
"This plant condition was brought to the attention of the HRR EHS&L staff on Tuesday 8/30/2011 at 0800 by an engineer responsible for the gamma monitoring system who was soliciting potential options to restore the system to service.
"At 0901 local time AREVA's HRR EHS&L notified the NRC Operation's Center of this condition per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (b) (4) (24 hour report) which requires reporting of any natural phenomenon that has or may have affected the intended safety function or availability or reliability of one or more items relied on for safety.
"Safety Significance of Event: The safety significance of this event is low. The feed and discharge to and from the waste water treatment sand filters were shut down as designed when the gamma detectors failed.
"Potential Nuclear Criticality Pathways Involved: The only potential pathway is for gradual build up / accumulation of uranium in the WWT equipment over an extended period of time (many years).
"Controlled Parameters (Mass, Moderation, Geometry, Concentration, Etc.): Uranium concentration is controlled. The maximum concentration of uranium in the equipment is estimated to be less than 1.5 g U/L based on gamma monitor readings just prior to the system being shut down.
"Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of License material (Includes process limit and % worst case critical mass): The facility is licensed for 5 wt.% U-235. Normal system clean out results in about 120 grams of uranium. A minimum critical mass of uranium at 5 wt.% U-235 assuming spherical geometry is about 38,000 grams.
"Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and description of the failures or deficiencies: No control system failures occurred.
"Corrective Actions to Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was Implemented: The system automatically shut down as designed and will remain down until the equipment is repaired, functionally tested, and returned to service."
Notified R2DO (Sykes) and NMSS (Pstrak).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47220
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS)
CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM HORN DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"On 8/29/11, it was discovered during troubleshooting on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound its local alarm horn. The module has been repaired and the system was returned to normal on 8/29/2011.
"An investigation into the cause of the failure has been initiated. There are indications that the apparent cause of the failure is an AC to DC converter that had a component short circuit.
"There were no active fissile material operations impacted by this failure. Consequently, no unsafe condition existed.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2)."
The licensee stated that the system had been tested satisfactorily within the last month.
The licensee will notify state and local authorities. The licensee also plans to notify NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
"On 8/29/11, it was discovered during troubleshooting on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound its local alarm horn. The module has been repaired and the system was returned to normal on 8/29/2011.
"An investigation into the cause of the failure has been initiated. There are indications that the apparent cause of the failure is an AC to DC converter that had a component short circuit.
"There were no active fissile material operations impacted by this failure. Consequently, no unsafe condition existed.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2)."
The licensee stated that the system had been tested satisfactorily within the last month.
The licensee will notify state and local authorities. The licensee also plans to notify NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47221
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALEX MCLELLAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALEX MCLELLAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PROGRAMMATIC DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED IN FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM
"At 1319 [hrs. EDT on] 8/29/2011, a programmatic deficiency was reported involving the SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] Fitness For Duty (FFD) program and compliance with 10CFR26. Current contractual agreement with PPL vendor to perform Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counseling and treatment for self referrals does not require appropriate reporting to the utility as mandated by 10CFR26.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4, 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."
The licensee has obtained an informal agreement by the vendor to report appropriate information until the contract can be amended.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1319 [hrs. EDT on] 8/29/2011, a programmatic deficiency was reported involving the SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] Fitness For Duty (FFD) program and compliance with 10CFR26. Current contractual agreement with PPL vendor to perform Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counseling and treatment for self referrals does not require appropriate reporting to the utility as mandated by 10CFR26.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4, 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."
The licensee has obtained an informal agreement by the vendor to report appropriate information until the contract can be amended.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47212
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STIDMON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STIDMON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/28/2011
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 06:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 06:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
"On 8/29/11, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) power supply will be isolated to perform a planned maintenance activity. The maintenance activity requires implementation of compensatory measures to maintain TSC functions during the activity. The compensatory measures include having the Emergency Director report to the Control Room and co-locating the remaining TSC staff at the EOF should an event be declared requiring ERO activation. The ERO has successfully previously demonstrated the ability to implement these compensatory measures. The maintenance activity is scheduled to be completed with the TSC returned to full functionality by the end of the dayshift on 8/29/11. The site Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the maintenance activity and instructed on the planned compensatory measures to be implemented during the activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1735 EDT ON 8/29/11 FROM ANDERSON TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reports that TSC maintenance activities were completed at 1308 CDT and that the TSC was declared fully operational at 1545 CDT on 8/29/11.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Kunowski) notified.
"On 8/29/11, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) power supply will be isolated to perform a planned maintenance activity. The maintenance activity requires implementation of compensatory measures to maintain TSC functions during the activity. The compensatory measures include having the Emergency Director report to the Control Room and co-locating the remaining TSC staff at the EOF should an event be declared requiring ERO activation. The ERO has successfully previously demonstrated the ability to implement these compensatory measures. The maintenance activity is scheduled to be completed with the TSC returned to full functionality by the end of the dayshift on 8/29/11. The site Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the maintenance activity and instructed on the planned compensatory measures to be implemented during the activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1735 EDT ON 8/29/11 FROM ANDERSON TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reports that TSC maintenance activities were completed at 1308 CDT and that the TSC was declared fully operational at 1545 CDT on 8/29/11.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Kunowski) notified.