Event Notification Report for August 12, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/11/2011 - 08/12/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
47229471554715147152471534733747264
Research Reactor
Event Number: 47229
Rep Org: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: THOMAS NEWTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: THOMAS NEWTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/01/2011
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2011
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
JESSE QUICHOCHO (NRR)
SCOTT SLOAN (NRR)
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
JESSE QUICHOCHO (NRR)
SCOTT SLOAN (NRR)
POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Technical Specification 3.2.3 requires two (2) channels of reactor period and reactor level are functional during work involving reactivity being moved in the core. In this case an experiment was being moved into the core and performing some blade testing. The reactor was shutdown at the time with all prior required tests competed satisfactorily. Upon completion, it was discovered that one of the period channels alarm function required by TS was disconnected.
The licensee implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
A conference call was established with the licensee and NRR (Adams, Quichocho and Sloan).
Technical Specification 3.2.3 requires two (2) channels of reactor period and reactor level are functional during work involving reactivity being moved in the core. In this case an experiment was being moved into the core and performing some blade testing. The reactor was shutdown at the time with all prior required tests competed satisfactorily. Upon completion, it was discovered that one of the period channels alarm function required by TS was disconnected.
The licensee implemented corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
A conference call was established with the licensee and NRR (Adams, Quichocho and Sloan).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47155
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: HRK SERVICES
Region: 4
City: HOOD RIVER State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-91120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: HRK SERVICES
Region: 4
City: HOOD RIVER State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-91120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received via email:
"On Friday August 12, 2011, the gauge owned by the licensee had been run over by a roller. The licensee reported that the gauge was in the shielded position and there were no elevated readings on the gauge. The gauge was placed into the shipping case and returned to the office for disposal."
The device was a CPN MC moisture density gauge serial number M390104801 containing 10 milliCuries Cs-137, Am-241/Be 50 milliCuries.
Incident #: 11-0028
* * * UPDATE FROM DARYL LEON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1253 ON 10/19/11 * * *
On August 17, 2011, the above source was received by Qal-Tek of Idaho Falls, ID who possesses NRC license 11-27610-01, for disposal. Both sources passed a leak test performed by Qal-Tek.
Notified R4DO (Campbell).
The following was received via email:
"On Friday August 12, 2011, the gauge owned by the licensee had been run over by a roller. The licensee reported that the gauge was in the shielded position and there were no elevated readings on the gauge. The gauge was placed into the shipping case and returned to the office for disposal."
The device was a CPN MC moisture density gauge serial number M390104801 containing 10 milliCuries Cs-137, Am-241/Be 50 milliCuries.
Incident #: 11-0028
* * * UPDATE FROM DARYL LEON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1253 ON 10/19/11 * * *
On August 17, 2011, the above source was received by Qal-Tek of Idaho Falls, ID who possesses NRC license 11-27610-01, for disposal. Both sources passed a leak test performed by Qal-Tek.
Notified R4DO (Campbell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47151
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PRATER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PRATER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 14:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 14:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO VALVE BODY LEAK
"On Friday August 12, 2011 at 1429 CDT, a through-wall leak was discovered on the body of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inlet Drain Pot Inboard Drain valve to the Main Condenser, AOV 2-2301-29. This is a safety-related, ASME Code Class 2 valve. Dresden Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.a, Condition B requires the leak to be isolated which renders the HPCI System Inoperable. The Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable at 1646 CDT, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G has been entered. The HPCI system is a single train system.
"The event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
T.S. 3.5.1 condition G is a 14 day LCO and the utility can make the repair at power. The unit is in a normal electrical lineup with offsite power available and all EDG's are operable. There was a slight increase in plant risk to "yellow" as a result of this issue.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On Friday August 12, 2011 at 1429 CDT, a through-wall leak was discovered on the body of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inlet Drain Pot Inboard Drain valve to the Main Condenser, AOV 2-2301-29. This is a safety-related, ASME Code Class 2 valve. Dresden Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.a, Condition B requires the leak to be isolated which renders the HPCI System Inoperable. The Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable at 1646 CDT, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G has been entered. The HPCI system is a single train system.
"The event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
T.S. 3.5.1 condition G is a 14 day LCO and the utility can make the repair at power. The unit is in a normal electrical lineup with offsite power available and all EDG's are operable. There was a slight increase in plant risk to "yellow" as a result of this issue.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47152
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/13/2011
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2011
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(5) - DEV FROM ISA
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
THOMAS HILTZ (NMSS)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
THOMAS HILTZ (NMSS)
INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS (ISA) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
"As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis, accident sequences associated with hydrogen piping are being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, facility walk downs of the piping were performed that identified a configuration that had not previously been analyzed. Based on a review of this as found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 12, 2011 that the system was improperly analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system inside the building has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and appropriate state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1228 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *
"Unnecessary piping branches have been removed and caps welded in place. The new piping configuration has been analyzed for ISA accident sequences.
"Based upon this, hydrogen supplies to affected equipment will resume and normal operations will commence."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
Notified R2DO (Widmann) and NMSS EO (Campbell).
"As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis, accident sequences associated with hydrogen piping are being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, facility walk downs of the piping were performed that identified a configuration that had not previously been analyzed. Based on a review of this as found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 12, 2011 that the system was improperly analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system inside the building has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and appropriate state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1228 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *
"Unnecessary piping branches have been removed and caps welded in place. The new piping configuration has been analyzed for ISA accident sequences.
"Based upon this, hydrogen supplies to affected equipment will resume and normal operations will commence."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
Notified R2DO (Widmann) and NMSS EO (Campbell).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47153
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Region: 1
City: CLEVELAND State: VA
County:
License #: GL-2266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Region: 1
City: CLEVELAND State: VA
County:
License #: GL-2266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION
The following report was received from the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:
"On August 12, 2011, the Radiation Safety Officer of American Electric Power, Clinch River Plant, reported a fixed gauge shutter stuck in the open position. The gauge is a Thermo MeasureTech Model 5197 containing 100 millicuries of cesium-137. It is a general license device used to measure levels in a fly ash precipitator hopper. Based on the licensee's lock-out procedures for entry into the hopper, the licensee has been authorized to continue operations. The licensee has contracted a licensed service provider to repair or replace the gauge. The malfunction does not pose a risk of additional radiation exposure to personnel.
VA report ID: VA-11-0007
The following report was received from the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:
"On August 12, 2011, the Radiation Safety Officer of American Electric Power, Clinch River Plant, reported a fixed gauge shutter stuck in the open position. The gauge is a Thermo MeasureTech Model 5197 containing 100 millicuries of cesium-137. It is a general license device used to measure levels in a fly ash precipitator hopper. Based on the licensee's lock-out procedures for entry into the hopper, the licensee has been authorized to continue operations. The licensee has contracted a licensed service provider to repair or replace the gauge. The malfunction does not pose a risk of additional radiation exposure to personnel.
VA report ID: VA-11-0007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47337
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: G. S. GRIFFIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: G. S. GRIFFIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/11/2011
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 05:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2011
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 05:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On August 12, 2011, while removing the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B from service for planned maintenance, Unit 2 secondary containment and partial Group II primary containment isolation signals were initiated upon disconnecting the battery with the following systems and components successfully started and actuated as designed:
- Unit 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) systems automatically started
- Complete actuation of Unit 2 secondary containment isolation devices in system 2T41
- Partial Group 2 primary containment isolation devices in systems in Division II associated with the 2D11, 2P33, and 2T48 systems.
"The procedure for rotating the affected battery chargers did not contain adequate direction to ensure the charger was functioning properly before disconnecting the associated battery in preparation for its replacement. This actuation was confirmed to be an invalid actuation as an unplanned response associated with this maintenance activity. Therefore, the event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv), since it was not a valid actuation. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) the option of reporting this event as a telephone notification within 60 days is being used. The event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because the actuations were not planned and were not expected to occur. In this case the systems to which the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) apply are general containment (primary and secondary) isolation signals as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) for the 'B' logic resulting in isolation of the associated valves on Unit 2, thereby affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Control room personnel restored the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B and the condition was cleared."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 12, 2011, while removing the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B from service for planned maintenance, Unit 2 secondary containment and partial Group II primary containment isolation signals were initiated upon disconnecting the battery with the following systems and components successfully started and actuated as designed:
- Unit 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) systems automatically started
- Complete actuation of Unit 2 secondary containment isolation devices in system 2T41
- Partial Group 2 primary containment isolation devices in systems in Division II associated with the 2D11, 2P33, and 2T48 systems.
"The procedure for rotating the affected battery chargers did not contain adequate direction to ensure the charger was functioning properly before disconnecting the associated battery in preparation for its replacement. This actuation was confirmed to be an invalid actuation as an unplanned response associated with this maintenance activity. Therefore, the event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv), since it was not a valid actuation. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) the option of reporting this event as a telephone notification within 60 days is being used. The event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because the actuations were not planned and were not expected to occur. In this case the systems to which the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) apply are general containment (primary and secondary) isolation signals as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) for the 'B' logic resulting in isolation of the associated valves on Unit 2, thereby affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Control room personnel restored the Unit 2, Division II 24/48 volt DC Cabinet 2B and the condition was cleared."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47264
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER, INC
Region: 1
City: DELRAY BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 3519-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER, INC
Region: 1
City: DELRAY BEACH State: FL
County:
License #: 3519-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/14/2011
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2011
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JIM WHITNEY BY EMAIL (ILTA)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JIM WHITNEY BY EMAIL (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING CS-137 SOURCE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"[The State of Florida] received a report from licensee of a missing 144.6 microCurie Cs-137 sealed source used as a dose calibrator. Source was first discovered missing by inventory on Aug 12, 2011. Also reported by licensee that the Hot Lab was broken into 2 weeks ago and items were missing from a crash cart. Advised licensee to make a police report. Central Inspection Office assigned to investigate."
Florida Incident Number: FL11-078.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received via facsimile:
"[The State of Florida] received a report from licensee of a missing 144.6 microCurie Cs-137 sealed source used as a dose calibrator. Source was first discovered missing by inventory on Aug 12, 2011. Also reported by licensee that the Hot Lab was broken into 2 weeks ago and items were missing from a crash cart. Advised licensee to make a police report. Central Inspection Office assigned to investigate."
Florida Incident Number: FL11-078.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf