Event Notification Report for August 11, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/10/2011 - 08/11/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4714147142471434714947147
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47141
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 01:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 00:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 01:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 00:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM INSERTED DUE TO A FEEDWATER LEAK ON A MIN FLOW LINE
"NMP2 inserted a manual reactor scram due to a through wall leak on feedwater pump 2FWS-P1A minimum flow line. 2FWS-P1A has been removed from service to minimize the leak. All control rods inserted and all systems functioned as designed. The unit will remain in hot shutdown until plant startup."
All systems functioned as required and the scram was uncomplicated.
The licensee plans to issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.
* * * UPDATE AT 1035 EDT ON 8/11/11 FROM MANLEY TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee will not be issuing a press release regarding this manual scram. R1DO (Powell) notified.
"NMP2 inserted a manual reactor scram due to a through wall leak on feedwater pump 2FWS-P1A minimum flow line. 2FWS-P1A has been removed from service to minimize the leak. All control rods inserted and all systems functioned as designed. The unit will remain in hot shutdown until plant startup."
All systems functioned as required and the scram was uncomplicated.
The licensee plans to issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.
* * * UPDATE AT 1035 EDT ON 8/11/11 FROM MANLEY TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee will not be issuing a press release regarding this manual scram. R1DO (Powell) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47142
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY A. MIELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY A. MIELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 07:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 03:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 07:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 03:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 68 | Power Operation |
INITIATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
"At 0327 [CDT] on August 11, 2011, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold commenced a reactor shutdown as required by TS 3.7.2.B for both River Water Supply subsystems inoperable. At 0008 [CDT], both River Water Supply subsystems were declared inoperable as a result of high differential pressure across the intake travelling screens. TS 3.7.2.B requires that one River Water Supply subsystem be restored or commence reactor shutdown. While the River Water Supply system is currently supplying rated flow, high differential pressure across the travelling screens indicates the potential for eventual degraded flow. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a TS required shutdown.
"Additionally, the current condition of both trains of River Water Supply inoperable also potentially affects the plant capability to remove residual heat. Therefore, this event is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b )(3)(v)(B), as an event that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0327 [CDT] on August 11, 2011, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold commenced a reactor shutdown as required by TS 3.7.2.B for both River Water Supply subsystems inoperable. At 0008 [CDT], both River Water Supply subsystems were declared inoperable as a result of high differential pressure across the intake travelling screens. TS 3.7.2.B requires that one River Water Supply subsystem be restored or commence reactor shutdown. While the River Water Supply system is currently supplying rated flow, high differential pressure across the travelling screens indicates the potential for eventual degraded flow. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a TS required shutdown.
"Additionally, the current condition of both trains of River Water Supply inoperable also potentially affects the plant capability to remove residual heat. Therefore, this event is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b )(3)(v)(B), as an event that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47143
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 11:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNPLANNED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS
"At 1138 CDT, while in the process of shutting down as required by Technical Specifications (Reference EN# 47142), with the reactor at approximately 15 percent power, a manual scram was inserted in order to complete the TS Required Action of being in Mode 3 within 12 hours. Upon inserting the manual scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 inches resulting in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3 and 4 being received. This reactor water level response is considered normal following a reactor scram from power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level is currently being controlled in the normal band. All PCIS group isolations went to completion and were subsequently reset. The PCIS isolations all functioned properly. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 1138 CDT, while in the process of shutting down as required by Technical Specifications (Reference EN# 47142), with the reactor at approximately 15 percent power, a manual scram was inserted in order to complete the TS Required Action of being in Mode 3 within 12 hours. Upon inserting the manual scram, reactor water level dropped below 170 inches resulting in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3 and 4 being received. This reactor water level response is considered normal following a reactor scram from power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel. Reactor water level is currently being controlled in the normal band. All PCIS group isolations went to completion and were subsequently reset. The PCIS isolations all functioned properly. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47149
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND - COLLEGE PARK
Region: 1
City: COLLEGE PARK State: MD
County:
License #: MD-33-004-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND - COLLEGE PARK
Region: 1
City: COLLEGE PARK State: MD
County:
License #: MD-33-004-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DARYL JOHNSON e-mail (ILTA)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DARYL JOHNSON e-mail (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF MATERIAL
The following report was received from the state of Maryland via fax:
"The RSO of UMCP [University of Maryland - College Park] telephoned 8/11/11 at 3:00 p.m. to report the loss of a vial of 5 ÁCi [microCuries] C-14. [The RSO] indicated that they were in the process of cleaning out a lab and discovered the vial frozen inside of the lab freezer. The vial was removed and placed in a styrofoam cup and put on the counter for removal by the Radiation Safety Office. [At some time subsequent to placing the vial on the counter, the vial disappeared and is now presumed lost.] From the time of discovery of the vial to the response of the Radiation Safety Office was less than 3 hours. It is believed that the facility management personnel cleaning the office, picked up the cup, and disposed of it as regular trash. They looked through the trash and monitored, but couldn't find the vial."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following report was received from the state of Maryland via fax:
"The RSO of UMCP [University of Maryland - College Park] telephoned 8/11/11 at 3:00 p.m. to report the loss of a vial of 5 ÁCi [microCuries] C-14. [The RSO] indicated that they were in the process of cleaning out a lab and discovered the vial frozen inside of the lab freezer. The vial was removed and placed in a styrofoam cup and put on the counter for removal by the Radiation Safety Office. [At some time subsequent to placing the vial on the counter, the vial disappeared and is now presumed lost.] From the time of discovery of the vial to the response of the Radiation Safety Office was less than 3 hours. It is believed that the facility management personnel cleaning the office, picked up the cup, and disposed of it as regular trash. They looked through the trash and monitored, but couldn't find the vial."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47147
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS DESANTIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS DESANTIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 21:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 16:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 21:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 16:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF INTAKE COOLING WATER FOR 20 MINUTES
"At 1631 hours on Thursday, August 11, 2011, Turkey Point Unit 3 lost the function of the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) System for approximately 20 minutes. This is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D). Loss of function occurred when manual valve 3-50-406, ICW/Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve, failed closed. Valve 3-50-406 is located in the common discharge line preventing flow through both ICW headers to the CCW heat exchangers. Operations Department personnel opened the bypass valves associated with the failed valve and restored ICW flow to the CCW heat exchangers at approximately 1651 hours.
"Presently, Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 100% power with all systems stable."
The failed valve is a manual 24" butterfly valve. The bypass valve can maintain full flow. During this event, Operations personnel monitored CCW temperature. Unit 3 briefly entered T.S. 3.0.3 before restoring flow using the bypass. A high RCP temperature alarm was received following the momentary loss of ICW flow. The valve failure was accompanied with a loud bang.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1631 hours on Thursday, August 11, 2011, Turkey Point Unit 3 lost the function of the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) System for approximately 20 minutes. This is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D). Loss of function occurred when manual valve 3-50-406, ICW/Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve, failed closed. Valve 3-50-406 is located in the common discharge line preventing flow through both ICW headers to the CCW heat exchangers. Operations Department personnel opened the bypass valves associated with the failed valve and restored ICW flow to the CCW heat exchangers at approximately 1651 hours.
"Presently, Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 100% power with all systems stable."
The failed valve is a manual 24" butterfly valve. The bypass valve can maintain full flow. During this event, Operations personnel monitored CCW temperature. Unit 3 briefly entered T.S. 3.0.3 before restoring flow using the bypass. A high RCP temperature alarm was received following the momentary loss of ICW flow. The valve failure was accompanied with a loud bang.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.