Event Notification Report for August 06, 2011

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the state of California via e-mail:

"On August 8, 2011, Mr. Todd Rucker, RSO from Pavement Engineering, Inc., notified RHB [Radiation Health Branch] Sacramento that one of their moisture-density gauge operators lost a gauge at their job site on August 6, 2011 at approximately 4:30 am. The gauge had been borrowed from A. Teicher & Son, Inc., License No 4030-34. The gauge was used on a job site on HWY 70 in Yuba County, near the town of Olivehurst, CA."

The lost gauge is a Troxler, Model 4640-B, Serial number T464 1793.

This model moisture density gauge has an 8 mCi Cs-137 source.

California event number: 080611

* * * UPDATE FROM EPHRIME MEKURIA TO CHARLES TEAL ON 8/17/11 AT 1731 EDT * * *

Pavement Engineering has found the lost gauge.

Notified R4DO (Hay), FSME EO (Watson), ILTAB (Johnson), and Mexico via fax.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

INVALID ACTUATION OF MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"This telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written LER for an invalid actuation of the 1A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On August 6, 2011 at 1055 CDT, during the performance of surveillance testing on the 1A Containment Spray (CS) pump, an unexpected automatic start of the 1A MDAFW pump occurred. While installing jumpers in the B1F sequencer to cause an automatic start for the 1A CS pump per the test procedure, the jumpers were inadvertently connected to the wrong relay which started the 1A MDAFW pump instead. This automatic start was considered invalid since the start signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. The 1A MDAFW pump was restored to a normal standby alignment at 1131 CDT.

"The following required information is being submitted per NUREG-1022, Rev. 2.

"(a) The 1A MDAFW pump is an 'A' train component.

"(b) The 1A MDAFW pump automatic start is considered a complete train actuation.

"(c) Once the 1A MDAFW pump inadvertently started, the system functioned per design."

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:

"At 0530 PDT on 8/6/2011, a Model 4640 Troxler material density gauge belonging to Pavement Engineering of Redding, CA was lost at a construction site between McAllen Road and Olivehurst on Highway 70 south of Yuba City, CA. The operator set the gauge down by the side of the road and returned to find it missing. It was reported missing at 1105 PDT on 8/6/2011 to the California Emergency Management Agency who contacted the California Department of Public Health, Radiological Health Branch (RHB) at 1126 PDT. Sutter County Sheriff's office has responded and is investigating. Also contacted was Sutter County Fire Dept. A health physicist has been deployed from RHB to assist in the search with a variety of radiation survey instruments in case the gauge was misplaced by the side of the road.

"The gauge contains 9 mCi of Cs-137. "

* * * UPDATE ON 08/06/2011 AT 1936 PDT FROM JOHN FASSELL (VIA EMAIL) TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

"A survey by RHB staff over 0.6 miles of highway margin assisted by licensee personnel failed to recover the gauge. A reward will be posted by the licensee."

Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME EO (McKenney) via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO DROPPED CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY

"On August 6, 2011, at approximately 1119 MST, the Palo Verde Unit 1 reactor tripped from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The actuation was caused by a dropped Shutdown Group Control Element Assembly (CEA) during surveillance testing to exercise the CEAs. Following the reactor trip, one Regulating Group CEA indicated a failure to insert, however the CEA subsequently indicated fully inserted with no additional operator actions approximately 2 minutes after the trip. All CEAs are currently inserted fully into the reactor core. With the exception of the delayed indication of one CEA to fully insert, this was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Palo Verde Emergency Plan. No automatic or manual ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related electrical buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event.

"Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3."

Decay heat is being removed via the steam generators to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNUSUAL EVENT AND PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO DRYWELL UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM

"At 0152 [EDT], Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received red alarms for containment monitoring cabinets 10A and 10B along with a rise in drywell floor drain leakage and drywell pressure.

"At 0205 [EDT], Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered technical specification action statement (TS 3.4.5 B) due to unidentified leakage rise of greater than 2 gpm within 24 hours.

"At 0217 EDT, the control room commenced power reduction to mitigate the rise in drywell leakage and drywell pressure.

"At 0322 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event (EAL 2.1.1) due to unidentified drywell leakage greater than 10 gpm. Actual drywell floor drain leakage reached 11.3 gpm.

"The cause of the rise in unidentified leakage is unknown at this time.

"At 0345 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has commenced a plant shutdown."

The licensee has notified State and local authorities. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 08/06/2011 AT 1140 EDT FROM JULIAN THOMPSON TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *

The licensee terminated Notice of Unusual Event at 1127 EDT because leakage rates, drywell level, drywell pressure, rad levels, and all other parameters on the licensee checklist were normal and stable.

The licensee is continuing to power down in order to perform inspections in the drywell area.

The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified: IRD MOC (Gott), R1RA (Dean), R1DO (Bellamy), NRR (Leeds), NRR EO (Cheok), DHS (Inzer) and FEMA (O'Connel) .

INITIATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"On August 6, 2011, Reactor Protection System (RPS) power supply 1B failed resulting in a partial loss of power to Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups and an invalid actuation of those PCIS groups. PCIS groups 1 and 2 received partial isolation signals with no subsequent system isolations, as designed. PCIS group 3, 6, and 8 received partial isolation signals with resulting system isolations, also as designed. The combination of loss of RPS 1B and PCIS group 6 isolation resulted in the isolation of the Drywell Floor Drain Sump and the Drywell Continuous Atmospheric Monitor for both particulate and gaseous activity. Thus, both means of automatic monitoring of Reactor Coolant System leakage became inoperable. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5.D (all required leakage detection systems inoperable) and immediately entered LCO 3.0.3 as required.

"At the time of occurrence, RPS 1A was being supplied from its alternate source for scheduled maintenance. Thus, the alternate source was not available to RPS 1B.

"Unit 1 entered LCO 3.0.3 at 0524 [CDT], 'Initiate actions within one hour to place the unit in MODE 2 within 10 hours; MODE 3 within 13 hours; and MODE 4 within 37 hours.' At 0617, Unit 1 began reducing reactor power to comply with LCO 3.0.3.

"This event requires a 4 hour report IAW 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.'

"The PCIS isolations which occurred at 0524 CDT are also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B)(2), 'General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)], except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The event time for the PCIS isolations is 0524 CDT.

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

"Service Request 412927 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program."

* * * UPDATE ON 08/06/2011 AT 1350 EDT FROM WILLIAM BAKER TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

Browns Ferry restored power to the 1B Reactor Protection System power supply at 1208 CDT, reset all isolations and exited LCO 3.0.3. The licensee plans to return the unit to full power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Binoy Desai).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE RUN OVER BY EXCAVATOR

"Kentucky Radiation Health Branch was notified on 08/08/2011, by a representative from Patriot Engineering and Environmental, Inc. of a vehicle running over a portable gauge on Saturday morning, 08/06/2011. The gauge was run over by an excavator during backfill operation. The gauge is identified as Humboldt Model 5001 EZ, serial no. 3260, containing 11 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241/Be. Surveys of the damaged gauge taken by the licensee indicated that the source had not been breached and that there was no leakage."

Kentucky Event Report ID No: KY110006