Event Notification Report for August 02, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/01/2011 - 08/02/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4712047116471144722647488
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47120
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 13:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2011
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 13:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VULNERABILITY FROM A POTENTIAL HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK
"The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' On 08/02/2011 at 1346 CDT, the ANO Unit 2 Control Room was notified by Engineering that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause both the Red and Green Train Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) Rooms to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. This postulated condition would be possible due to normally open room purge dampers exposing ESF equipment in these rooms to a common area impacted by HELB conditions. The ESF Rooms contain the Red and Green Trains of High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Until further Engineering evaluation can be performed to validate this postulated scenario, ANO-2 has closed ESF room purge dampers to provide Red and Green ESF train separation during a potential HELB event.
"Refer to [ANO-2] Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2011-02772 for further information. The NRC Resident has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1514 EDT ON 8/18/11 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) on 08/02/2011 at 2127 [EDT] (EN# 47120). The initial report documented that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause rooms containing both trains of Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) equipment to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. The ESF rooms contain the High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Specifically, normally open ESF room purge dampers exposing both trains of ESF equipment to a common area impacted by postulated HELB conditions were not modeled in the ANO-2 HELB analysis. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has revised the ANO-2 HELB model to include the effects of the open ESF room purge dampers. The resulting analysis shows that a HELB event will not cause the required ESF equipment to exceed analyzed temperature limits with the room purge dampers in the open configuration. Therefore, the condition did not result in 'a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function' and did not result in an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. Based on the revised HELB analysis, the previous report (EN#47120) describes a condition that does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) or 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the retraction."
Notified R4DO (Hay).
"The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' On 08/02/2011 at 1346 CDT, the ANO Unit 2 Control Room was notified by Engineering that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause both the Red and Green Train Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) Rooms to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. This postulated condition would be possible due to normally open room purge dampers exposing ESF equipment in these rooms to a common area impacted by HELB conditions. The ESF Rooms contain the Red and Green Trains of High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Until further Engineering evaluation can be performed to validate this postulated scenario, ANO-2 has closed ESF room purge dampers to provide Red and Green ESF train separation during a potential HELB event.
"Refer to [ANO-2] Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2011-02772 for further information. The NRC Resident has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1514 EDT ON 8/18/11 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) on 08/02/2011 at 2127 [EDT] (EN# 47120). The initial report documented that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause rooms containing both trains of Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) equipment to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. The ESF rooms contain the High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Specifically, normally open ESF room purge dampers exposing both trains of ESF equipment to a common area impacted by postulated HELB conditions were not modeled in the ANO-2 HELB analysis. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'.
"Since the initial report, Engineering has revised the ANO-2 HELB model to include the effects of the open ESF room purge dampers. The resulting analysis shows that a HELB event will not cause the required ESF equipment to exceed analyzed temperature limits with the room purge dampers in the open configuration. Therefore, the condition did not result in 'a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function' and did not result in an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. Based on the revised HELB analysis, the previous report (EN#47120) describes a condition that does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) or 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the retraction."
Notified R4DO (Hay).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47116
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LINDSEY KOBERLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LINDSEY KOBERLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 09:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 09:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING AN EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR
A utility non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
A utility non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47114
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MONTANA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MONTANA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/01/2011
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED MAINTENANCE THAT WILL RESULT IN TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABILITY
"On August 02, 2011, at 0700 EDT, the Technical Support Center will be unavailable due to pre-planned maintenance to maintain the Technical Support Center and Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System ventilation system. The TSC is expected to be restored to available status in approximately 12 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures, and the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM TIM MILLER TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/2/2011 AT 1726 EDT* * *
On August 2, 2011 at 1645 EDT the TSC was restored and is now fully functional.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai).
"On August 02, 2011, at 0700 EDT, the Technical Support Center will be unavailable due to pre-planned maintenance to maintain the Technical Support Center and Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System ventilation system. The TSC is expected to be restored to available status in approximately 12 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures, and the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM TIM MILLER TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/2/2011 AT 1726 EDT* * *
On August 2, 2011 at 1645 EDT the TSC was restored and is now fully functional.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47226
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: U.S. STEEL
Region: 1
City: WEST MIFFLIN State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0309
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: U.S. STEEL
Region: 1
City: WEST MIFFLIN State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0309
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/31/2011
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2011
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILURE
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: Failure of the shutter mechanism on one of its generally licensed thickness gauges was identified immediately to operators through a computer based warning message and visually by a red status light adjacent to the gauge location. Adjustment of the air supply allowed the shutter to close but still not operate properly. Routine maintenance activities were not successful in allowing the shutter to return to operational status and Applied Health Physics were notified to provide radiological support. No radiation exposure to personnel ensued during this event. The device is identified as: Manufacturer (IRMS), Model (TG-2), Serial# (00M0397-I5), Isotope (Americium-241), Activity (3 Ci), Location (Cold Reduction Mill).
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: A faulty actuator cylinder.
"ACTIONS: The shutter mechanism was replaced, tested, and confirmed as operating properly. The actuator cylinder will be placed on a preventive maintenance schedule following this event."
PA Report No.: PA110022
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: Failure of the shutter mechanism on one of its generally licensed thickness gauges was identified immediately to operators through a computer based warning message and visually by a red status light adjacent to the gauge location. Adjustment of the air supply allowed the shutter to close but still not operate properly. Routine maintenance activities were not successful in allowing the shutter to return to operational status and Applied Health Physics were notified to provide radiological support. No radiation exposure to personnel ensued during this event. The device is identified as: Manufacturer (IRMS), Model (TG-2), Serial# (00M0397-I5), Isotope (Americium-241), Activity (3 Ci), Location (Cold Reduction Mill).
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: A faulty actuator cylinder.
"ACTIONS: The shutter mechanism was replaced, tested, and confirmed as operating properly. The actuator cylinder will be placed on a preventive maintenance schedule following this event."
PA Report No.: PA110022
Part 21
Event Number: 47488
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF McCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF McCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/29/2011
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2011
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PT 21 GRP (E-MAIL)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PT 21 GRP (E-MAIL)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION ON LIMITORQUE SMB-5T ACTUATOR CLUTCH LUG FAILURE
The following is a summary of information was received from Limitorque via facsimile:
"On August 2, 2011, Flowserve-Limitorque was notified by Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) Generating Station that a Limitorque SMB-5T valve actuator (1-MVOP-074-052) had failed to run open automatically during the performance of a stroke test. Electrical maintenance personnel working at the valve reported an abnormal mechanical noise. Upon disassembly, it was found that the driving lugs on both the sliding clutch gear and the flexible clutch were seriously worn with a significant amount of deformation. Further investigation by BFN showed that the declutch mechanism would not allow full engagement of the drive lugs on the sliding clutch and flexible clutch. These lugs must be engaged for motor operation to take place. The declutch mechanism required adjustment to allow full drive lug engagement.
"Following reassembly of the SMB-5T on 1-MVOP-074-052, an inspection was performed of the SMB-5T on valve 1-MVOP-074-066 which was manufactured and supplied to TVA at the same time. This actuator was functioning normally at the time of the inspection. Disassembly of the clutch compartment revealed evidence of deformation of the clutch drive lugs. To better evaluate the operation of the clutch components, the grease was cleaned out of the compartment and a boroscope used so that the action of the clutch could be seen. Boroscope examination of several declutching and re-clutching tests showed that the clutch lugs would not engage fully. The major contributing factor in this issue was found to be the external declutch lever stop screw adjustment. Adjustment of the lever stop screw significantly improved the lug engagement. Subsequently, BFN personnel inspected four additional SMB-5T actuators. The declutch components were found to be adjusted correctly and no indications of abnormal clutch lug wear were found.
"The potential for this issue is limited to SMB-5 and SMB-5T actuators only. Other sizes of SMB/SB/SBD actuators are not affected. This issue, when it occurs can affect the safety related function of the actuator by preventing proper motorized operation. Indications of the issue can include failure to complete valve stroke, failure to remain in motorized operation, intermittent motorized operation resulting in longer than expected stroke time, and/or abnormal noise in the clutch compartment.
"Limitorque performed an investigation per the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21. The failure of 1-MVOP-074-052 to operate was due to damage to the drive lug interface between the sliding clutch and the flexible clutch which resulted in the actuator disengaging from electric motor operation in mid-stroke of the valve. This lug damage occurred over time during normal operation of the actuator and is directly attributable to an assembly set-up error resulting in partial lug engagement. The actuators which were investigated at BFN Unit 1 were of relatively recent manufacture, having been shipped from the Limitorque factory in 2004. Limitorque's review of existing SMB-5/5T assembly procedures followed by interviews with assembly personnel led to the conclusion that the root cause of this event was that the Limitorque factory assembly procedure documents for the SMB-5/5T lack adequate detail to ensure reliable long term functionality of the clutching mechanism.
"Limitorque's review of previous industry operating experience did not show any history of problems related to drive lug engagement and/or declutch components in SMB-5/5T actuators. However to address the potential issue of insufficient drive lug engagement, Limitorque will issue a Maintenance Update to the MOV Users Group for distribution to the utilities (on or before January 15, 2012) containing recommendations for site inspection of the SMB-5/5T clutch mechanism as well as detailed instructions for set-up, adjustment and verification of proper clutch operation. As part of our internal corrective action, Limitorque will develop enhanced assembly and service procedures for the SMB-5/5T to include sufficient detail to ensure the proper set-up and function of the clutching mechanism. Limitorque assembly, field service, and QC personnel will be trained in the enhanced procedures."
Technical contacts:
John Thilking 434-522-9862
Jeff McConkey 434-845-9738
The following is a summary of information was received from Limitorque via facsimile:
"On August 2, 2011, Flowserve-Limitorque was notified by Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) Generating Station that a Limitorque SMB-5T valve actuator (1-MVOP-074-052) had failed to run open automatically during the performance of a stroke test. Electrical maintenance personnel working at the valve reported an abnormal mechanical noise. Upon disassembly, it was found that the driving lugs on both the sliding clutch gear and the flexible clutch were seriously worn with a significant amount of deformation. Further investigation by BFN showed that the declutch mechanism would not allow full engagement of the drive lugs on the sliding clutch and flexible clutch. These lugs must be engaged for motor operation to take place. The declutch mechanism required adjustment to allow full drive lug engagement.
"Following reassembly of the SMB-5T on 1-MVOP-074-052, an inspection was performed of the SMB-5T on valve 1-MVOP-074-066 which was manufactured and supplied to TVA at the same time. This actuator was functioning normally at the time of the inspection. Disassembly of the clutch compartment revealed evidence of deformation of the clutch drive lugs. To better evaluate the operation of the clutch components, the grease was cleaned out of the compartment and a boroscope used so that the action of the clutch could be seen. Boroscope examination of several declutching and re-clutching tests showed that the clutch lugs would not engage fully. The major contributing factor in this issue was found to be the external declutch lever stop screw adjustment. Adjustment of the lever stop screw significantly improved the lug engagement. Subsequently, BFN personnel inspected four additional SMB-5T actuators. The declutch components were found to be adjusted correctly and no indications of abnormal clutch lug wear were found.
"The potential for this issue is limited to SMB-5 and SMB-5T actuators only. Other sizes of SMB/SB/SBD actuators are not affected. This issue, when it occurs can affect the safety related function of the actuator by preventing proper motorized operation. Indications of the issue can include failure to complete valve stroke, failure to remain in motorized operation, intermittent motorized operation resulting in longer than expected stroke time, and/or abnormal noise in the clutch compartment.
"Limitorque performed an investigation per the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21. The failure of 1-MVOP-074-052 to operate was due to damage to the drive lug interface between the sliding clutch and the flexible clutch which resulted in the actuator disengaging from electric motor operation in mid-stroke of the valve. This lug damage occurred over time during normal operation of the actuator and is directly attributable to an assembly set-up error resulting in partial lug engagement. The actuators which were investigated at BFN Unit 1 were of relatively recent manufacture, having been shipped from the Limitorque factory in 2004. Limitorque's review of existing SMB-5/5T assembly procedures followed by interviews with assembly personnel led to the conclusion that the root cause of this event was that the Limitorque factory assembly procedure documents for the SMB-5/5T lack adequate detail to ensure reliable long term functionality of the clutching mechanism.
"Limitorque's review of previous industry operating experience did not show any history of problems related to drive lug engagement and/or declutch components in SMB-5/5T actuators. However to address the potential issue of insufficient drive lug engagement, Limitorque will issue a Maintenance Update to the MOV Users Group for distribution to the utilities (on or before January 15, 2012) containing recommendations for site inspection of the SMB-5/5T clutch mechanism as well as detailed instructions for set-up, adjustment and verification of proper clutch operation. As part of our internal corrective action, Limitorque will develop enhanced assembly and service procedures for the SMB-5/5T to include sufficient detail to ensure the proper set-up and function of the clutching mechanism. Limitorque assembly, field service, and QC personnel will be trained in the enhanced procedures."
Technical contacts:
John Thilking 434-522-9862
Jeff McConkey 434-845-9738