Event Notification Report for July 26, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/25/2011 - 07/26/2011
Agreement State
Event Number: 47095
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COASTAL TESTING LABORATORIES, INC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 01945
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: COASTAL TESTING LABORATORIES, INC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 01945
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/26/2011
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2011
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
MEXICO via fax/email
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
MEXICO via fax/email
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN HUMBOLDT NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On July 26, 2011, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a Humboldt model 5001 EZ moisture/density gauge serial number 3567 was stolen out of one of their trucks in Houston, Texas. The gauge contains a 40 milliCurie Americium-241 source and a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in the back of a pickup parked at a training center where the user was attending safety training. When the user returned to the truck, he found the lock and chain securing the gauge had been cut and the transport case with the gauge was missing. The user contacted his employer who then contacted local law enforcement who responded to the scene. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer also responded to the scene. The licensee believes that the gauge operating trigger was locked, but could not state that with all certainty. Additional information will be provided as it is received."
Texas Incident No.: I-8875
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On July 26, 2011, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a Humboldt model 5001 EZ moisture/density gauge serial number 3567 was stolen out of one of their trucks in Houston, Texas. The gauge contains a 40 milliCurie Americium-241 source and a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source. The gauge was locked in the back of a pickup parked at a training center where the user was attending safety training. When the user returned to the truck, he found the lock and chain securing the gauge had been cut and the transport case with the gauge was missing. The user contacted his employer who then contacted local law enforcement who responded to the scene. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer also responded to the scene. The licensee believes that the gauge operating trigger was locked, but could not state that with all certainty. Additional information will be provided as it is received."
Texas Incident No.: I-8875
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47096
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/26/2011
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2011
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITIONS INVOLVING THE SAFETY RELATED DIRECT CURRENT (DC) SYSTEM
"Information was received in regards to an old design issue identified in a Component Design Basis Inspection Unresolved Item. Two issues were identified with the Safety-Related Direct Current (DC) System:
"1. The plant's licensing basis states that non-safety-related electrical equipment, whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the specified safety-related electrical equipment required safety functions, is qualified as required. However, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) backup lift oil pump motors and the Containment Emergency Lighting Panel L49E1 are located inside containment and are not environmentally qualified. This could challenge the adequacy of electrical separation between the potentially grounded non-safety related equipment and the safety related batteries.
"2. Automatic transfer switches are installed to automatically transfer non-safety related loads such as non-nuclear instrumentation, station annunciators, plant computer, and integrated control system between two non-safety related inverters, which receive power from the safety-related DC power system. If a ground fault existed on one of these switches, the fault could be transferred from one power source to the redundant source, potentially impacting the ability of both safety-related DC power sources to perform their required functions. This type of transfer is not permitted by the plant's licensing basis.
"The breakers for the 4 RCP backup lift oil pump motors and for the Containment Emergency Lighting were opened. One train of instrumentation power was placed on its alternate power source from the Alternating Current (AC) system, eliminating the potential to impact both trains of the DC power system.
"This condition is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A-D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Information was received in regards to an old design issue identified in a Component Design Basis Inspection Unresolved Item. Two issues were identified with the Safety-Related Direct Current (DC) System:
"1. The plant's licensing basis states that non-safety-related electrical equipment, whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the specified safety-related electrical equipment required safety functions, is qualified as required. However, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) backup lift oil pump motors and the Containment Emergency Lighting Panel L49E1 are located inside containment and are not environmentally qualified. This could challenge the adequacy of electrical separation between the potentially grounded non-safety related equipment and the safety related batteries.
"2. Automatic transfer switches are installed to automatically transfer non-safety related loads such as non-nuclear instrumentation, station annunciators, plant computer, and integrated control system between two non-safety related inverters, which receive power from the safety-related DC power system. If a ground fault existed on one of these switches, the fault could be transferred from one power source to the redundant source, potentially impacting the ability of both safety-related DC power sources to perform their required functions. This type of transfer is not permitted by the plant's licensing basis.
"The breakers for the 4 RCP backup lift oil pump motors and for the Containment Emergency Lighting were opened. One train of instrumentation power was placed on its alternate power source from the Alternating Current (AC) system, eliminating the potential to impact both trains of the DC power system.
"This condition is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A-D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.