Event Notification Report for July 20, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/19/2011 - 07/20/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4707647078470794708047081470824708347117
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47076
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 13:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM CONCERN
"On July 20, 2011 at 1315 hours it was determined that a design deficiency at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) constituted a fire protection program concern which could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire. In the event of a postulated control room fire, a normally closed valve (EFHV0060) on the Essential Service Water (ESW) system return from the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger could spuriously open. If this occurs, the flow balance in the ESW system would be affected and cooling flow to other essential components could be reduced to below the minimum required flow.
"Present system operability is not affected as there has been no occurrence of a fire in the Control Room and compensatory actions are in place to detect and mitigate the effects of a fire in the Control Room. An hourly fire watch is currently in place in the control room and will remain in place until this issue is resolved. In addition to the hourly fire watch, alternate shutdown procedure OFN RP-017 is being revised to include interim compensatory actions to deenergize, and verify closed, valve EFHV0060.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. A follow-up licensee event report will be made in 60 days.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On July 20, 2011 at 1315 hours it was determined that a design deficiency at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) constituted a fire protection program concern which could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire. In the event of a postulated control room fire, a normally closed valve (EFHV0060) on the Essential Service Water (ESW) system return from the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger could spuriously open. If this occurs, the flow balance in the ESW system would be affected and cooling flow to other essential components could be reduced to below the minimum required flow.
"Present system operability is not affected as there has been no occurrence of a fire in the Control Room and compensatory actions are in place to detect and mitigate the effects of a fire in the Control Room. An hourly fire watch is currently in place in the control room and will remain in place until this issue is resolved. In addition to the hourly fire watch, alternate shutdown procedure OFN RP-017 is being revised to include interim compensatory actions to deenergize, and verify closed, valve EFHV0060.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. A follow-up licensee event report will be made in 60 days.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47078
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WARREN MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WARREN MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 15:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 15:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION
"Duke Energy Scientific Services group representative notified the NC Wildlife Resources Commission at 1555 hours that MNS was operating their LLI Pumps to maintain discharge temperatures within the NPDES permit average monthly temperature limit.
"Based on the elevated lake temperatures, action to align circulating water to the LLI (cooler water) is necessary to prevent exceeding discharge temperature limits. Operation of the LLI pumps is sometimes needed during this time of year to comply with the water permit. Substantial effort is taken to avoid this alignment due to the potential to accelerate the natural phenomenon of oxygen depletion in the lower depths of Lake Norman that occurs as water temperature increases. The normal seasonal oxygen level changes can stress the fish population in that depth of the lake.
"During the operation of the LLI pumps, Duke Energy's Scientific Services group monitors water quality and fish in the lake via the following activities,
1) Hydro acoustic surveys of the Cowan's Ford Dam fore-bay both immediate to the dam and also an approximate 2 mile run up the Catawba River channel.
2) Monitoring of fish behavior in the immediate vicinity of the LLI. A DIDSON camera sits atop the LLI (25 meter deep).
3) Water quality monitoring including dissolved oxygen and temperature profiles at every meter to the bottom of the lake. These profiles occur in the fore-bay and at multiple locations up the channel.
4) Hourly MNS discharge temperature monitoring.
"These activities will continue to be exercised until the LLI pumps are turned off or the natural cycle of oxygen depletion has ended.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Duke Energy Scientific Services group representative notified the NC Wildlife Resources Commission at 1555 hours that MNS was operating their LLI Pumps to maintain discharge temperatures within the NPDES permit average monthly temperature limit.
"Based on the elevated lake temperatures, action to align circulating water to the LLI (cooler water) is necessary to prevent exceeding discharge temperature limits. Operation of the LLI pumps is sometimes needed during this time of year to comply with the water permit. Substantial effort is taken to avoid this alignment due to the potential to accelerate the natural phenomenon of oxygen depletion in the lower depths of Lake Norman that occurs as water temperature increases. The normal seasonal oxygen level changes can stress the fish population in that depth of the lake.
"During the operation of the LLI pumps, Duke Energy's Scientific Services group monitors water quality and fish in the lake via the following activities,
1) Hydro acoustic surveys of the Cowan's Ford Dam fore-bay both immediate to the dam and also an approximate 2 mile run up the Catawba River channel.
2) Monitoring of fish behavior in the immediate vicinity of the LLI. A DIDSON camera sits atop the LLI (25 meter deep).
3) Water quality monitoring including dissolved oxygen and temperature profiles at every meter to the bottom of the lake. These profiles occur in the fore-bay and at multiple locations up the channel.
4) Hourly MNS discharge temperature monitoring.
"These activities will continue to be exercised until the LLI pumps are turned off or the natural cycle of oxygen depletion has ended.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47079
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE BAHNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 13:18 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 20:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 13:18 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - PRESS RELEASE AFTER FIRE ON SITE
"On July 20, 2011 at 1318 PDT, during performance of STP M-9A, 'Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test,' personnel reported a fire on the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-1. No abnormal indications were observed in the control room and no annunciator for 'Fire Detected' was received. Operators shutdown the EDG and the onsite fire department responded immediately.
"On July 20, 2011 at 1322 PDT, personnel reported that the fire, which was centered around the exhaust insulation material, had been extinguished.
"EDG 1-1 is in a scheduled Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) and is not being relied on for emergency onsite power. The two sources of offsite power (the 230 kV startup system and the 500 kV system) along with the remaining two EDGs, are available and operable.
"Unit 2 was not affected by the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
A press release will be issued by the licensee.
"On July 20, 2011 at 1318 PDT, during performance of STP M-9A, 'Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test,' personnel reported a fire on the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-1. No abnormal indications were observed in the control room and no annunciator for 'Fire Detected' was received. Operators shutdown the EDG and the onsite fire department responded immediately.
"On July 20, 2011 at 1322 PDT, personnel reported that the fire, which was centered around the exhaust insulation material, had been extinguished.
"EDG 1-1 is in a scheduled Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) and is not being relied on for emergency onsite power. The two sources of offsite power (the 230 kV startup system and the 500 kV system) along with the remaining two EDGs, are available and operable.
"Unit 2 was not affected by the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
A press release will be issued by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47080
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: COREY GRAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: COREY GRAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 11:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 11:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR
A contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
A contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47081
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LOVITT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LOVITT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 00:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 21:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 00:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 21:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO NEGATIVE RATE TRIP FOLLOWING RAPID TURBINE LOAD REDUCTION
"At 2129 EST on 7/20/2011, Unit 1 reactor/turbine automatically tripped.
"Following the reactor trip, all safety-related equipment operated as designed. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated as expected from the Feedwater Isolation Signal. Primary PORVs and/or safety valves lifted and reseated as indicated by tailpipe temperatures and PRT pressure.
"Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, approximately 548 F and 2235 psig, with Auxiliary Feedwater supplying the steam generators.
"At the time of the trip, maintenance was in progress on Preferred Inverter #1. AOP-P.09 'Loss of 120VAC Preferred Power' was used to restore power to #1 Preferred board after the trip.
"Method of decay heat removal is via steam dumps to the condenser with MSIVs open.
"Current temperature and pressure: Temperature - 548 degrees Fahrenheit and stable, Pressure 2235 - psig and stable
"No indication of any primary/secondary leakage.
"All rods are inserted.
"Electrical alignment is normal, supplied from off-site power.
"No impact on Unit 2. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power/Mode 1"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee notified the State of Tennessee.
"At 2129 EST on 7/20/2011, Unit 1 reactor/turbine automatically tripped.
"Following the reactor trip, all safety-related equipment operated as designed. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated as expected from the Feedwater Isolation Signal. Primary PORVs and/or safety valves lifted and reseated as indicated by tailpipe temperatures and PRT pressure.
"Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, approximately 548 F and 2235 psig, with Auxiliary Feedwater supplying the steam generators.
"At the time of the trip, maintenance was in progress on Preferred Inverter #1. AOP-P.09 'Loss of 120VAC Preferred Power' was used to restore power to #1 Preferred board after the trip.
"Method of decay heat removal is via steam dumps to the condenser with MSIVs open.
"Current temperature and pressure: Temperature - 548 degrees Fahrenheit and stable, Pressure 2235 - psig and stable
"No indication of any primary/secondary leakage.
"All rods are inserted.
"Electrical alignment is normal, supplied from off-site power.
"No impact on Unit 2. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power/Mode 1"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee notified the State of Tennessee.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47082
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BRAZOS VALLEY INSPECTION SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: BRYAN State: TX
County:
License #: 02859
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: BRAZOS VALLEY INSPECTION SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: BRYAN State: TX
County:
License #: 02859
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 08:38 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOCKING MECHANISM
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On July 20, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that they had completed radiography operations at a field site using a INC IR-100 radiography camera containing an 82 curie iridium-192 source and retracted the source to its fully shielded position. The radiographer surveyed the camera and found the readings to be normal. When he disconnected the drive cable from the source pigtail, he found that the pigtail was no longer protruding from the back of the camera, it was now flush with the rear of the device. The shipping plug and the front dust cover were placed on the camera. The camera is being returned to the manufacturer for repair. Additional information will be provided as it is received. The licensee believes that the locking device that holds the pigtail in place inside the camera has failed. The serial number for the camera is 4590."
Texas Incident Report Number: I-8873
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On July 20, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that they had completed radiography operations at a field site using a INC IR-100 radiography camera containing an 82 curie iridium-192 source and retracted the source to its fully shielded position. The radiographer surveyed the camera and found the readings to be normal. When he disconnected the drive cable from the source pigtail, he found that the pigtail was no longer protruding from the back of the camera, it was now flush with the rear of the device. The shipping plug and the front dust cover were placed on the camera. The camera is being returned to the manufacturer for repair. Additional information will be provided as it is received. The licensee believes that the locking device that holds the pigtail in place inside the camera has failed. The serial number for the camera is 4590."
Texas Incident Report Number: I-8873
Agreement State
Event Number: 47083
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING SCIENCES, INC.
Region: 1
City: FT. PIERCE State: FL
County:
License #: 1136-12
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNIVERSAL ENGINEERING SCIENCES, INC.
Region: 1
City: FT. PIERCE State: FL
County:
License #: 1136-12
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via email from the State of Florida:
"An accident caused damage to a moisture density gauge at a work site on the Kissimmee River Restoration/CSX Bridge project. The operator of a large earthmoving vehicle lost control and ran over a parked truck with the gauge sitting on the tailgate. The truck & contents were mangled and buried under the earthmoving vehicle. The tech was not injured. A 15 foot area was roped off around the accident site. When the gauge was recovered it appeared to have some damage to the top housing. Survey readings were elevated to around 40-50 mR/hr at one foot. Using shielding, the gauge was transported to the Troxler office in Orlando for repair. Licensee sent a written report to this office. This office will take no further action on this incident."
The device is a Troxler Model No. 3440 S/N 37720 with two sources; 9.0 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241/Be.
Florida Incident No.: FL-11-062
The following report was received via email from the State of Florida:
"An accident caused damage to a moisture density gauge at a work site on the Kissimmee River Restoration/CSX Bridge project. The operator of a large earthmoving vehicle lost control and ran over a parked truck with the gauge sitting on the tailgate. The truck & contents were mangled and buried under the earthmoving vehicle. The tech was not injured. A 15 foot area was roped off around the accident site. When the gauge was recovered it appeared to have some damage to the top housing. Survey readings were elevated to around 40-50 mR/hr at one foot. Using shielding, the gauge was transported to the Troxler office in Orlando for repair. Licensee sent a written report to this office. This office will take no further action on this incident."
The device is a Troxler Model No. 3440 S/N 37720 with two sources; 9.0 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241/Be.
Florida Incident No.: FL-11-062
Agreement State
Event Number: 47117
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: QUANTEGY, INC.
Region: 1
City: OPELIKA State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID A. TURBERVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: QUANTEGY, INC.
Region: 1
City: OPELIKA State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID A. TURBERVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF LOST GENERAL LICENSED DEVICES
The following report was received from the State of Alabama via fax:
"On the afternoon of July 20, 2011, a representative of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control [the Agency] discovered that five general license devices containing radioactive material were unaccounted for at the closed Quantegy, Inc. facility located in Opelika, AL. The Agency representative was there to perform a routine inspection of general licensed activities and discovered that the facility was being demolished and the metal was being sold for scrap. Records indicate that the company did possess at one time fifteen general license devices. The Agency representative was able to account for ten of the fifteen devices. Five devices are unaccounted for at this time. The demolition crew, the scrap company and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources have been made aware of the missing devices. Also, the Agency is working with the manufacturer to determine if these devices were returned to the manufacturer in the past. The devices missing include four NDC Model 105 devices containing 250 millicuries (original assay) each of Cm-244. The serial numbers on record for these devices are 6075, 6025, 6102 and 6024. The fifth device missing is an NDC Model 103 device containing 150 millicuries (original assay) of Am-241. The serial number on record for this device is 2063.
"This is all the information that this Agency has at this time and is current as of 1530 CDT, August 2, 2011."
Alabama Incident No.: 11-30
* * * UPDATE FROM THE ALABAMA OFFICE OF RADIATION CONTROL TO HUFFMAN VIA FAX ON 7/12/12 AT 1605 EDT * * *
"On August 2, 2011, the NRC Operations Center was informed of an incident when five general devices containing radioactive material were determined to be unaccounted for at the closed Quantegy, Inc. facility located in Opelika, AL. At that time, an Agency representative was able to account for ten general license devices. These ten devices were secured in a building on site. On July 12, 2012, the Agency was advised that five of the ten in storage were now missing and are considered stolen. All five devices are NDC model 105 gauges each containing Curium-244. The serial number and activity of each are noted below:
NDC 105 SN 6025 Cm-244 250 mCi on 11/84
NDC 105 SN 6062 Cm-244 250 mCi on 8/87
NDC 105 SN 6064 Cm-244 250 mCi on 10/87
NDC 105 SN 6027 Cm-244 100 mCi on 5/98
NDC 105 SN 6001 Cm-244 250 mCi on 10/83
"The owner of the property indicated that the devices were stolen with other property in the recent past and the local law enforcement was notified. The time and date of the theft has not yet been made available to the Agency. A copy of the police report has been requested. The five remaining devices were impounded by Agency personnel for security on the morning of July 12, 2012."
R1DO (Burritt) has been notified. FSME Resources ILTAB notified via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
The following report was received from the State of Alabama via fax:
"On the afternoon of July 20, 2011, a representative of the Alabama Office of Radiation Control [the Agency] discovered that five general license devices containing radioactive material were unaccounted for at the closed Quantegy, Inc. facility located in Opelika, AL. The Agency representative was there to perform a routine inspection of general licensed activities and discovered that the facility was being demolished and the metal was being sold for scrap. Records indicate that the company did possess at one time fifteen general license devices. The Agency representative was able to account for ten of the fifteen devices. Five devices are unaccounted for at this time. The demolition crew, the scrap company and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources have been made aware of the missing devices. Also, the Agency is working with the manufacturer to determine if these devices were returned to the manufacturer in the past. The devices missing include four NDC Model 105 devices containing 250 millicuries (original assay) each of Cm-244. The serial numbers on record for these devices are 6075, 6025, 6102 and 6024. The fifth device missing is an NDC Model 103 device containing 150 millicuries (original assay) of Am-241. The serial number on record for this device is 2063.
"This is all the information that this Agency has at this time and is current as of 1530 CDT, August 2, 2011."
Alabama Incident No.: 11-30
* * * UPDATE FROM THE ALABAMA OFFICE OF RADIATION CONTROL TO HUFFMAN VIA FAX ON 7/12/12 AT 1605 EDT * * *
"On August 2, 2011, the NRC Operations Center was informed of an incident when five general devices containing radioactive material were determined to be unaccounted for at the closed Quantegy, Inc. facility located in Opelika, AL. At that time, an Agency representative was able to account for ten general license devices. These ten devices were secured in a building on site. On July 12, 2012, the Agency was advised that five of the ten in storage were now missing and are considered stolen. All five devices are NDC model 105 gauges each containing Curium-244. The serial number and activity of each are noted below:
NDC 105 SN 6025 Cm-244 250 mCi on 11/84
NDC 105 SN 6062 Cm-244 250 mCi on 8/87
NDC 105 SN 6064 Cm-244 250 mCi on 10/87
NDC 105 SN 6027 Cm-244 100 mCi on 5/98
NDC 105 SN 6001 Cm-244 250 mCi on 10/83
"The owner of the property indicated that the devices were stolen with other property in the recent past and the local law enforcement was notified. The time and date of the theft has not yet been made available to the Agency. A copy of the police report has been requested. The five remaining devices were impounded by Agency personnel for security on the morning of July 12, 2012."
R1DO (Burritt) has been notified. FSME Resources ILTAB notified via e-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.