Event Notification Report for July 14, 2011

AGREEMENT STATE - SOURCE DISCOVERED IN SCRAP SHIPMENT - TWO OTHERS STILL MISSING

"On Thursday July 14 a scrap dealer contacted the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) indicating a load of steel had set off their alarm. The scrap yard was able to identify the material that set off the alarm and isolate. On Friday July 15 VRMP staff went to the scrap yard to perform surveys and identify the material in question. The investigation determined that the material had come from the demolishing site of Dan River, Inc, a former textile business that closed in 2008. The gauge was determined to contain Kr-85 utilizing a radionuclide identifier and the GL database, which lists three Mahlo Controls Kr-85 gauges being possessed by Dan River, Inc. The VRMP continues to work with the scrap yard and demolishing company looking for the other two gauges. VRMP is also working with Mahlo Controls in researching the three gauges in question."

The sources in these generally licensed devices were originally 100 milliCuries each. It is estimated that they have decayed three half-lives and the current strength is estimated at approximately 13 milliCuries each.



THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTANT SIREN ACTUATION

"At about 1319 on July 14, 2011, Dauphin County 911 (Pennsylvania) was advised by a local resident that siren number 121 sounded for 3 minutes. Dauphin County (Pennsylvania) contacted the TMI main control room to inform Exelon of an inadvertent siren actuation at about 1350 on July 14, 2011.

"Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) later notified (about 1430 on July 14, 2011) the TMI main control room of the same issue.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) because offsite agencies were notified regarding the inadvertent actuation of part of the public notification system.

"Siren Maintenance was notified and is troubleshooting the issue."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUDIBILITY OF CRITICALITY EVACUATION ALARM DEGRADED

"Early in the morning of 7/14/2011, intermittent trouble alarms associated with production area speakers were observed by security and Plant Superintendent personnel. Testing of the Public Address (PA) system confirmed that the speakers could not be heard in the production areas. The speakers associated with the PA system are also used for the criticality evacuation alarm. When in trouble alarm, the speakers do not function. Safety personnel were notified of the problem and a stop movement order was issued for the affected areas. Operations personnel were briefed on the situation and were provided with compensatory measures (e.g., radios). Nonessential personnel were also removed from the affected areas. Troubleshooting of the system was performed (e.g., re-termination of control module and panel reset) and the system was retested and restored to service. Operations have resumed in the affected areas.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION FROM RANDY SHACKELFORD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1315 EDT ON 7/15/2011 * * *

"Further testing of the speakers associated with the criticality evacuation alarm has indicated that the system was not compromised as originally thought when the telephone notification was made on 7/14/2011. The test performed on 7/14/2011 did not properly test the criticality evacuation alarm circuit. The criticality evacuation alarm was retested on 7/15/2011; and, the alarm was heard throughout the affected areas. Therefore, NFS is retracting the Event Report #47049. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Freemen) and NMSS EO (Rahimi). Notified Fuels Group via E-mail.

NEWS RELEASE REGARDING ARREST OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT WORKING AT PALO VERDE

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"This event is being reported as a newsworthy concern to the public under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) was notified that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) issued a news release at 1411 on July 14, 2011, regarding entrance to the PVNGS site property by an individual who MCSO alleged to be an undocumented immigrant.

"The individual had entered Palo Verde's Security Owner Controlled Area on July 13, 2011, but was not granted access to the site's Protected Areas surrounding the three units and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. PVNGS Security contacted MCSO to validate the identification card furnished by the individual at the Security Owner Controlled Area. MCSO determined the identification card to be suspicious, responded to the site, detained the individual, and transported him off-site for questioning.

"The station notified NRC Resident Inspectors and Region IV staff of the condition on July 13, 2011.

"Arizona Public Service is planning to issue a news release and is responding to media inquiries regarding the matter."

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO SUSPECTED INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND INTO THE PROTECTED AREA

The licensee declared an Unusual Event due to indications that potentially dangerous contraband had been introduced into the protected area. After further investigation, the licensee determined that the indication of contraband was due to incorrect interpretation of screening equipment imaging. The licensee exited its Unusual Event declaration at 1942 CDT. The licensee continues to investigate the circumstances leading to this event declaration.

The licensee notified State and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED BASED ON REACTOR COOLANT LEAK GREATER THAN 10 GPM

"At 2053 on July 14, 2011 Salem unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to reactor coolant system leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute. While performing a monthly Emergency Core Cooling System vent of the high head safety injection piping a motor operated valve was opened and a leak developed on the high head piping greater than 10 gallons per minute. The leak rate was approximately 11-15 gallon per minute. The leak was terminated when the motor operated valve was closed. The time of the leak was about 6 minutes."

At this time the leak is believed to be from a crack on the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) relief valve line which is connected to the high head piping. A total of approximately 90 gallon of reactor coolant leaked into the BIT room. The licensee has declared the high head safety injection inoperable and is proceeding to shutdown under Tech Spec 3.0.3.

The license has notified appropriate State and local authorities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM KARL HANPHO TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/15/11 AT 0025 EDT* * *

"Salem Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage being greater than 10 gpm and pressurizer level decreasing. Leakage was estimated to be approximately 15 gpm. The leakage was determined to be from a weld on the high head charging injection relief valve connection. This leaking weld impacts both trains of high head charging/safety injection. Both trains of high head charging/safety injection were declared inoperable at 2038 [EDT] on July 14, 2011, entering TS 3.0.3. Salem Unit 2 began the Technical Specification shutdown in accordance with TS 3.0.3 at 2136 [EDT]. The technical specification shutdown is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) and RAL 11.1.1.a.

"In addition since the leakage from the weld on the high head charging/safety injection piping exceeded the analyzed limit for ESF leakage outside containment, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and RAL 11.2.2.b as a condition that prevents the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Salem unit 2 is currently at 27% and reducing power."

The licensee notified the states of New Jersey and Delaware, Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), NRR-EO (Giiter) and IRD (Morris).

* * * UPDATE FROM KARL HANPHO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 7/15/11 AT 0345 EDT* * *

Salem Unit 2 has exited the Unusual Event as of 0339 EDT. The criteria for exit was the leakage rate was below the 10 gpm rate. The plant is in Mode 3 and is preparing to cooldown.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), NRR EO (Giitter), IRD (Morris), DHS(Hill), and FEMA (Blankenship).

TEST REACTOR VIOLATED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

"The following special report is being made in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.7.2(1)(c) which states in part: There shall be a report not later than the following day by telephone or similar conveyance to the NRC Headquarters Operation Center of any reportable occurrence as defined in TS 1.3. TS 1.3 defines an observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls, such that the inadequacy caused the existence of a condition which results in a violation of technical specifications as a reportable occurrence.

"Specifically, on Thursday July 14, 2011, while performing routine surveillance checks, an operator left the control room while the console key remained in the console key switch and the switch was in the TEST position. This is in direct violation of the staffing requirements defined in TS 6.1.3(1)(a) which states a licensed reactor operator must be in the control room when the reactor is not secured. The reactor was not secured by the fact that the console key switch was not in the OFF position and the key remained in the console key switch. However, all control elements were fully inserted, the reactor was shut down, no work was in progress involving core fuel, core structure, control elements or drives and no experiments were being moved. This condition remained for a period of approximately 7 minutes until the cognizant senior reactor operator entered the control room and secured the reactor."

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT AGASIE TO PETE SNYDER ON 7/18/11 AT 0846 EDT * * *

After a records review the licensee determined that: the actual event time was 1055 AM CDT and the actual duration of time that the operator was not in the control room was 85 seconds.

Notified R3DO (Duncan) and NRR (Tran).

INITIATION OF MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING RESOLUTION PROCEDURE

"10CFR74.57(f)(2) requires notification within 24 hours that an MC&A [Material Control and Accounting] alarm resolution procedure has been initiated. In the solvent extraction area of Building 333, the input minus output value exceeded the MC&A limit. Because the alarm investigation procedure has been initiated, this notification is being made. There is no indication that a material loss has occurred.

"MC&A process monitoring tests for material balance were run as specified by applicable procedures and requirements. Based on the test results for the Building 333 solvent extraction area, the test limit was exceeded. An investigation is currently underway to resolve the issue.

"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

INOPERABLE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM WARNING HORNS

"As part of the corrective actions for the event reported on 7/13/11 [EN #47047], GNF-A performed a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility test covering the Controlled Access Area (CAA) at approximately 1655 on 7/14/11. The subsequent test revealed that the installed CAAS system failed to immediately activate the horn signal generators as expected. Activation of the associated warning horns was delayed approximately 3 minutes. This response time to activate horns did not meet the design requirement. Additionally, a review determined an approximately 3 minute horn signal delay was noted in a previous test on 7/12/11. An investigation into these matters is ongoing.

"The FMO [Fuel Manufacturing Operations] complex fissile material process operations were suspended on 7/14/11 and personnel evacuated. The emergency organization was activated and efforts to troubleshoot the root cause in the horn signal activation circuit delay initiated. All production activities involving Special Nuclear Material are shut down.

"The installed CAAS is a safety-significant system and is maintained through routine response checks and scheduled functional tests conducted in accordance with internal procedures. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2)."

The licensee notified NRC Region 2 personnel (Sykes), State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County EMA.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/17/11 AT 1826 EDT FROM OLLIS TO HUFFMAN * * *

The cause of the inoperable Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has been identified as a hardware failure - specifically a capacitor on a circuit board. The CAAS has been repaired and a comprehensive testing plan is under development. The licensee continues to withhold personnel from the Controlled Access Area and all production activities remain shut down. A root cause analysis and recovery plan are underway.

The licensee has contacted R2 (Sykes) and will be notifying state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman notified).

See related Events #47047 and #47066.