Event Notification Report for June 07, 2011

FIRE IN THE WEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM

"At 0940 CDT an alert (HA 2, EAL 1) for operating Mode less than 210 degrees F [was] declared for a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. Time of fire was 0930 CDT. Control room received multiple alarms [and] 480 V bus 1B4A amps were observed to be oscillating. Bus 1B4A was secured [and] buses 1B3A and 1B3A-4A were lost. Halon activated properly. [At] 0956 CDT all notifications to applicable personnel were completed. At 1000 CDT 4160v buses 1A2 / 1A4 were secured to facilitate fire fighting. Spent fuel pool cooling was lost [as a result of the de-energized busses and the licensee] entered AOP-36 for loss of SFP cooling. Heat up rate [was] determined by STA. Current time to boil for SFP is 88.3 hrs. Spent fuel pool cooling is currently back in service. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of an emergency class specified in the licensee's approved emergency plan."

Plant was in AOP-1 for flood mitigation. The fire is not believed to be flood related. Plant remains in AOP-1.

At about 0930 CDT the licensee noted fire in the west switchgear room. The fire brigade responded and found a room filled with smoke but no active fire. Halon did discharge in the room. At 0956 CDT, offsite assistance was called and Blair Fire Department responded to the site. Blair Fire Department confirmed no active fire in the switchgear room. All offsite power remained available as well as the emergency diesel generators if needed. The licensee is currently attempting to ventilate the room. A thorough inspection of the affected area and determine the caused of the electrical fault will be facilitated once the room has been fully ventilated.

The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A media or press release is also anticipated.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1313 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *

"Entered Alert for HA 3, EAL 1 access to a vital area (Switchgear and Turbine Building basement) due to toxic gases present from the fire in the West Switchgear room."

The licensee entered HA 3 at 1144 CDT. Their exit criteria is that the switchgear room is cleared for unimpeded access.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4IRC (Kennedy)

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO WILLIAM HUFFMAN 1421 EDT ON 6/7/11 * * *

At 1315 CDT, Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station has exited Alert HA 2, EAL. It has been confirmed that no fire remained in the vital area. Plant shutdown cooling remained in-service and spent fuel pool cooling was restored and temperature verified to be lowering. The licensee has also exited Alert HA 3, EAL 1 after it was confirmed that the environmental conditions from the event and associated Halon discharge does not affect the ability to safely operate or safely shutdown the reactor due to being in Mode 5 and shutdown cooling remaining in-service. Fort Calhoun remains in Unusual Event HU 1, EAL 5 for River Level greater than 1004' elevation as reported under EN #46929.

The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC made notifications of the event termination to DHS, FEMA, DOE HHS and USDA.

ERRORS IN METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

"On Tuesday, June 7, 2011, at 0800 hours, Pilgrim Station reviewed General Electric Hitachi (GEH) 10 CFR 50.46 Notification Letters 2011-02 and 2011-03. These letters indicate that certain errors were discovered in the methodology application and inputs used by GEH for nuclear fuel core configurations with GE14 and GNF2 fuel, and when corrected may increase the Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) limits in excess of 2200 degrees F under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. Pilgrim's core contains both GE14 and GNF2 fuel. 10 CFR 50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The Pilgrim licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with the criterion 50.46(b)(1) and must not exceed a PCT of 2200?F.

"GEH had provided a compensatory measure in the form of multiplier to be applied to the MAPLHGR (Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate) limit so that Pilgrim operates within 50.46 limits. Entergy/Pilgrim implemented the compensatory measure and as a result the errors reported have no impact on current plant operation or public health and safety. This 8-hour notification is being reported for conservative purposes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Based on 50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, Entergy/Pilgrim will submit a report within 30 days.

"Entergy/Pilgrim has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." The licensee also plans to notify the State of Massachusetts.

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO EXCESS OUTSIDE AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE

"Outside ambient air temperature exceeded the maximum analytical value for operability for Unit 1 D1 and D2 Diesel Generators at 1349 CDT. The calculated limiting outside air temperature needed for equipment in the D1 and D2 rooms to meet their temperature limits is 100.5?F. Outside ambient temperature exceeded this limiting value and both Unit 1 safeguards diesel generators were declared inoperable at 1349 CDT on 6/7/2011. If outside ambient air temperature is above the maximum analytical value, components within the D1 and D2 diesel rooms may not be able to perform their required functions thus preventing them from fulfilling their safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)).

"Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Ambient outside air temperatures are at or near peak values for the day and expected to decrease approximately 1 to 2 degrees per hour which will restore ambient conditions to less than the maximum analytical value.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The outside air temperature has peaked at 101.4?F which is unusually high for this location and is expected to drop below the 100.5?F limit shortly. The licensee does not anticipate that this condition will be repeated again any time soon.

* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE INGALLS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1108 EDT ON 7/29/11 * * *

"An eight hour report (EN #46934) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) was made on June 7, 2011 for outside ambient air temperature exceeding the maximum analytical value for operability for Unit 1 D1 and D2 Diesel Generators.

"Subsequent engineering analysis determined that D1 & D2 diesel generators would have performed their safety function with outside air temperatures of up to 102.5 degrees F. The outside air temperature did not reach 102.5 degrees F and the diesel generators were not inoperable.

"The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report, EN #46934, is retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Giessner).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAS CHROMATOGRAPH NICKEL-63 SOURCE FAILED LEAK TEST

The following information was provided by the State via facsimile:

"The RSO called to report a leaking Ni-63 sealed source in a gas chromatograph. The leak test result was 0.04 microCuries of removable contamination at ECD [Electron Capture Device] inlet. The RSO contacted the manufacturer, Agilent, about this event and they will be making a site visit to investigate. The system was shut down and isolated. The defective detector will be sent back to the manufacturer. There is no apparent cause. The system is only a year old and is used carefully. All other areas surveyed & swiped were negative for contamination."

Event #: NY-11-10

NONCONSERVATIVE VALVE ACTUATOR PROGRAM SOFTWARE

"In Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuator Program (KVAP) Error Report 2011-02, Kalsi Engineering identified an error in the KVAP software that provides default flow and torque coefficients for ball and plug valves which can affect margin predictions. Communication between Kalsi and Duke Energy personnel confirmed that non-conservative torque values were calculated for select ball valves used at Oconee for containment isolation. As a result of the Kalsi error, the non-conservatively calculated torque values resulted in negative actuator margins, calling into question the actuators' capability to close the valves under all design conditions. Therefore, it has been determined that the KVAP software program error constitutes a defect, reportable under 10CFR21.

"Four safety-related containment isolation valves in the High Pressure Injection system were impacted, requiring entry into TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, on two Oconee units [Units 2 and 3]."

Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling outage at the time of this event and the actuator spring was replaced during the outage. The valves on units 2 and 3 required a Notification of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) which occurred on June 2, 2011. Three of the four valves were declared operable on June 10, 2011 and the remaining valve was declared operable the next day.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.