Event Notification Report for June 04, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/03/2011 - 06/04/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
46927469254711847022
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 46927
Rep Org: ENI US OPERATING COMPANY
Licensee: ENI US OPERATING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: Anchorage State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29411-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM LIVERANCE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: ENI US OPERATING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: Anchorage State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29411-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM LIVERANCE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/05/2011
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2011
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)
FIXED PROCESS GAUGE FAILED SEMI-ANNUAL SHUTTER TEST
A Tracerco 600DP series nuclear gauge licensed to ENI US Operating Company failed a semi-annual shutter test on June 4, 2011. The gauge is located at Oliktok Production Pad, Oliktok Point, Alaska.
Specifically, the RSO for the gauge stated that the extension rod (attached to the arming rod with the cesium source) could not be withdrawn sufficiently to move the source behind the shutter mechanism. Binding of the arming and/or extension rods could be felt in attempts to move the source behind the shutter mechanism.
Mechanical restrictions were felt as the RSO successfully returned the source to its in-service position following the failed shutter test. The gauge is currently in-service and there is no immediate operational or safety requirement to lock this gauge out.
Tracerco has been notified of the deficiency by phone. Tracerco will provide a technician to repair this discrepancy.
The 600DP gauge houses a 925 MBq Cs-137 source with serial #RM510.
A Tracerco 600DP series nuclear gauge licensed to ENI US Operating Company failed a semi-annual shutter test on June 4, 2011. The gauge is located at Oliktok Production Pad, Oliktok Point, Alaska.
Specifically, the RSO for the gauge stated that the extension rod (attached to the arming rod with the cesium source) could not be withdrawn sufficiently to move the source behind the shutter mechanism. Binding of the arming and/or extension rods could be felt in attempts to move the source behind the shutter mechanism.
Mechanical restrictions were felt as the RSO successfully returned the source to its in-service position following the failed shutter test. The gauge is currently in-service and there is no immediate operational or safety requirement to lock this gauge out.
Tracerco has been notified of the deficiency by phone. Tracerco will provide a technician to repair this discrepancy.
The 600DP gauge houses a 925 MBq Cs-137 source with serial #RM510.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46925
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/04/2011
Notification Time: 23:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 16:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2011
Notification Time: 23:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 16:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
BOTH CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS OUT OF SERVICE
"On 06/04/2011, personnel observed the temperature control valve for the 'B' control structure chiller not operating properly. To investigate control valve operation, the controller was taken to the manual mode (from automatic) at 1614 [EDT]. The control valve stem was lubricated, and the valve was operated with the controller in the manual mode. The 'B' control structure chiller was inoperable in this condition until control valve responsiveness was validated (total of 35 minutes, until 1649 [EDT]). The 'B' chiller continued to operate during this period.
"The 'A' control structure chiller was out of service during this timeframe to perform maintenance activities. Hence, neither chiller was operable.
"The control structure chillers provide control building habitability during unit operation. The control structure chillers also provide cooling water for emergency switchgear room cooling on unit one only.
"This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 7/22/2011 AT 1519 FROM LONNIE CRAWFORD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On June 4, 2011, Susquehanna reported the simultaneous inoperability of both control structure (CS) chillers as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). After further investigation, Susquehanna has concluded that the 'A' and 'B' CS chillers were not inoperable at the same time.
"On June 3, 2011 at 1608, fluctuating amperage was observed on the 'A' CS chiller and the chiller was declared inoperable. As a result, the 'B' CS chiller was placed in service with the 'A' CS chiller placed in standby. Subsequent troubleshooting of the 'A' CS chiller included replacing the chiller temperature controller with a spare while the original controller was evaluated in the shop. The original controller was re-installed on June 4, 2011 at approximately 1030 but did not resolve the issue. The 'A' CS chiller was later shutdown and removed from standby on June 4, 2011 at 1727.
"Originally, Susquehanna believed that the fluctuating amperage on the 'A' chiller was an operability issue. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the observed oscillations were not rapid enough and did not have sufficient amplitude to cause damage to the chiller motor and were within design limits. The conclusion is that the 'A' control structure chiller was operable and would continue to operate for its 30 day mission time with the observed current oscillations. Although the 'A' chiller was inoperable as a result of troubleshooting at various times on June 3 and 4, the 'A' chiller was available and operable during the short period of time on June 4 when the 'B' chiller was inoperable. .
"Based on the above information, this ENS report is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Dentel).
"On 06/04/2011, personnel observed the temperature control valve for the 'B' control structure chiller not operating properly. To investigate control valve operation, the controller was taken to the manual mode (from automatic) at 1614 [EDT]. The control valve stem was lubricated, and the valve was operated with the controller in the manual mode. The 'B' control structure chiller was inoperable in this condition until control valve responsiveness was validated (total of 35 minutes, until 1649 [EDT]). The 'B' chiller continued to operate during this period.
"The 'A' control structure chiller was out of service during this timeframe to perform maintenance activities. Hence, neither chiller was operable.
"The control structure chillers provide control building habitability during unit operation. The control structure chillers also provide cooling water for emergency switchgear room cooling on unit one only.
"This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 7/22/2011 AT 1519 FROM LONNIE CRAWFORD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On June 4, 2011, Susquehanna reported the simultaneous inoperability of both control structure (CS) chillers as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). After further investigation, Susquehanna has concluded that the 'A' and 'B' CS chillers were not inoperable at the same time.
"On June 3, 2011 at 1608, fluctuating amperage was observed on the 'A' CS chiller and the chiller was declared inoperable. As a result, the 'B' CS chiller was placed in service with the 'A' CS chiller placed in standby. Subsequent troubleshooting of the 'A' CS chiller included replacing the chiller temperature controller with a spare while the original controller was evaluated in the shop. The original controller was re-installed on June 4, 2011 at approximately 1030 but did not resolve the issue. The 'A' CS chiller was later shutdown and removed from standby on June 4, 2011 at 1727.
"Originally, Susquehanna believed that the fluctuating amperage on the 'A' chiller was an operability issue. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the observed oscillations were not rapid enough and did not have sufficient amplitude to cause damage to the chiller motor and were within design limits. The conclusion is that the 'A' control structure chiller was operable and would continue to operate for its 30 day mission time with the observed current oscillations. Although the 'A' chiller was inoperable as a result of troubleshooting at various times on June 3 and 4, the 'A' chiller was available and operable during the short period of time on June 4 when the 'B' chiller was inoperable. .
"Based on the above information, this ENS report is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Dentel).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47118
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JASON SOLBERG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JASON SOLBERG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 22:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 22:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SIGNAL CAUSED A PARTIAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION
"While preparing to restore AOV 3-1601-22, Drywell /Torus Vent Valve, to operable status following solenoid replacement, operations personnel attempted to open AOV 3-1601-22 in accordance with plant procedures. When the control switch was taken to the open position, the U3 control room received a partial U3 Containment System Isolation. Light indication was lost for several Containment Isolation valves.
"Troubleshooting revealed that a control power fuse had blown during the attempt to open AOV 3-1601-22. Operations personnel entered the appropriate Technical Specification and Technical Requirement Manual Required Actions.
"Operations personnel replaced the blown fuse and indication was restored to the affected valves.
"Following the fuse replacement, the following containment air sample valves were observed to have repositioned during the event: 3-8501-3B, 3-8501-1B, 3-8501-5B, 3-9205B, 3-9206B, 3-9207B, and 3-9208B.
"Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that during the AOV solenoid replacement, the conduit cover screw penetrated the tape of an electrical splice and caused a short to ground.
"The solenoid was repaired and systems were restored as required.
"During this event, all valves repositioned to their intended safety position. There was no loss of function as a result of this condition. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not compromised.
"Since this ESF actuation was caused by an invalid signal, it is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv) (A) as specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a) (1), which allows a telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report within 60 days."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While preparing to restore AOV 3-1601-22, Drywell /Torus Vent Valve, to operable status following solenoid replacement, operations personnel attempted to open AOV 3-1601-22 in accordance with plant procedures. When the control switch was taken to the open position, the U3 control room received a partial U3 Containment System Isolation. Light indication was lost for several Containment Isolation valves.
"Troubleshooting revealed that a control power fuse had blown during the attempt to open AOV 3-1601-22. Operations personnel entered the appropriate Technical Specification and Technical Requirement Manual Required Actions.
"Operations personnel replaced the blown fuse and indication was restored to the affected valves.
"Following the fuse replacement, the following containment air sample valves were observed to have repositioned during the event: 3-8501-3B, 3-8501-1B, 3-8501-5B, 3-9205B, 3-9206B, 3-9207B, and 3-9208B.
"Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that during the AOV solenoid replacement, the conduit cover screw penetrated the tape of an electrical splice and caused a short to ground.
"The solenoid was repaired and systems were restored as required.
"During this event, all valves repositioned to their intended safety position. There was no loss of function as a result of this condition. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not compromised.
"Since this ESF actuation was caused by an invalid signal, it is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv) (A) as specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a) (1), which allows a telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report within 60 days."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47022
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD AGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD AGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 07/05/2011
Notification Time: 09:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 15:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2011
Notification Time: 09:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2011
Event Time: 15:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION CAUSED ALL 4 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS TO START
"This report is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The event was an invalid actuation of all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). At the time of the event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was in a refueling outage with the core offloaded.
"At 1517 EDT on 6/4/2011, breaker 212 on Vital Battery Board III was opened under a work order in preparation for breaker maintenance. The opening of this breaker started the 2A-A EDG by removing the control power to the 2A-A EDG emergency start relays. In addition, the loss of control power to 2A-A EDG remote control circuit actuated a relay in the common emergency start circuit, which caused the other three EDGs to start. The 2A-A EDG was declared inoperable until it's control power was restored approximately 30 minutes after starting, requiring an unplanned entry for Unit 1 into Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1.1 action b. The impact on EDG control power was not foreseen when planning the breaker maintenance, so it was not expected that any EDGs would start.
"Both trains of the Unit 1 and 2 EDGs received a complete train actuation, started and functioned successfully. The EDGs ran unloaded. Actual plant conditions did not exist that required an automatic start of the EDGs. Therefore, this actuation was invalid."
The 4 EDGs were not loaded and were returned to normal stand-by alignment.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The event was an invalid actuation of all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). At the time of the event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was in a refueling outage with the core offloaded.
"At 1517 EDT on 6/4/2011, breaker 212 on Vital Battery Board III was opened under a work order in preparation for breaker maintenance. The opening of this breaker started the 2A-A EDG by removing the control power to the 2A-A EDG emergency start relays. In addition, the loss of control power to 2A-A EDG remote control circuit actuated a relay in the common emergency start circuit, which caused the other three EDGs to start. The 2A-A EDG was declared inoperable until it's control power was restored approximately 30 minutes after starting, requiring an unplanned entry for Unit 1 into Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1.1 action b. The impact on EDG control power was not foreseen when planning the breaker maintenance, so it was not expected that any EDGs would start.
"Both trains of the Unit 1 and 2 EDGs received a complete train actuation, started and functioned successfully. The EDGs ran unloaded. Actual plant conditions did not exist that required an automatic start of the EDGs. Therefore, this actuation was invalid."
The 4 EDGs were not loaded and were returned to normal stand-by alignment.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.