Event Notification Report for May 14, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/13/2011 - 05/14/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46852
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/14/2011
Notification Time: 04:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2011
Event Time: 02:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2011
Notification Time: 04:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2011
Event Time: 02:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 14 | Power Operation | 14 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INABILITY TO MAINTAIN SPECIFIED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE BETWEEN DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER
"Following startup from RFO [Refueling Outage] 18, at approximately 14% reactor power, PNPS [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] was unable to set the conditions required to demonstrate the drywell to suppression chamber decay rate is less than 25% of the differential pressure decay rate for the maximum allowable bypass area of 0.2 ft2 [as required by] TS [Technical Specification] 3.7.A.4(b).
"Prior to exceeding 15% power, PNPS Technical Specifications require differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber to be greater than 1.17 psid. The licensee was not able to achieve this delta pressure and initiated troubleshooting to determine the cause. A plant shutdown is being initiated to continue this effort.
"The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing into the failure to establish test conditions. There is no threat to the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition."
The licensee suspects leakby in the Drywell to Torus vacuum breaker but will not be able to verify until the plant is shutdown.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of Massachusetts.
"Following startup from RFO [Refueling Outage] 18, at approximately 14% reactor power, PNPS [Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station] was unable to set the conditions required to demonstrate the drywell to suppression chamber decay rate is less than 25% of the differential pressure decay rate for the maximum allowable bypass area of 0.2 ft2 [as required by] TS [Technical Specification] 3.7.A.4(b).
"Prior to exceeding 15% power, PNPS Technical Specifications require differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber to be greater than 1.17 psid. The licensee was not able to achieve this delta pressure and initiated troubleshooting to determine the cause. A plant shutdown is being initiated to continue this effort.
"The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing into the failure to establish test conditions. There is no threat to the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition."
The licensee suspects leakby in the Drywell to Torus vacuum breaker but will not be able to verify until the plant is shutdown.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of Massachusetts.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46885
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT W. DITTMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT W. DITTMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/25/2011
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2011
Event Time: 14:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2011
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2011
Event Time: 14:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
VIOLATION OF LICENSE CONDITION
"On May 16, 2011, at 2013 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN) entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5, Condition B, because based on performance of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.5.2, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater system was determined to be inoperable. Failure of the surveillance was caused by loss of the ability to control the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) manually. This was the first operation of the TDAFWP since the turbine had been rebuilt and had a new governor and servo installed during the WBN refueling outage 10 in May 2011. Misalignment of the servo caused the controller to stick, so that the TDAFWP pump could not be controlled in manual. The servo was replaced and the TDAFWP subsequently passed its required surveillance. LCO 3.7.5 was exited at 1745 on May 19, 2011.
"Although the TDAFWP was not known to be inoperable until performance of the surveillance, TVA has concluded that the inoperability existed from the time that WBN entered Mode 3.
"WBN had entered Mode 3 at 1428 EDT, on May 14, 2011. LCO 3.0.4 prohibits MODE changes when an LCO is not met except under certain conditions that were not applicable to this event. Therefore, TVA considers that WBN entered Mode 3 without the required three operable trains of AFW.
"TVA also determined that the TDAFWP was inoperable for a period of 123 hours and 17 minutes while the plant was in Mode 3, which exceeded the 96 hours allowed for an inoperable train of AFW in LCO 3.7.5. (72 hours to restore, 6 hours to be in MODE 3, and 18 hours to be in MODE 4). It should be noted that actions were taken and completed within the required time from time of discovery of the condition.
"Changing MODEs when LCO 3.7.5 was not met, and exceeding the time allowed for an inoperable train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) were determined to be reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).
"Since these conditions are a violation of the requirements contained in Section 2.c of the WBN License (Technical Specifications), this notification is made in accordance with Watts Bar License condition 2.G.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."
"On May 16, 2011, at 2013 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN) entered Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5, Condition B, because based on performance of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.5.2, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater system was determined to be inoperable. Failure of the surveillance was caused by loss of the ability to control the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) manually. This was the first operation of the TDAFWP since the turbine had been rebuilt and had a new governor and servo installed during the WBN refueling outage 10 in May 2011. Misalignment of the servo caused the controller to stick, so that the TDAFWP pump could not be controlled in manual. The servo was replaced and the TDAFWP subsequently passed its required surveillance. LCO 3.7.5 was exited at 1745 on May 19, 2011.
"Although the TDAFWP was not known to be inoperable until performance of the surveillance, TVA has concluded that the inoperability existed from the time that WBN entered Mode 3.
"WBN had entered Mode 3 at 1428 EDT, on May 14, 2011. LCO 3.0.4 prohibits MODE changes when an LCO is not met except under certain conditions that were not applicable to this event. Therefore, TVA considers that WBN entered Mode 3 without the required three operable trains of AFW.
"TVA also determined that the TDAFWP was inoperable for a period of 123 hours and 17 minutes while the plant was in Mode 3, which exceeded the 96 hours allowed for an inoperable train of AFW in LCO 3.7.5. (72 hours to restore, 6 hours to be in MODE 3, and 18 hours to be in MODE 4). It should be noted that actions were taken and completed within the required time from time of discovery of the condition.
"Changing MODEs when LCO 3.7.5 was not met, and exceeding the time allowed for an inoperable train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) were determined to be reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).
"Since these conditions are a violation of the requirements contained in Section 2.c of the WBN License (Technical Specifications), this notification is made in accordance with Watts Bar License condition 2.G.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."