Event Notification Report for April 26, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/25/2011 - 04/26/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46786
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/26/2011
Notification Time: 03:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2011
Event Time: 00:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2011
Notification Time: 03:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2011
Event Time: 00:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
SAFETY RELATED PIPING HAD UNACCEPTABLE AIR VOID
"Engineering reported that an ultrasonic [test] had identified an unacceptable air void in the horizontal run of suction piping from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the Safety Injection pumps, Residual Heat Removal pumps, and Containment Spray pumps. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 0020 CDT [on] 04/26/2011, and actions were started to remove the [air] void by venting of the suction pipe. Unit 2 was in progress of low power physics testing following refueling outage 2RF12. Inspection for [air] voids is in response to NRC generic letter on voiding in ECCS piping.
"The void was removed from the system by venting. Engineering confirmed with ultrasonic [test] that the void was removed, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 0143 CDT [on] 04/26/2011."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE NIEMEYER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1628 EDT ON 6/23/2011 * * *
"Further analysis demonstrated that the declaration of inoperability was a conservative action, and RHR and SI would have fulfilled their respective safety functions and been operable. This analysis is based on a detailed study of the void transport and piping design. The analysis confirmed that one (1) train of containment spray was inoperable, however the containment spray safety function would have been fulfilled with the remaining operable [containment spray] train. Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this condition and this event has been evaluated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."
Notified R4DO (Deese).
"Engineering reported that an ultrasonic [test] had identified an unacceptable air void in the horizontal run of suction piping from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the Safety Injection pumps, Residual Heat Removal pumps, and Containment Spray pumps. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 0020 CDT [on] 04/26/2011, and actions were started to remove the [air] void by venting of the suction pipe. Unit 2 was in progress of low power physics testing following refueling outage 2RF12. Inspection for [air] voids is in response to NRC generic letter on voiding in ECCS piping.
"The void was removed from the system by venting. Engineering confirmed with ultrasonic [test] that the void was removed, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 0143 CDT [on] 04/26/2011."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE NIEMEYER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1628 EDT ON 6/23/2011 * * *
"Further analysis demonstrated that the declaration of inoperability was a conservative action, and RHR and SI would have fulfilled their respective safety functions and been operable. This analysis is based on a detailed study of the void transport and piping design. The analysis confirmed that one (1) train of containment spray was inoperable, however the containment spray safety function would have been fulfilled with the remaining operable [containment spray] train. Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this condition and this event has been evaluated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."
Notified R4DO (Deese).
Agreement State
Event Number: 46787
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STORK TESTING AND METALLURGICAL CONSULTING
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00299
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: STORK TESTING AND METALLURGICAL CONSULTING
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00299
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/26/2011
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2011
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA GUIDE TUBE
The following information was provided via email:
"On April 20, 2011 the Agency was notified that a radiography source had failed to retract to the shielded position because the material being radiographed had fallen on the guide tube and crimped it. Following company procedures, the Radiation Safety Officer was notified and the area was restricted to avoid public or excessive employee exposures.
"Several entries were made to shield the source and allow an authorized individual to straighten the crimped portion of the tube within tolerable radiation fields. After several other trips to place lead shot on the source, four additional trips were required before the crimp in the source tube was straightened and the source was retracted into the shielded position.
"The source retriever and his assistance received nominal radiation exposures during the procedure and no public exposures reportedly occurred. No violations were cited."
Texas Incident #: I-8838.
The following information was provided via email:
"On April 20, 2011 the Agency was notified that a radiography source had failed to retract to the shielded position because the material being radiographed had fallen on the guide tube and crimped it. Following company procedures, the Radiation Safety Officer was notified and the area was restricted to avoid public or excessive employee exposures.
"Several entries were made to shield the source and allow an authorized individual to straighten the crimped portion of the tube within tolerable radiation fields. After several other trips to place lead shot on the source, four additional trips were required before the crimp in the source tube was straightened and the source was retracted into the shielded position.
"The source retriever and his assistance received nominal radiation exposures during the procedure and no public exposures reportedly occurred. No violations were cited."
Texas Incident #: I-8838.