Event Notification Report for April 25, 2011

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INABILITY TO RETRACT SOURCE INTO RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

"On April 26, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was informed by a licensee that on April 25, 2011, at 2200 [CDT] hours a QSA model 880D radiography camera containing 92 curies of Iridium (Ir) 192 fell from a 16 inch pipe it was sitting on. The camera landed on the guide tube side of the camera crimping the guide tube near the connection of the guide tube to the camera. This prevented the radiographer from retracting the source into the camera. The radiographers used a hammer and were able to remove the crimp from the guide tube enough to retract the source. No individual involved with the event exceeded an exposure limit based on their electronic dosimetry readings. The radiographer doing most of the source retraction work, radiographer 'A', had an electronic dosimeter reading of 1.5 Rem. The second radiographer, radiographer 'B', received 200 milliRem. The licensee stated that the exposure to the radiographer 'A' was high due to the inability to place shielding over the source due to the crimp being so close to the camera. The personnel dosimetry of the two individuals involved have been sent to the licensee's dosimetry processor for reading. The licensee stated that the camera would be leak tested on April, 26, 2011. The licensee is investigating the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with Reporting Material Events SA-300."

Texas Incident Report # I-8839

SINGLE TRAIN CHARGING PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE

"During normal operation with 23 Charging pump in service, an unusual sound was noticed by Operations. All other parameters were normal for the pump, but 21 Charging pump was placed in service as a precaution. Subsequent investigation was unable to conclusively identify the source of the unusual sound and a lower-than-expected crankcase oil pressure was observed on a maintenance run. Therefore, 23 Charging Pump was declared inoperable. This is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown. NRC guidance indicates that a loss of a single train system not credited in accident analysis is reportable when identified in LCD 3.3.4 'Remote Shutdown.'"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York Public Service Commission.

* * * UPDATE AT 1408 EDT ON 04/29/11 FROM MIKE BURNEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on April 25, 2011, at 1606 EDT (EN #46782). The notification on April 25, 2011, reported a loss of a single train system identified in LCO 3.3.4 'Remote Shutdown' (SSFF [safety system functional failure]) as a result of declaring the 23 Charging Pump (CP) inoperable. The 23 CP exhibited unusual sound during operation. Because the 23 CP is credited in Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.4 for Remote Shutdown, the inoperable condition was determined to be a loss of safety function. The TS 3.3.4 Allowed Outage Time (AOT) for inoperable conditions is 30 days. In accordance with recent NRC guidance provided to Indian Point for loss of single train systems, although not credited in the accident analysis and specified in Technical Specification 3.3.4, this condition is reportable as a SSFF.

"Subsequent investigations determined that the documented condition does not pose a challenge to the operability of the 23 CP. The noise was associated with the normal operation of the charging pump internal check valves. This condition is a long term issue that does not affect the current operation of the pump. The pump was in operation with no abnormal parameters noted at the time the noise was noted. No SSFF occurred."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Schmidt).

PENNSYLVANIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNSECURED RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"On April 25, 2011, an Ir-192 source (SN# D36C-5591), 3.36 Ci activity, was removed from a Nucletron microSelectron HDR unit, placed into an approved Type A source storage and transportation container, and moved to a secure designated HDR source storage location, awaiting return to the manufacturer. However, due to miscommunication, the source was never shipped back to the manufacturer and as a result, the source was relocated by contractors approximately a month later to an unoccupied storage room in an uncontrolled area of the building. The source was estimated to have decayed to 2.5 Ci. On October 10, 2011, the unoccupied storage room became the office of a new full-time physicist. The activity was estimated to be 0.69 Ci at this time. On October 27, 2011, the source was discovered during a routine inspection by the Department of Environmental Protection and immediately placed back into the permanent storage area within the HDR storage location. It was determined that the badged physicist who occupied the office received 5.6 mrem, however, his subsequent dosimeter reading indicated no measureable radiation exposure. The unmonitored contractor who moved the source was estimated to have received 0.6 mrem.

"The source was returned to the manufacturer via [a national shipper] on November 10, 2011. In the future, the new full-time physicist will maintain control of all sources, as well as document when the sources actually leave the facility to be returned to the manufacturers. The licensee has also modified their policies and procedures. The Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] plans another reactive inspection."

PA Event Report ID: PA110037