Event Notification Report for April 24, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/23/2011 - 04/24/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Research Reactor
Event Number: 46784
Rep Org: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: JOHN BERNARD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: JOHN BERNARD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/25/2011
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2011
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
WILLIAM KENNEDY (NRR)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
WILLIAM KENNEDY (NRR)
VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.2.3, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
During a committee review, it was determined that during reactor operations on 4/24/11, the reactor was in operation when it became xenon precluded. Technical Specifications require two period monitoring channels in service during power operations. Because of xenon, one period monitor was indicating below scale and was considered inoperable. When the reactor operator identified the condition, he notified the reactor supervisor who ordered the operator to shutdown the reactor. The reactor operated in this condition for approximately 30 minutes.
The licensee notified their Project Manager who advised them to notify the NRC Operations Center.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN BERNARD TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 4/27/11 AT 1653 EDT * * *
Upon further review, it was determined that since the reactor was subcritical at the time this event occurred, Technical Specification 3.2.3 was not applicable. Therefore, the licensee has retracted this event.
R1DO (Schmidt) and NRR (Adams) were notified.
During a committee review, it was determined that during reactor operations on 4/24/11, the reactor was in operation when it became xenon precluded. Technical Specifications require two period monitoring channels in service during power operations. Because of xenon, one period monitor was indicating below scale and was considered inoperable. When the reactor operator identified the condition, he notified the reactor supervisor who ordered the operator to shutdown the reactor. The reactor operated in this condition for approximately 30 minutes.
The licensee notified their Project Manager who advised them to notify the NRC Operations Center.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN BERNARD TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 4/27/11 AT 1653 EDT * * *
Upon further review, it was determined that since the reactor was subcritical at the time this event occurred, Technical Specification 3.2.3 was not applicable. Therefore, the licensee has retracted this event.
R1DO (Schmidt) and NRR (Adams) were notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46966
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/16/2011
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2011
Event Time: 21:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2011
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2011
Event Time: 21:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
60 DAY OPTIONAL NOTIFICATION OF INVALID START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.
"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator on 4/24/11 while performing a test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence. Emergency AC Electrical Power system including Emergency Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(6).
"On 4/24/11, at 2144, [hrs. EDT] while testing the continuity of relay SI-20X that is part of the test of diesel generator load and safeguard sequence, an unexpected partial Safety Injection signal occurred. The initiating action was the testing of the continuity of relay SI-20X while the 'B' train Safety Injection DC breaker was closed. Once the testing of relay SI-20X was completed, the partial Safety Injection signal ceased and all the equipment that had started, or had been repositioned, was returned to its pre-test condition. The unexpected partial Safety Injection signal was the result of the improper sequencing of a separate test of process radiation monitors that was being performed concurrently with the test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence.
"Specific information required per NUREG-1022:
"a. The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' Diesel Generator actuated. In addition, (a) equipment that started, or was repositioned, were the 'D' Service Water pump, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS), and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves 871B and 852B; and (b) equipment that stopped was the containment purge supply and exhaust fans, and Control Room Air Handling Unit supply and return fans.
"b. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation was partial.
"c. Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator started and operated successfully. It was later secured by Operations personnel.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator on 4/24/11 while performing a test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence. Emergency AC Electrical Power system including Emergency Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(6).
"On 4/24/11, at 2144, [hrs. EDT] while testing the continuity of relay SI-20X that is part of the test of diesel generator load and safeguard sequence, an unexpected partial Safety Injection signal occurred. The initiating action was the testing of the continuity of relay SI-20X while the 'B' train Safety Injection DC breaker was closed. Once the testing of relay SI-20X was completed, the partial Safety Injection signal ceased and all the equipment that had started, or had been repositioned, was returned to its pre-test condition. The unexpected partial Safety Injection signal was the result of the improper sequencing of a separate test of process radiation monitors that was being performed concurrently with the test of the diesel generator load and safeguard sequence.
"Specific information required per NUREG-1022:
"a. The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' Diesel Generator actuated. In addition, (a) equipment that started, or was repositioned, were the 'D' Service Water pump, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS), and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves 871B and 852B; and (b) equipment that stopped was the containment purge supply and exhaust fans, and Control Room Air Handling Unit supply and return fans.
"b. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation was partial.
"c. Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator started and operated successfully. It was later secured by Operations personnel.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."