Event Notification Report for April 19, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/18/2011 - 04/19/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46767
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER TRENT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER TRENT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY OF A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE
"This notification is a 4-hour Non-Emergency notification being performed in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to an off-site government agency.
"At 0708 [EDT] on 4/19/2011, off-site medical assistance was requested for a Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Station contract employee experiencing an apparent heart attack while being in-processed to the plant. The individual was transported to the hospital and was later pronounced dead.
"At 1045 on 4/19/2011, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was notified. The Turkey Point Unit 3/4 control room was notified of the OSHA notification at 1058 on 4/19/2011.
"Unit 3 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"Unit 4 is in a planned refueling outage.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
The contract employee was outside of the Protected Area and had not performed any work at the facility.
"This notification is a 4-hour Non-Emergency notification being performed in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to an off-site government agency.
"At 0708 [EDT] on 4/19/2011, off-site medical assistance was requested for a Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Station contract employee experiencing an apparent heart attack while being in-processed to the plant. The individual was transported to the hospital and was later pronounced dead.
"At 1045 on 4/19/2011, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was notified. The Turkey Point Unit 3/4 control room was notified of the OSHA notification at 1058 on 4/19/2011.
"Unit 3 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"Unit 4 is in a planned refueling outage.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
The contract employee was outside of the Protected Area and had not performed any work at the facility.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46769
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RONALD RUSTICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RONALD RUSTICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 20:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 20:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH DIVISIONS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE
"At 1430 hours, a water leak was discovered on the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (EDGCWP) room cooler. As a result, the Unit 1 EDG (Division II) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 was entered.
"At this time, Division I RHR was inoperable for planned maintenance on the Division I RHR room cooler. In the event of a LOOP/LOCA scenario, RHR would not have been able to perform its safety function (i.e., Division I RHR was impacted by the ongoing room cooler maintenance and Division II RHR would not have had an operable on-site emergency power source). Given the impact on the RHR system, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Note that at the time of discovery, offsite power was available to Division II RHR as well as the Division I and Division II Core Spray systems.
"At 1816 hours, the Division I RHR system room cooler was restored and Division I RHR was declared operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1430 hours, a water leak was discovered on the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (EDGCWP) room cooler. As a result, the Unit 1 EDG (Division II) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 was entered.
"At this time, Division I RHR was inoperable for planned maintenance on the Division I RHR room cooler. In the event of a LOOP/LOCA scenario, RHR would not have been able to perform its safety function (i.e., Division I RHR was impacted by the ongoing room cooler maintenance and Division II RHR would not have had an operable on-site emergency power source). Given the impact on the RHR system, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Note that at the time of discovery, offsite power was available to Division II RHR as well as the Division I and Division II Core Spray systems.
"At 1816 hours, the Division I RHR system room cooler was restored and Division I RHR was declared operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 46834
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/10/2011
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On May 10, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] received written notification from a licensee that on April 19, 2011, at approximately 12:45 p.m. while performing radiographic operations on a tank, a radiographer found he was unable to retract a 58.6 Curie Iridium (Ir) -192 source into to a QSA Model 880D radiography camera. The radiographers working with the camera immediately repositioned the restricted area barricade to ensure that the barricade was set at less than 2 millirem per hour. The radiographers contacted their office and two source retrieval supervisors immediately proceeded to the jobsite. The Site Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and went to the location.
"The source retrieval team arrived at the secured barricaded area at 1:40 p.m. The radiographers maintained visual surveillance to ensure no members of the public had entered the area. The exposure device was adjacent to the tank's exterior; secured by a magnetic plate lifter, and located approximately 40 feet above ground. The exposure device was removed from the tank using a JLG lift and lowered to the ground. The guide tube was removed from the front of the camera and it was discovered that the source pigtail was sticking out of the front of the camera about one and a half inches. The source was manually retracted to the shielded position and locked in place. A radiation survey of the camera found the readings to be normal. No one exceeded any exposure limits and there was no exposure to any member of the general public. The camera was transported to the licensee's facility and inspected. The camera has been returned to the manufacturer for inspection and repair. The investigation into this event is on going. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8843.
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On May 10, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] received written notification from a licensee that on April 19, 2011, at approximately 12:45 p.m. while performing radiographic operations on a tank, a radiographer found he was unable to retract a 58.6 Curie Iridium (Ir) -192 source into to a QSA Model 880D radiography camera. The radiographers working with the camera immediately repositioned the restricted area barricade to ensure that the barricade was set at less than 2 millirem per hour. The radiographers contacted their office and two source retrieval supervisors immediately proceeded to the jobsite. The Site Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and went to the location.
"The source retrieval team arrived at the secured barricaded area at 1:40 p.m. The radiographers maintained visual surveillance to ensure no members of the public had entered the area. The exposure device was adjacent to the tank's exterior; secured by a magnetic plate lifter, and located approximately 40 feet above ground. The exposure device was removed from the tank using a JLG lift and lowered to the ground. The guide tube was removed from the front of the camera and it was discovered that the source pigtail was sticking out of the front of the camera about one and a half inches. The source was manually retracted to the shielded position and locked in place. A radiation survey of the camera found the readings to be normal. No one exceeded any exposure limits and there was no exposure to any member of the general public. The camera was transported to the licensee's facility and inspected. The camera has been returned to the manufacturer for inspection and repair. The investigation into this event is on going. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8843.