Event Notification Report for April 18, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/17/2011 - 04/18/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4684946770467684676546766
Agreement State
Event Number: 46849
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SOLO CUP OPERATING CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 02174
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: SOLO CUP OPERATING CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 02174
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/13/2011
Notification Time: 07:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2011
Notification Time: 07:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SHUTTER ON NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following information from the State was received by email:
"On May 12, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on April 18, 2011, while conducting a routine inspection of a NDC model 8000 TDI nuclear gauge containing 80 milliCuries of Americium (Am) - 241 they found the shutter for the device was missing. The licensee conducted a search for the shutter, but it was not found. The licensee contacted the manufacturer for assistance in repairing the gauge. The licensee placed a lead plate over the shutter to prevent exposure to personnel. The gauge was repaired by the manufacturer on April 29, 2011. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No: I-8848
The following information from the State was received by email:
"On May 12, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on April 18, 2011, while conducting a routine inspection of a NDC model 8000 TDI nuclear gauge containing 80 milliCuries of Americium (Am) - 241 they found the shutter for the device was missing. The licensee conducted a search for the shutter, but it was not found. The licensee contacted the manufacturer for assistance in repairing the gauge. The licensee placed a lead plate over the shutter to prevent exposure to personnel. The gauge was repaired by the manufacturer on April 29, 2011. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No: I-8848
Agreement State
Event Number: 46770
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: L00254
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: L00254
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTIONING GAUGE INVOLVING A 2 CURIE CESIUM-137 SOURCE
The following was received from the state via fax:
"On April 18, 2011, a gauge malfunction occurred at the licensee's facility during a device installation on a process vessel. When the 2 Curie Cesium-137 source was inserted into the vessel, the chain connecting the source to the nuclear gauge broke allowing the source to travel to the bottom of the insertion tube. The source being at the bottom of the insertion tube is its normal operating position. A radiation survey was conducted by the licensee indicating radiation levels were normal. The device was removed from the vessel, [and] the source [was] retrieved from inside of the vessel. The device and the 2 sources were taken by the service company to their facility for repair. There was no additional radiation exposure to any members of the general public or radiation workers due to this incident. Gauge information: TFS model 5220 containing (2) 2-Ci Cesium-137 sources. Device SN: B-36. Source SNs: MB-3946 and MB 3956.
"Additional Information:
"The sources had been removed from the process vessel back in January 2011 and were put into storage while the unit was down for repairs (a 'turnaround'). There are 6 of these custom devices on 3 vessels. The insertion tube is a divided tube and one source is lowered down each side; 2 sources each tube. Five of the sources lowered with no problems. As they were lowering the 6th one down the insertion tube, the chain attached to the source broke and the source fell to the bottom of the tube (which is its normal position when unit is in operation, so no exposure to any individual resulted from it being there). The insertion tube is approximately 25 feet down to the bottom. They were able to 'fish' the top of the chain and pulled the chain with the source out of the tube and put the source directly into a pig. All other individuals had been moved back a safe distance for ALARA. The service company took the device and sources to their facility for repair. The unit will remain out of operation until device is repaired and installed."
Texas Incident #: I - 8836
The following was received from the state via fax:
"On April 18, 2011, a gauge malfunction occurred at the licensee's facility during a device installation on a process vessel. When the 2 Curie Cesium-137 source was inserted into the vessel, the chain connecting the source to the nuclear gauge broke allowing the source to travel to the bottom of the insertion tube. The source being at the bottom of the insertion tube is its normal operating position. A radiation survey was conducted by the licensee indicating radiation levels were normal. The device was removed from the vessel, [and] the source [was] retrieved from inside of the vessel. The device and the 2 sources were taken by the service company to their facility for repair. There was no additional radiation exposure to any members of the general public or radiation workers due to this incident. Gauge information: TFS model 5220 containing (2) 2-Ci Cesium-137 sources. Device SN: B-36. Source SNs: MB-3946 and MB 3956.
"Additional Information:
"The sources had been removed from the process vessel back in January 2011 and were put into storage while the unit was down for repairs (a 'turnaround'). There are 6 of these custom devices on 3 vessels. The insertion tube is a divided tube and one source is lowered down each side; 2 sources each tube. Five of the sources lowered with no problems. As they were lowering the 6th one down the insertion tube, the chain attached to the source broke and the source fell to the bottom of the tube (which is its normal position when unit is in operation, so no exposure to any individual resulted from it being there). The insertion tube is approximately 25 feet down to the bottom. They were able to 'fish' the top of the chain and pulled the chain with the source out of the tube and put the source directly into a pig. All other individuals had been moved back a safe distance for ALARA. The service company took the device and sources to their facility for repair. The unit will remain out of operation until device is repaired and installed."
Texas Incident #: I - 8836
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 46768
Rep Org: NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER
Licensee: NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER
Region: 4
City: KEYPORT State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER
Region: 4
City: KEYPORT State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
UNACCOUNTED FOR IONIZING AIR GUNS CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF Po-210
Naval Undersea Warfare Command (NUSW) located in Keyport, Washington has identified fifty seven (57) ionizing air guns that are unaccounted for. The devices were manufactured by NRD, LLC of New York, NY and contained 10 milliCuries of Po-210. NUSW is missing five (5) Model P-2021 devices and fifty-two (52) P-2051 devices. These are general license devices.
The unaccounted devices were found during a command inspection after questions arose surrounding the number of devices in the command. The inspection revealed the majority of the devices seem to have gone unaccounted for during the 1994 - 1995 timeframe.
Contamination surveys have confirmed there are no contamination issues or workforce exposure issues associated with this event.
A command investigation is ongoing.
The following serial numbers were identified as unaccounted for: For Model P-2021: A2GQ217, A2GQ241, A2BY498, A2AW678, and A2AQ471. For Model P-2051: 95609, 83722, 79841, 79225, 76422, 76423, 76424, 76425, 76427, 76428, 76429, 76430, 76431, 76432, 76433, 72859, 72860, 72861, 70708, 70709, 70710, 70711, 70712, 70713, 70714, 67850, 67851, 67853, 67854, 67855, 67856, 67857, 67860, 67861, 67862, 67863, 67881, 67882, 67883, 67884, 67888, 56477, 56303, 55244, 46840, 46844, 46914, 46952, 46954, 46963, 38242, AND 38348.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Naval Undersea Warfare Command (NUSW) located in Keyport, Washington has identified fifty seven (57) ionizing air guns that are unaccounted for. The devices were manufactured by NRD, LLC of New York, NY and contained 10 milliCuries of Po-210. NUSW is missing five (5) Model P-2021 devices and fifty-two (52) P-2051 devices. These are general license devices.
The unaccounted devices were found during a command inspection after questions arose surrounding the number of devices in the command. The inspection revealed the majority of the devices seem to have gone unaccounted for during the 1994 - 1995 timeframe.
Contamination surveys have confirmed there are no contamination issues or workforce exposure issues associated with this event.
A command investigation is ongoing.
The following serial numbers were identified as unaccounted for: For Model P-2021: A2GQ217, A2GQ241, A2BY498, A2AW678, and A2AQ471. For Model P-2051: 95609, 83722, 79841, 79225, 76422, 76423, 76424, 76425, 76427, 76428, 76429, 76430, 76431, 76432, 76433, 72859, 72860, 72861, 70708, 70709, 70710, 70711, 70712, 70713, 70714, 67850, 67851, 67853, 67854, 67855, 67856, 67857, 67860, 67861, 67862, 67863, 67881, 67882, 67883, 67884, 67888, 56477, 56303, 55244, 46840, 46844, 46914, 46952, 46954, 46963, 38242, AND 38348.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46765
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/18/2011
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2011
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period for the Technical Support Center ventilation system. The maintenance activities include replacement of the evaporator coil, fan, and expansion valve. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority and is expected to be complete prior to 1200 EDT on 4/19/11 .
"Pre-arranged compensatory measures for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were put in place prior to the beginning of the TSC ventilation maintenance and will remain in place for the duration of the maintenance period. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency IF the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period for the Technical Support Center ventilation system. The maintenance activities include replacement of the evaporator coil, fan, and expansion valve. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority and is expected to be complete prior to 1200 EDT on 4/19/11 .
"Pre-arranged compensatory measures for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were put in place prior to the beginning of the TSC ventilation maintenance and will remain in place for the duration of the maintenance period. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency IF the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46766
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDALL RAHRIG
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDALL RAHRIG
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 00:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 23:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Notification Time: 00:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: 23:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED REPLACEMENT
"At 2309 [CDT] on April 18, 2011, the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for planned replacement in the current Unit 2 refueling outage. The Unit 2 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 2 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 1 Plant Process computer will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 2 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, the backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC and EOF exists. There is no impact to the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communications systems.
"The new Unit 2 PPC is scheduled to be functional on April 23, 2011. However, based on the mode Unit 2 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 2 PPC will be tested as mode changes occur. The Unit 2 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 2 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BUTLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 0932 ON 5/10/11 * * *
"As of 0815 CT on May 10, 2011, the Unit PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a Major Loss of Assessment Capability no longer exists on Unit 2. The EP Manager will contact the NRC Computer Center today to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 2 to ensure the data is being satisfactorily sent to the NRC.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update.
Notified R3DO(Passehl)
"At 2309 [CDT] on April 18, 2011, the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for planned replacement in the current Unit 2 refueling outage. The Unit 2 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 2 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 1 Plant Process computer will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 2 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, the backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC and EOF exists. There is no impact to the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communications systems.
"The new Unit 2 PPC is scheduled to be functional on April 23, 2011. However, based on the mode Unit 2 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 2 PPC will be tested as mode changes occur. The Unit 2 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 2 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BUTLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 0932 ON 5/10/11 * * *
"As of 0815 CT on May 10, 2011, the Unit PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a Major Loss of Assessment Capability no longer exists on Unit 2. The EP Manager will contact the NRC Computer Center today to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 2 to ensure the data is being satisfactorily sent to the NRC.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update.
Notified R3DO(Passehl)