Event Notification Report for April 16, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/15/2011 - 04/16/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46763
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE O'DELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE O'DELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 04:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 22:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 04:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 22:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BALDWIN (R2 I)
RICHARD BALDWIN (R2 I)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW OUT OF BAND
"Event Description: On 4/16/2011 at 2252 [EDT], the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to the determination that its Lube Oil System was not providing adequate lube oil pressure and flow to the HPCI Turbine/Pump bearings. This was determined following the high steam pressure operability run (i.e., within 48 hours of achieving adequate test pressure following a scheduled refueling/maintenance outage) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.7. The HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3){v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"Corrective Actions: The HPCI system remains inoperable pending further troubleshooting of the low lube oil pressure condition."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LEE GRZECK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2051 EDT ON 4/17/11 * * *
"Upon further review, it has been determined that the HPCI system was not rendered inoperable as a result of the condition identified on April 16, 2011. During performance of 0PT-09.2, the Control Room received a HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure low alarm. Following 0PT-09.2, preventive maintenance procedure 0PM-TRB507, 'High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Operational Inspection', was performed. During performance of 0PM-TRB507, the turbine governor end oil pressure was found indicating 8.5 psig. The procedure specifies a normal value of 10-12 psig. Due to the above condition, HPCI was conservatively declared inoperable at 2252 [EDT] on April 16, 2011.
"Subsequent Engineering evaluation has determined that HPCI could have run long enough to complete its intended safety function [24 hrs.]. Pressure outside of the normal band specified in 0PM-TRB507 is a condition that requires correction, but is not detrimental to the bearing itself. The critical characteristic of proper bearing lubrication is to assure a film of oil between the tilting pads and the rotating shaft of the HPCI turbine. Bearing outlet temperatures are recorded during each performance of 0PT-092 for trending and no abnormal temperatures were noted during the last performance of 0PT-09.2 on April 16, 2011. This indicates there was a film of lubrication between the rotating shaft and the tilting pads of the journal bearing. The two hour turbine operation of the most recent 0PT-09.2 performance resulted in higher oil temperature, which can result in lower oil pressure. Adjustments can be made to the ball valve of the HPCI governor end bearing to attain the specified supply pressure to each bearing. These adjustments are not unexpected, as discussed in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) maintenance guide for HPCI turbines. A slight adjustment was made to the HPCI governor end bearing on April 17, 2011 to establish pressure at 11.5 psig. At 1009 hrs. on April 17, 2011, 0PT-09.2 was performed satisfactorily, with the HPCI governor end oil bearing supply pressure verified to be within the 10-12 psig range at 2100 rpm and 4100 rpm. Oil flow to and from the bearing is required only for lubrication and cooling and does not provide any lift or other force to assist the bearing in performing its function. The oil flow during this event was still adequate to provide sufficient lubrication and cooling of the bearings. Therefore, the slight decrease in oil pressure to the HPCI governor end bearing did not indicate degradation in performance.
"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 460134.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).
"Event Description: On 4/16/2011 at 2252 [EDT], the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to the determination that its Lube Oil System was not providing adequate lube oil pressure and flow to the HPCI Turbine/Pump bearings. This was determined following the high steam pressure operability run (i.e., within 48 hours of achieving adequate test pressure following a scheduled refueling/maintenance outage) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.7. The HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3){v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"Corrective Actions: The HPCI system remains inoperable pending further troubleshooting of the low lube oil pressure condition."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LEE GRZECK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2051 EDT ON 4/17/11 * * *
"Upon further review, it has been determined that the HPCI system was not rendered inoperable as a result of the condition identified on April 16, 2011. During performance of 0PT-09.2, the Control Room received a HPCI turbine bearing oil pressure low alarm. Following 0PT-09.2, preventive maintenance procedure 0PM-TRB507, 'High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Operational Inspection', was performed. During performance of 0PM-TRB507, the turbine governor end oil pressure was found indicating 8.5 psig. The procedure specifies a normal value of 10-12 psig. Due to the above condition, HPCI was conservatively declared inoperable at 2252 [EDT] on April 16, 2011.
"Subsequent Engineering evaluation has determined that HPCI could have run long enough to complete its intended safety function [24 hrs.]. Pressure outside of the normal band specified in 0PM-TRB507 is a condition that requires correction, but is not detrimental to the bearing itself. The critical characteristic of proper bearing lubrication is to assure a film of oil between the tilting pads and the rotating shaft of the HPCI turbine. Bearing outlet temperatures are recorded during each performance of 0PT-092 for trending and no abnormal temperatures were noted during the last performance of 0PT-09.2 on April 16, 2011. This indicates there was a film of lubrication between the rotating shaft and the tilting pads of the journal bearing. The two hour turbine operation of the most recent 0PT-09.2 performance resulted in higher oil temperature, which can result in lower oil pressure. Adjustments can be made to the ball valve of the HPCI governor end bearing to attain the specified supply pressure to each bearing. These adjustments are not unexpected, as discussed in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) maintenance guide for HPCI turbines. A slight adjustment was made to the HPCI governor end bearing on April 17, 2011 to establish pressure at 11.5 psig. At 1009 hrs. on April 17, 2011, 0PT-09.2 was performed satisfactorily, with the HPCI governor end oil bearing supply pressure verified to be within the 10-12 psig range at 2100 rpm and 4100 rpm. Oil flow to and from the bearing is required only for lubrication and cooling and does not provide any lift or other force to assist the bearing in performing its function. The oil flow during this event was still adequate to provide sufficient lubrication and cooling of the bearings. Therefore, the slight decrease in oil pressure to the HPCI governor end bearing did not indicate degradation in performance.
"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 460134.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 46764
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
AIR MONITORING VACUUM PUMPS DISABLED
"The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 30 minutes. The soft water supply to the air monitoring vacuum pump seals on the 2nd floor of the Feed Materials Building (FMB) was shut down for Annual Shut Down. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the FMB. While the soft water system was shut down, a sanitary well water supply was being used for the vacuum pump seals. A back flow preventer in the sanitary water supply line malfunctioned and interrupted flow to the pump seals. This caused the vacuum pumps to be shut down until a temporary water supply could be established. A temporary water supply was reestablished to the pump seals. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 1500 [CDT]. The back flow preventer has been replaced and the system is currently working properly."
There were no indications that activities performed in the FMB caused a release during the time period that the stack and personnel monitoring system was out of service.
The licensee notified R2 (Hartland).
"The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 30 minutes. The soft water supply to the air monitoring vacuum pump seals on the 2nd floor of the Feed Materials Building (FMB) was shut down for Annual Shut Down. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the FMB. While the soft water system was shut down, a sanitary well water supply was being used for the vacuum pump seals. A back flow preventer in the sanitary water supply line malfunctioned and interrupted flow to the pump seals. This caused the vacuum pumps to be shut down until a temporary water supply could be established. A temporary water supply was reestablished to the pump seals. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 1500 [CDT]. The back flow preventer has been replaced and the system is currently working properly."
There were no indications that activities performed in the FMB caused a release during the time period that the stack and personnel monitoring system was out of service.
The licensee notified R2 (Hartland).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46761
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEOFFREY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEOFFREY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/16/2011
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 18:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2011
Event Time: 18:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2011
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
VICTOR MCCREE (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
ALLEN HOWE (NRR)
VICTOR MCCREE (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
ALLEN HOWE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 2 | A/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER FROM TORNADO DAMAGE
"At 1849 hrs, Surry Power Station (SPS) Unit 1 and Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from a Loss of Offsite Power, as a result of a tornado touching down in the station's switchyard. Unit 1 reactor tripped as a result of a Loss of Coolant Flow > P-8 (35% power), and the Unit 2 reactor tripped as a result of a 500 kV Leads Differential Turbine-Generator trip. Both units responded as designed.
"Unit 1 electrical power is being provided by Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the 1H emergency bus, with the Station Blackout (SBO) diesel loaded on to the 1J emergency bus. Unit 2 electrical power is being supplied by the number 2 EDG to the 2H emergency bus, with the number 3 EDG loaded on to the 2J emergency bus.
"All Unit 1 control rods inserted on the reactor trip, and all Unit 2 control rods inserted on its respective reactor trip. The Low Level Intake Structure (LLIS) is without power. All three Emergency Service Water Pumps are running to supply the intake canal. Efforts are underway to restore Bus 7, which will give each unit an emergency bus powered by offsite power (Unit 1 1J, Unit 2 2H) and restore power to the LLIS.
"Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater on both units and atmospheric steam release via the steam generator PORVs. Both units are currently on natural circulation. All other system parameters are normal and stable.
"At 1855 hrs a NOUE was declared due to a loss of offsite power (applicable to U1 and U2). Additionally, due to an estimated 100 gallon fuel oil spill from an above ground storage tank near the station's garage, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified at 2041 and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2114. At 2334, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2336, due to an estimated 200 gallon oil leak to the ground from a station switchyard transformer damaged during the tornado.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on-site."
Notified DHS (Rickerson), FEMA (Boscoe), DOE (Turner), HHS (Hoskins), and USDA (Russell).
See related EN #46762
* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER CARLSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/11 AT 0756 * * *
The licensee exited the emergency condition at 0745 EDT on 4/19/11. Offsite power has been restored, and the plant is shutdown and cooled down.
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), NRR EO (Thorpe) and IRD (Gott). Informed the following Federal Agencies via Blast Dial: DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS and DOE.
"At 1849 hrs, Surry Power Station (SPS) Unit 1 and Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from a Loss of Offsite Power, as a result of a tornado touching down in the station's switchyard. Unit 1 reactor tripped as a result of a Loss of Coolant Flow > P-8 (35% power), and the Unit 2 reactor tripped as a result of a 500 kV Leads Differential Turbine-Generator trip. Both units responded as designed.
"Unit 1 electrical power is being provided by Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the 1H emergency bus, with the Station Blackout (SBO) diesel loaded on to the 1J emergency bus. Unit 2 electrical power is being supplied by the number 2 EDG to the 2H emergency bus, with the number 3 EDG loaded on to the 2J emergency bus.
"All Unit 1 control rods inserted on the reactor trip, and all Unit 2 control rods inserted on its respective reactor trip. The Low Level Intake Structure (LLIS) is without power. All three Emergency Service Water Pumps are running to supply the intake canal. Efforts are underway to restore Bus 7, which will give each unit an emergency bus powered by offsite power (Unit 1 1J, Unit 2 2H) and restore power to the LLIS.
"Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater on both units and atmospheric steam release via the steam generator PORVs. Both units are currently on natural circulation. All other system parameters are normal and stable.
"At 1855 hrs a NOUE was declared due to a loss of offsite power (applicable to U1 and U2). Additionally, due to an estimated 100 gallon fuel oil spill from an above ground storage tank near the station's garage, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified at 2041 and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2114. At 2334, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2336, due to an estimated 200 gallon oil leak to the ground from a station switchyard transformer damaged during the tornado.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on-site."
Notified DHS (Rickerson), FEMA (Boscoe), DOE (Turner), HHS (Hoskins), and USDA (Russell).
See related EN #46762
* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER CARLSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/11 AT 0756 * * *
The licensee exited the emergency condition at 0745 EDT on 4/19/11. Offsite power has been restored, and the plant is shutdown and cooled down.
Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), NRR EO (Thorpe) and IRD (Gott). Informed the following Federal Agencies via Blast Dial: DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS and DOE.