Event Notification Report for April 12, 2011

POTENTIAL DEFECT IN CERTAIN VELAN SUPPLIED GLOBE VALVES

The following is a summary of a Part 21 e-mail notification received from Velan Inc:

Velan Inc., a valve vendor, has identified a potential defect in certain lots of 0.5, 0.75 and 1 inch NPS globe valves sold to Areva and Fenoc. The failure could result in the valve travelling into the bonnet cavity and became jammed between body and bonnet. The analysis revealed that the failure was caused by the wrong bonnet being installed on the valve which ultimately allowed the disc to travel too far into the bonnet cavity and consequently the disc dropped into the body-bonnet gap. This prevented the valve from being closed during manual operation.

Internal analysis also determined that this failure mode is very plausible in valves installed with the stem in a horizontal orientation. Valves installed with the stem in vertical orientation are far less likely to fail but we cannot guarantee that; on valves that are normally fully open certain flow conditions may cause the disc to tilt and jam between body and bonnet. Nevertheless, operational history seems to suggest that valves installed with the stem in vertical orientation have not experienced this type of failure.

Velan has requested that each affected utility reviews the individual applications for the specific valves identified in this notification; in the event of any application where the valves inability to close will impact significantly the safe operation of the plant. Velan will work with the utility towards reaching a suitable solution.

Velan does not have specific information concerning the specific system and function applicable to these globe valves and therefore we cannot assess whether a substantial safety hazard exists as a result of their inability to close after falling as described above.

Velan's investigation and review of the available manufacturing records revealed that the same bonnet, with an oversized lift, was installed in all valves identified hereunder.



CUSTOMER ORDER QTY. VALVE FIGURE No. VALVE SERIAL No.
AREVA NP 8 W04-2074B-02AA 971022-1 to-8
AREVA NP 12 W03-2074B-02AA 971042-1 to -12
AREVA NP 27 W04-2074B-02AA 971048-1 to -27
AREVA NP 5 W03-2074B-02AA 981028-1 to-5
AREVA NP 5 W03-20748-02AA 981030-1 to-5
AREVA NP 10 W05-20748-02AA 001012-1 to-10
AREVA NP 13 W03-20748-02AA 001029 -1 to -13
AREVA NP 26 W04 20748-02AA 001056 -1 to -26
ARE VA NP 10 W04-20748-02AA 011035-1 to-10
FENOC 4 W05-2074B 02AA 001033 -1 to-4

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN PORTABLE DARKROOM

The following information was received from the state via email:

"On 4/12/2011, at 10:35AM the corporate RSO for TEAM Industrial Services informed the PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) of a temporary job site fire which occurred earlier in the day. This event type is 'An unplanned fire... damaging any licensed material or any device, container, or equipment containing licensed material' which is reportable under 10CFR30.50(b)(4).

"A fire occurred in the portable darkroom which was housed within the bed of a pickup truck at the job site. A QSA Model 880 Delta radiographic exposure device containing approximately 75 curies of Iridium-192 (Ir-192) was stored in its metal over-pack inside the darkroom. The metal over-pack sustained significant fire damage, however, the radiographic exposure device was undamaged with the exception of a melted plastic handle. Surveys revealed radiation levels to be in the normal range and consistent for the source being in the locked position. It appears that the Ir-192 source was undamaged by the fire, however, the housing and source will be returned to the manufacturer for examination. Early indications are that an electrical problem started the fire.

"An immediate reactive inspection occurred on 4/12/11. BRP responded, examined the damaged truck and confirmed radiation surveys and measurements taken by the licensee. The camera was taken out of service and will be returned to QSA for inspection once a suitable shipping container is received. Further details [from the State] will be reported as received."

PA Event Report No. PA110007

UNSEALED FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATION

"During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a flood barrier sealing a diesel driven fire pump exhaust was found to be cracked. This exhaust pipe penetrates the west wall of the intake structure. Flooding through the penetration could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.

"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).

"The penetration is at an approximate elevation of 1012 feet mean sea level (MSL). The river level has been less than 997 feet MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetration."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO JOE O'HARA AT 1641 ON 4/20/11 * * *

"This event is being retracted.

"Additional review and evaluation determined that the seal flaw is above the station design flood level of 1014 feet mean sea level, and is therefore, not reportable."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R4DO (Hay).

ESF ACTUATION FOLLOWING LOSS OF A SAFEGUARD BUS DURING EDG TESTING

The following event occurred with the unit in a "No Mode" defueled condition.

"On the 12th of April at 2215 CDT Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 had a Train B ESF Actuation (Black Out) reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) for [the 6.9KV Train B] Emergency AC Electrical power systems including Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).

"At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in 'No Mode' - the core was off loaded and post maintenance testing was being performed on the 2-02 Emergency Diesel Generator. The scope of the EDG testing was to verify proper operation of the EDG when it was the sole supply to the Unit 2 Train B 6.9KV safeguards buses. Unit 2 Train B 6.9 KV buses have 3 AC sources - XST1 (138KV) preferred source, XST2 (345KV) alternate source and the 2-02 Emergency Diesel Generator.

"The 2-02 EDG was started normally and was operating in parallel with XST1 (preferred AC source) just before the event. The event was triggered when the preferred AC supply breaker to the Train B 6.9KV Safeguard bus was opened per plan. The opening of the preferred feeder breaker resulted in the 2-02 EDG being the sole AC source to the Train B 6.9KV bus. Immediately following this breaker operation, the EDG tripped on an Auto Voltage Regulator failure. This caused the Train B 6.9KV safeguard bus to de-energize which resulted in the automatic closure of the alternate AC (XST2) feeder breaker. This in turn triggered the Train B Solid State Sequencer to sequence on Train B Black Out loads - as designed.

"The Train B Black Out Solid State Sequencer operated as designed. No abnormalities were noted. All available equipment operated as designed.

"The 2-02 EDG is currently tagged out and the problem associated with the [Auto Voltage Regulator] failure is being investigated.

"[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been informed and is currently located on site."

No fuel movement was in progress during this event. Train A safeguard power was unaffected and available throughout. Non-safety related power was also not affected. The only operational impact was the loss of a Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump for approximately 10 minutes. The spent fuel pool temperature increased approximately 1/2 degree during before cooling was restored.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID BUTLER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1830 EDT ON 4/14/11 * * *

"Further investigation of this event has determined that the 2-02 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) auto voltage regulator functioned as designed. The EDG did not receive an emergency start signal, which was consistent with the design for the plant conditions present. In addition, Unit 2 was defueled and in a 'No Mode' condition, and there was no actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(B) by the sequencer operation. Therefore, this event is not reportable because it did not meet the criteria for a system actuation per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and the guidance in NUREG-1022."

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Miller).

AGREEMENT STATE - MISSING PO-210 STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCE

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via fax:

"On March 15, 2011, BAE systems called the Massachusetts Radiation program to report a missing Po-210 static eliminator.

"In 2009, BAE ordered an air nozzle and unexpectedly received it with a Po-210 source. It is assumed that the RSO at that time removed the source from the nozzle and placed into storage. In March, 2009, the RSO left the company and did not inform the Safety, Health, and Environment Manager that an additional source had been received. It was discovered during a February, 2011 internal audit that there was a discrepancy between shipped and inventoried ionizers.

"The former RSO has been contacted and does not recall where the source was stored. BAE believes the source was never put into their laboratories for use. A search for the source in the BAE laboratories and former RSO work area, etc. has not uncovered the source.

"The source is a Staticmaster In-line Alpha Ionizer, model P-2021-2002 leased from NRD. It has Serial Number A2GP089, and contained 10 mCi on 3/4/2009.

"Corrective Actions:

"BAE has created an inventory log form, and will perform more frequent inventory checks. BAE has also assigned the inventory checks to dedicated lab technicians, who will be overseen by the site RSO."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf