Event Notification Report for March 22, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/21/2011 - 03/22/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4673446689466904669146692
Agreement State
Event Number: 46734
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PASCAGOULA State: MS
County:
License #: MS-413-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PASCAGOULA State: MS
County:
License #: MS-413-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/06/2011
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2011
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISLODGED FROM OHMART VEGA MODEL SHLM-BR
The following was received via e-mail:
"Licensee's RSO notified DRH [state] by phone on 3-22-11, and by letter received on 3-22-11, of a dislodged source from an Ohmart Vega Model SHLM-BR, fixed gauge Ser. No. 13530993. The source became dislodged from the main rod during the gauge's shutter test and fell into the gauge well. The licensee's surveys around the gauge well were less than 0.5 mR/hr. A gauge representative has been called in to repair the gauge.
"DRH [state] requested licensee send in manufacturer's service report with the licensee's written 30-day report."
The source is 40 millicurie Cs-137, ser. No. 6965GK.
Mississippi Incident Number MS-11004.
* * * UPDATE FROM JAYSON MOAK TO JOE O'HARA VIA E-MAIL AT 1200 EDT ON 4/7/11 * * *
"Licensee was contacted [by the state] on 4/7/11, for further clarification of the location of the source. The licensee's RSO said the source was at the bottom of the well inside a vessel. This would also be the case during normal operations. Surveys were also confirmed by the RSO to be 0.5 mR/hr around the vessel. Licensee's RSO said a new well is being built for the vessel and a service representative has been notified. Source retrieval and replacement of the gauge is scheduled for the middle of April once the new well is built, and the material in the vessel has cooled."
Notified R4DO(O'Keefe) and FSME(McIntosh)
* * * UPDATE AT 1603 ON 6/13/2011 FROM JAYSON MOAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"Licensee submitted a field service report from the gauge service company on 6/9/2011. The service report indicated the roll pin in the rod was sheared and the source carrier fell to the bottom of the well. The service report claimed the roll pin was corroded due to the harsh environment that the source was in. Part of the rod was still attached to the source which was retrieved and inserted back into the source holder. The source was replaced, and the old source has been transferred."
Notified the R4DO (Werner) and FSME (Persinko).
The following was received via e-mail:
"Licensee's RSO notified DRH [state] by phone on 3-22-11, and by letter received on 3-22-11, of a dislodged source from an Ohmart Vega Model SHLM-BR, fixed gauge Ser. No. 13530993. The source became dislodged from the main rod during the gauge's shutter test and fell into the gauge well. The licensee's surveys around the gauge well were less than 0.5 mR/hr. A gauge representative has been called in to repair the gauge.
"DRH [state] requested licensee send in manufacturer's service report with the licensee's written 30-day report."
The source is 40 millicurie Cs-137, ser. No. 6965GK.
Mississippi Incident Number MS-11004.
* * * UPDATE FROM JAYSON MOAK TO JOE O'HARA VIA E-MAIL AT 1200 EDT ON 4/7/11 * * *
"Licensee was contacted [by the state] on 4/7/11, for further clarification of the location of the source. The licensee's RSO said the source was at the bottom of the well inside a vessel. This would also be the case during normal operations. Surveys were also confirmed by the RSO to be 0.5 mR/hr around the vessel. Licensee's RSO said a new well is being built for the vessel and a service representative has been notified. Source retrieval and replacement of the gauge is scheduled for the middle of April once the new well is built, and the material in the vessel has cooled."
Notified R4DO(O'Keefe) and FSME(McIntosh)
* * * UPDATE AT 1603 ON 6/13/2011 FROM JAYSON MOAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"Licensee submitted a field service report from the gauge service company on 6/9/2011. The service report indicated the roll pin in the rod was sheared and the source carrier fell to the bottom of the well. The service report claimed the roll pin was corroded due to the harsh environment that the source was in. Part of the rod was still attached to the source which was retrieved and inserted back into the source holder. The source was replaced, and the old source has been transferred."
Notified the R4DO (Werner) and FSME (Persinko).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46689
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KROS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KROS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 10:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 10:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT COOLERS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 10:58 CDT, today during the performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B, I&C found NG-HCV-400A-A3, CCW INLET VALVE HCV-400A NITROGEN SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE, closed which is required to remain open for VA-3A to remain operable. This valve supplies backup nitrogen to VA-3A CCW cooler isolation valve HCV-400A on loss of instrument air to maintain cooling flow to the ventilation during an accident condition. While the nitrogen valve NG-HCV-400A-A3 was closed, performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B on VA-3B, CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR FAN, placed the containment cooler in an inoperable status. This led to Technical Specification 2.0.1 entry due to both trains of cooling being inoperable. The cause for the mispositioning of NG-HCV-400A-A3 is unknown at this time. The inoperability of VA-3A along with VA-3B rendered the containment cooling trains unavailable to perform their safety function during an accident condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D) for mitigating the consequences of an accident. FCS entered into Technical Specification at 10:58 CDT and exited Technical Specification at 11:14 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 10:58 CDT, today during the performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B, I&C found NG-HCV-400A-A3, CCW INLET VALVE HCV-400A NITROGEN SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE, closed which is required to remain open for VA-3A to remain operable. This valve supplies backup nitrogen to VA-3A CCW cooler isolation valve HCV-400A on loss of instrument air to maintain cooling flow to the ventilation during an accident condition. While the nitrogen valve NG-HCV-400A-A3 was closed, performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B on VA-3B, CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR FAN, placed the containment cooler in an inoperable status. This led to Technical Specification 2.0.1 entry due to both trains of cooling being inoperable. The cause for the mispositioning of NG-HCV-400A-A3 is unknown at this time. The inoperability of VA-3A along with VA-3B rendered the containment cooling trains unavailable to perform their safety function during an accident condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D) for mitigating the consequences of an accident. FCS entered into Technical Specification at 10:58 CDT and exited Technical Specification at 11:14 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46690
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL FLOODING OF RAW WATER PUMP
"During ongoing investigations of flood barrier penetrations at the station, a weakness in the flood protection strategy that would prevent protection of the raw water pumps for floods above 1007'-6" Mean Sea Level (MSL) was discovered. Cell in-leakage through penetrations at 997' 10" MSL would be beyond the capacity of the raw water pumps. During the preparation of a calculation to demonstrate the validity of this method it was determined that the grid backwash pipe for each grid and the surface sluice penetrate the east wall of the intake structure through an unsealed penetration (a total of 7 penetrations). The grid backwash line is an 18" pipe passing through a 24" sleeve. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).
"The penetration is at an elevation of 997'10" MSL. The design flood for the station is at 1014' MSL. The raw water pumps would not be affected until a river level of 1007'6" MSL was reached. The river level is currently approximately 993.5' MSL and has been less than 995'MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw water pumps are currently operable. The National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office is predicting a rise in river level of 2 feet over the next 5 days. Actions are in progress to seal the penetration."
The licensee has instituted a temporary plug contingency plan dependant on river level.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During ongoing investigations of flood barrier penetrations at the station, a weakness in the flood protection strategy that would prevent protection of the raw water pumps for floods above 1007'-6" Mean Sea Level (MSL) was discovered. Cell in-leakage through penetrations at 997' 10" MSL would be beyond the capacity of the raw water pumps. During the preparation of a calculation to demonstrate the validity of this method it was determined that the grid backwash pipe for each grid and the surface sluice penetrate the east wall of the intake structure through an unsealed penetration (a total of 7 penetrations). The grid backwash line is an 18" pipe passing through a 24" sleeve. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).
"The penetration is at an elevation of 997'10" MSL. The design flood for the station is at 1014' MSL. The raw water pumps would not be affected until a river level of 1007'6" MSL was reached. The river level is currently approximately 993.5' MSL and has been less than 995'MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw water pumps are currently operable. The National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office is predicting a rise in river level of 2 feet over the next 5 days. Actions are in progress to seal the penetration."
The licensee has instituted a temporary plug contingency plan dependant on river level.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 46691
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: APPLIED GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: LINDON State: UT
County:
License #: UT1800298
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: APPLIED GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: LINDON State: UT
County:
License #: UT1800298
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 17:35 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 17:35 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN AND RECOVERED
"A Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. Model 3430, portable gauging device [serial number 22936, containing approximately 8.0 millicuries of cesium-137, and approximately 40 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium] was stolen from the licensee's vehicle while parked at the Home Depot in Lindon, Utah. The Cs-137 source was in the safe shielded position when it was stolen and the transportation case was also secured. The device had been secured by two independent physical barriers, but both barriers were breached. The device was recovered at approximately 5:55 p.m. MST by licensee personnel. The transportation case had been opened, but the source rod was still secured in the shielded position.
"The licensee's vehicle was an open bed pickup truck with a mechanism to secure the device as required."
Utah Report: UT110001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"A Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. Model 3430, portable gauging device [serial number 22936, containing approximately 8.0 millicuries of cesium-137, and approximately 40 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium] was stolen from the licensee's vehicle while parked at the Home Depot in Lindon, Utah. The Cs-137 source was in the safe shielded position when it was stolen and the transportation case was also secured. The device had been secured by two independent physical barriers, but both barriers were breached. The device was recovered at approximately 5:55 p.m. MST by licensee personnel. The transportation case had been opened, but the source rod was still secured in the shielded position.
"The licensee's vehicle was an open bed pickup truck with a mechanism to secure the device as required."
Utah Report: UT110001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Part 21
Event Number: 46692
Rep Org: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Licensee: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ARMSTRONG
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: AUTOMATIC VALVE
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ARMSTRONG
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/23/2011
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2011
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
VALVE PLUNGER GUIDE MALFUNCTION
"Initial Concern: Valve, serial number 73386, does not consistently return to the closed position."
"Nature of the Defect: A dent in the plunger guide may prevent the valve from changing state.
"Number and Location of Components:
"Model: U0204GBBR-AA Quantity: 32 Customer: EXELON LIMERICK,
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEEL Quantity: 30 Customer: ALABAMA POWER FARLEY
"Model: U0204GBBR-DE Quantity: 4 Customer: ALABAMA POWER FARLEY
"Model: U0204FBBR-DE Quantity: 8 Customer: RALPH A. HILLER
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEL Quantity: 4 Customer: DRESSER MASONEILAN
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEP Quantity: 3 Customer: DRESSER MASONEILAN
"Advice to Purchasers:
"Any of the valves identified above may be inspected by removing the coil and checking the plunger guide for any defects. A dent which will prevent plunger movement is noticeable without magnification. It typically occurs approximately 0.10 inches from the base of the valve. Any valves thought to contain defects will be rebuilt or replaced by Automatic Valve."
"Initial Concern: Valve, serial number 73386, does not consistently return to the closed position."
"Nature of the Defect: A dent in the plunger guide may prevent the valve from changing state.
"Number and Location of Components:
"Model: U0204GBBR-AA Quantity: 32 Customer: EXELON LIMERICK,
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEEL Quantity: 30 Customer: ALABAMA POWER FARLEY
"Model: U0204GBBR-DE Quantity: 4 Customer: ALABAMA POWER FARLEY
"Model: U0204FBBR-DE Quantity: 8 Customer: RALPH A. HILLER
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEL Quantity: 4 Customer: DRESSER MASONEILAN
"Model: U0204GBBR-DEP Quantity: 3 Customer: DRESSER MASONEILAN
"Advice to Purchasers:
"Any of the valves identified above may be inspected by removing the coil and checking the plunger guide for any defects. A dent which will prevent plunger movement is noticeable without magnification. It typically occurs approximately 0.10 inches from the base of the valve. Any valves thought to contain defects will be rebuilt or replaced by Automatic Valve."