Event Notification Report for March 19, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/2011 - 03/19/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46685
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARCY BLOW
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARCY BLOW
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/19/2011
Notification Time: 06:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 04:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2011
Notification Time: 06:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 04:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
SAFETY INJECTION DISCHARGE TO THE REACTOR
"Following a scheduled plant shutdown for refueling the operators were forced to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) to limit plant cooldown. While opening MSIV's to restore steam to the secondary, a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection (SI) occurred. The MSIV bypass valves were opened to equalize pressure across the MSIV's. Steam header pressure dipped when the MSIV for 'C' Steam Generator (S/G) was opened. The low steamline pressure bistables are rate sensitive and actuated to cause the SI when steam pressure dipped. Lowest steamline pressure was 1040 psig, the low steam line pressure SI actuates at 615 psig.
"During the SI the PZR [Pressurizer] PORV's cycled approximately 10 times to limit RCS pressure. When the PORV's opened the 'B' PZR Code Safety Main Control Board (MCB) and plant computer alarm actuated but the actual MCB indication did not change nor does plant response indicate that a PZR Code Safety opened. This appears to be an indication problem related to the PORV's cycling."
"All equipment functioned as required."
The station electric buses are aligned to normal offsite power. Decay heat removal is being discharged to the atmospheric relief valves with no indication of primary to secondary leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1221 EDT ON 3/19/2011 * * *
"1. The expected system actuations that occurred when the plant experienced a Safety Injection (SI) 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT, previously reported on EN 46685 for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), is also reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for Specified System Actuation.
"2. During the recovery of the Safety Injection (SI) actuation that occurred 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT and previously reported on EN 46685, the Safety Injection Signal was reset which blocked any further automatic actuation. This was directed per the appropriate procedure step. There is no Technical Specifications allowed condition for both trains of ECCS to be inoperable, therefore the unit entered Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 due to the Auto SI feature being blocked. LCO 3.5.2 action C.1. directs immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. The entry into TS 3.0.3 was made at 0411 CDT and exited at 0639 CDT when the Reactor Trip Breakers were reclosed which re-enabled the automatic SI signal. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation.
"NRC Resident was notified of the update."
Notified R4DO(Cain).
"Following a scheduled plant shutdown for refueling the operators were forced to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) to limit plant cooldown. While opening MSIV's to restore steam to the secondary, a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection (SI) occurred. The MSIV bypass valves were opened to equalize pressure across the MSIV's. Steam header pressure dipped when the MSIV for 'C' Steam Generator (S/G) was opened. The low steamline pressure bistables are rate sensitive and actuated to cause the SI when steam pressure dipped. Lowest steamline pressure was 1040 psig, the low steam line pressure SI actuates at 615 psig.
"During the SI the PZR [Pressurizer] PORV's cycled approximately 10 times to limit RCS pressure. When the PORV's opened the 'B' PZR Code Safety Main Control Board (MCB) and plant computer alarm actuated but the actual MCB indication did not change nor does plant response indicate that a PZR Code Safety opened. This appears to be an indication problem related to the PORV's cycling."
"All equipment functioned as required."
The station electric buses are aligned to normal offsite power. Decay heat removal is being discharged to the atmospheric relief valves with no indication of primary to secondary leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1221 EDT ON 3/19/2011 * * *
"1. The expected system actuations that occurred when the plant experienced a Safety Injection (SI) 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT, previously reported on EN 46685 for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), is also reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for Specified System Actuation.
"2. During the recovery of the Safety Injection (SI) actuation that occurred 03/19/11 at 04:04 CDT and previously reported on EN 46685, the Safety Injection Signal was reset which blocked any further automatic actuation. This was directed per the appropriate procedure step. There is no Technical Specifications allowed condition for both trains of ECCS to be inoperable, therefore the unit entered Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 due to the Auto SI feature being blocked. LCO 3.5.2 action C.1. directs immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. The entry into TS 3.0.3 was made at 0411 CDT and exited at 0639 CDT when the Reactor Trip Breakers were reclosed which re-enabled the automatic SI signal. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation.
"NRC Resident was notified of the update."
Notified R4DO(Cain).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46686
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE LINDEMANN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE LINDEMANN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS IN INDICATIONS ON TWO REACTOR HEAD PENETRATIONS
"On March 19, 2011, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the toe of the J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The UT examinations continue for the remaining head penetrations. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. Repairs are currently being planned and will be competed prior to startup.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM BLAINE PETERS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0910 EDT ON 03/30/11 * * *
"Ultrasonic examination [made on March 19, 2011] resulted in indications on two reactor head penetrations.
"As mentioned in Event Notification 46686, reactor vessel head penetrations [In-service inspection] ISI examinations were still in progress. On Wednesday, March 30, 2011, two additional Unit 1 reactor head penetrations were found to contain indications that will require repair prior to returning the reactor head to service. The indications on these two penetrations are within the reactor vessel head pressure boundary."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.
Notified the R3DO (Peterson).
"On March 19, 2011, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on two penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Both require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the toe of the J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The UT examinations continue for the remaining head penetrations. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. Repairs are currently being planned and will be competed prior to startup.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM BLAINE PETERS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0910 EDT ON 03/30/11 * * *
"Ultrasonic examination [made on March 19, 2011] resulted in indications on two reactor head penetrations.
"As mentioned in Event Notification 46686, reactor vessel head penetrations [In-service inspection] ISI examinations were still in progress. On Wednesday, March 30, 2011, two additional Unit 1 reactor head penetrations were found to contain indications that will require repair prior to returning the reactor head to service. The indications on these two penetrations are within the reactor vessel head pressure boundary."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.
Notified the R3DO (Peterson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46687
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY LIDDELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY LIDDELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/20/2011
Notification Time: 07:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 22:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2011
Notification Time: 07:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2011
Event Time: 22:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY VALVE BREAKER OVERCURRENT TRIP SETPOINT OUT OF TOLERANCE
"During testing of the High Pressure Core Spray [HPCS] system minimum flow valve breaker, it was discovered that the overcurrent trip setpoint was out of tolerance. This testing was being performed as a result of a breaker trip that occurred during a surveillance. The discovery occurred while the system was inoperable for maintenance and no TS [Technical Specification] limits or action times were exceeded."
The overcurrent trip setpoint was placed within tolerance and HPCS is in operable status.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During testing of the High Pressure Core Spray [HPCS] system minimum flow valve breaker, it was discovered that the overcurrent trip setpoint was out of tolerance. This testing was being performed as a result of a breaker trip that occurred during a surveillance. The discovery occurred while the system was inoperable for maintenance and no TS [Technical Specification] limits or action times were exceeded."
The overcurrent trip setpoint was placed within tolerance and HPCS is in operable status.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.