Event Notification Report for March 15, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/14/2011 - 03/15/2011
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46674
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/15/2011
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 14:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2011
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 14:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATION NOT SEALED
"During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a 4 inch conduit has been identified that is not sealed. This conduit penetrates the South wall of the auxiliary building near the transformers into room 19. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).
"The penetration is at an elevation of 1007'-8". The river level has been less than 995 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The AFW pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetration."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM ERICK MATZKE TO DONG PARK ON 5/13/11 AT 1709 EDT* * *
Further investigation has determined that the penetration is adequately sealed inside of the affected structure. Therefore this notification is being retracted.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker).
"During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a 4 inch conduit has been identified that is not sealed. This conduit penetrates the South wall of the auxiliary building near the transformers into room 19. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v).
"The penetration is at an elevation of 1007'-8". The river level has been less than 995 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The AFW pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetration."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM ERICK MATZKE TO DONG PARK ON 5/13/11 AT 1709 EDT* * *
Further investigation has determined that the penetration is adequately sealed inside of the affected structure. Therefore this notification is being retracted.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46676
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/15/2011
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 11:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2011
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 11:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM
"On 03/15/2011 at 1131 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was rendered nonfunctional as a result of loss of power to the system. System power was lost approximately one hour after returning the normal power supply to service following maintenance. This condition has the potential to render the TSC unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation and filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate the TSC to alternate locations.
"On 03/15/2011 at 1545 EDT, after verifying the bus supplying the TSC ventilation was satisfactory for return to service, power was restored using an alternate feed. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
"On 03/15/2011 at 1131 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was rendered nonfunctional as a result of loss of power to the system. System power was lost approximately one hour after returning the normal power supply to service following maintenance. This condition has the potential to render the TSC unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation and filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate the TSC to alternate locations.
"On 03/15/2011 at 1545 EDT, after verifying the bus supplying the TSC ventilation was satisfactory for return to service, power was restored using an alternate feed. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46817
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HASER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HASER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/04/2011
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 17:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2011
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2011
Event Time: 17:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID ACTUATION OF THE STANDBY SERVICE WATER PUMP
"On March 15, 2011 with Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a scheduled refueling outage, the 'A' Standby Service Water (SWE) pump 2SWE-P21A automatically started at 1716 hours when electrical power was removed from the Secondary Process Rack 'A' . The removal of power from the process rack caused pressure transmitter 2SWS-PT113A (Service Water Pump Discharge Pressure Transmitter) to read low resulting in an invalid automatic start of pump 2SWE-P21A. As a result of the automatic start of the SWE pump, the SWE pump discharge isolation valve (2SWE-MOV116A) also opened to provide a flow path from the SWE header to the main service water supply header. The SWE pump is designed to automatically start on a low service water header pressure (i.e. < 34 psig). At the time of the actuation, the service water header pressure was stable at 93 psig. This invalid actuation resulted in a successful start of the Train 'A' SWE system which functioned properly. Plant operators secured the SWE pump after determining that the pump start was invalid and entered the issue into the corrective action program for evaluation.
"The SWE system is required by the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Licensing Requirements Manual requirement number 3.7.5 to be Functional in plant operating Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The SWE system is not normally in operation and serves as a backup cooling water supply on a loss of the main intake structure. The non-safety related automatic start of the SWE pump on low service water pressure is provided to prevent an inadvertent plant trip on a loss of a running service water pump and is not required for the design basis event. The plant was in Mode 6 when the invalid actuation occurred. The automatic start of the SWE pump was not initiated in response to any plant event.
"This event is reportable 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of an emergency service water system as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Train 'A' SWE was invalid."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 15, 2011 with Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a scheduled refueling outage, the 'A' Standby Service Water (SWE) pump 2SWE-P21A automatically started at 1716 hours when electrical power was removed from the Secondary Process Rack 'A' . The removal of power from the process rack caused pressure transmitter 2SWS-PT113A (Service Water Pump Discharge Pressure Transmitter) to read low resulting in an invalid automatic start of pump 2SWE-P21A. As a result of the automatic start of the SWE pump, the SWE pump discharge isolation valve (2SWE-MOV116A) also opened to provide a flow path from the SWE header to the main service water supply header. The SWE pump is designed to automatically start on a low service water header pressure (i.e. < 34 psig). At the time of the actuation, the service water header pressure was stable at 93 psig. This invalid actuation resulted in a successful start of the Train 'A' SWE system which functioned properly. Plant operators secured the SWE pump after determining that the pump start was invalid and entered the issue into the corrective action program for evaluation.
"The SWE system is required by the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Licensing Requirements Manual requirement number 3.7.5 to be Functional in plant operating Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The SWE system is not normally in operation and serves as a backup cooling water supply on a loss of the main intake structure. The non-safety related automatic start of the SWE pump on low service water pressure is provided to prevent an inadvertent plant trip on a loss of a running service water pump and is not required for the design basis event. The plant was in Mode 6 when the invalid actuation occurred. The automatic start of the SWE pump was not initiated in response to any plant event.
"This event is reportable 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of an emergency service water system as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Train 'A' SWE was invalid."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.