Event Notification Report for March 10, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/09/2011 - 03/10/2011
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 46669
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: JULIE OLIVIER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: JULIE OLIVIER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/11/2011
Notification Time: 08:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2011
Notification Time: 08:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
MALFUNCTIONING VALVE LEADS TO A LOSS OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH
"During a performance of temporary operating procedure on a laser optical device, it was identified that one of two valves used to isolate the device failed to operate. The valves are operated as a pair and the valves are redundant to provide defense in depth. One valve shut as expected. The second valve did not shut.
"The valves are identified as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). The system was not operating and one of the valves operated as designed. No unsafe condition existed.
"Operability of both valves is required to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2) within 24 hours. The affected device will remain shutdown pending further investigation and implementation of associated corrective actions.
"[This event is of] low safety significance - the discovery did not result in an unsafe condition."
"During a performance of temporary operating procedure on a laser optical device, it was identified that one of two valves used to isolate the device failed to operate. The valves are operated as a pair and the valves are redundant to provide defense in depth. One valve shut as expected. The second valve did not shut.
"The valves are identified as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). The system was not operating and one of the valves operated as designed. No unsafe condition existed.
"Operability of both valves is required to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2) within 24 hours. The affected device will remain shutdown pending further investigation and implementation of associated corrective actions.
"[This event is of] low safety significance - the discovery did not result in an unsafe condition."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46666
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/10/2011
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 15:49 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2011
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 15:49 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown |
INADVERTANT OPENING A SUBSTATION BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF STATION POWER
"At 1549 on 03/10/2011 with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, power was lost to Safeguards 4160 Volt Bus 6. Diesel Generator B started and re-energized Bus 6.
"At the time of the event, Bus 6 was energized from the Main Auxiliary Transformer (MAT) on backfeed. The event was caused by opening of substation breaker TA2066 as the result of an error by technicians working In the substation.
"All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus 6. Safeguards Bus 5 remained energized from offsite power through the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer during the event.
"Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train A remained In operation during the event. Spent Fuel Cooling Train B was restarted following restoration of power to Bus 6.
"The loss of the MAT also resulted in the loss of non-safeguards 4160 V Buses 1-4. In response to the loss of power to Bus 4, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel started and failed to load onto 480 Volt Bus 46. This resulted in a loss of power to the Technical Support Center. The loss of power to the TSC is being reported as a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. At 1632, the TSC/SBO Diesel Generator tripped due to the failure of the output breaker to close and provide power to its support equipment. The cause of the failure of the TSC/SBO output breaker to close is unknown at this time."
The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker being opened and failure of the TSC/SBO diesel to load. One Spent Fuel Pool cooling train was in service throughout the event and no pool heatup occurred.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1549 on 03/10/2011 with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, power was lost to Safeguards 4160 Volt Bus 6. Diesel Generator B started and re-energized Bus 6.
"At the time of the event, Bus 6 was energized from the Main Auxiliary Transformer (MAT) on backfeed. The event was caused by opening of substation breaker TA2066 as the result of an error by technicians working In the substation.
"All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus 6. Safeguards Bus 5 remained energized from offsite power through the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer during the event.
"Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train A remained In operation during the event. Spent Fuel Cooling Train B was restarted following restoration of power to Bus 6.
"The loss of the MAT also resulted in the loss of non-safeguards 4160 V Buses 1-4. In response to the loss of power to Bus 4, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel started and failed to load onto 480 Volt Bus 46. This resulted in a loss of power to the Technical Support Center. The loss of power to the TSC is being reported as a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. At 1632, the TSC/SBO Diesel Generator tripped due to the failure of the output breaker to close and provide power to its support equipment. The cause of the failure of the TSC/SBO output breaker to close is unknown at this time."
The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker being opened and failure of the TSC/SBO diesel to load. One Spent Fuel Pool cooling train was in service throughout the event and no pool heatup occurred.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46667
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAN COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAN COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/11/2011
Notification Time: 02:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 20:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2011
Notification Time: 02:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2011
Event Time: 20:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1DO)
SAM HANSELL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF PRIMARY AND BACKUP METEROLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT ON BOTH TOWERS
"Loss of power to radiological monitoring equipment (primary and backup). This constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability per Nine Mile Point procedures. The cause of the loss of monitoring equipment is a downed 13.2 kV power line. Monitoring capability was restored at 0100."
The loss of power was caused by high winds, and the grid operator was able to restore power at 0100 EST.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Loss of power to radiological monitoring equipment (primary and backup). This constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability per Nine Mile Point procedures. The cause of the loss of monitoring equipment is a downed 13.2 kV power line. Monitoring capability was restored at 0100."
The loss of power was caused by high winds, and the grid operator was able to restore power at 0100 EST.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.