Event Notification Report for March 03, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/02/2011 - 03/03/2011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46653
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/03/2011
Notification Time: 20:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 13:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2011
Notification Time: 20:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 13:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEMPORARY LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER TRAINS
"While testing fire detection systems, a radio was keyed in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel. Control Room alarms that occurred at the same time led to a review of plant data. This review revealed two momentary events (approximately 8 and 19 seconds) over an approximate two minute period that caused momentary reductions in the control signals to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Motor-Driven Feedwater Pump discharge control valves. These momentary signal reductions resulted in all trains of Emergency Feedwater being inoperable for approximately two minutes, pending further evaluation.
"With all trains of Emergency Feedwater inoperable, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a momentary loss of safety function for equipment needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and to (B) remove residual heat.
"Fire detection testing has been completed, and a sign placed on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Room door stating that no radio usage is permitted inside the room."
All trains of Emergency Feedwater are now operable.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While testing fire detection systems, a radio was keyed in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel. Control Room alarms that occurred at the same time led to a review of plant data. This review revealed two momentary events (approximately 8 and 19 seconds) over an approximate two minute period that caused momentary reductions in the control signals to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Motor-Driven Feedwater Pump discharge control valves. These momentary signal reductions resulted in all trains of Emergency Feedwater being inoperable for approximately two minutes, pending further evaluation.
"With all trains of Emergency Feedwater inoperable, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a momentary loss of safety function for equipment needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and to (B) remove residual heat.
"Fire detection testing has been completed, and a sign placed on the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Room door stating that no radio usage is permitted inside the room."
All trains of Emergency Feedwater are now operable.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46654
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/03/2011
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 22:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2011
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 22:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
TECHNCIAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE HPCI
At 2259 EST, Susquehanna Unit 1 commenced a TS Required shutdown for High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) T.S. 3.5.1. Due to a suspected steam leak, the HPCI Inboard Steam Supply Valve HV155F002 was closed to attempt to identify and isolate an unknown drywell leakage condition. After closing the HV155F002, a detectable change in drywell leak rate occurred, therefore, HV155F002 was left closed. Closing HV155F002 makes HPCI INOP and UNAVAILABLE.
TS 3.5.1 was entered for this condition on 2/25/2011 at 2136 EST. LCO completion time for T.S. 3.5.1 entry is 3/11/2011 at 2136 EST.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. The licensee also anticipates issuing a press release.
At 2259 EST, Susquehanna Unit 1 commenced a TS Required shutdown for High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) T.S. 3.5.1. Due to a suspected steam leak, the HPCI Inboard Steam Supply Valve HV155F002 was closed to attempt to identify and isolate an unknown drywell leakage condition. After closing the HV155F002, a detectable change in drywell leak rate occurred, therefore, HV155F002 was left closed. Closing HV155F002 makes HPCI INOP and UNAVAILABLE.
TS 3.5.1 was entered for this condition on 2/25/2011 at 2136 EST. LCO completion time for T.S. 3.5.1 entry is 3/11/2011 at 2136 EST.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. The licensee also anticipates issuing a press release.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47878
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: WORLD TESTING
Region: 1
City: CLARKSVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-95009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: WORLD TESTING
Region: 1
City: CLARKSVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-95009
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH JACKSON (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following report was received via fax:
"World Testing reported a 3.66 TBq (99 Ci) Se-75 radiography source (QSA Global model A-424-25W) disconnect from the exposure device (QSA Global model 880 Delta, serial #D1120) that occurred on 3/3/2011. The lead radiographer determined that the source remained in the collimator at the end of the guide tube following retraction attempts. The work area was surveyed and the barricade was appropriately adjusted. A manned lift was used to detach the exposure device from overhead piping and lower it to the ground. A six-foot retrieval tool was used to grasp the collimator and elevate it until the source fell out of the end of the guide tube. Using concrete and lead for shielding, personnel were able to place the source back into the exposure device and secure it. Inspection of the source drive cable revealed that the crimped connection, which attaches to the source pigtail, detached from the drive cable. QSA Global was notified of the failure."
Tennessee Report Number: TN-11-038
The following report was received via fax:
"World Testing reported a 3.66 TBq (99 Ci) Se-75 radiography source (QSA Global model A-424-25W) disconnect from the exposure device (QSA Global model 880 Delta, serial #D1120) that occurred on 3/3/2011. The lead radiographer determined that the source remained in the collimator at the end of the guide tube following retraction attempts. The work area was surveyed and the barricade was appropriately adjusted. A manned lift was used to detach the exposure device from overhead piping and lower it to the ground. A six-foot retrieval tool was used to grasp the collimator and elevate it until the source fell out of the end of the guide tube. Using concrete and lead for shielding, personnel were able to place the source back into the exposure device and secure it. Inspection of the source drive cable revealed that the crimped connection, which attaches to the source pigtail, detached from the drive cable. QSA Global was notified of the failure."
Tennessee Report Number: TN-11-038