Event Notification Report for February 22, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/21/2011 - 02/22/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
46636466374663446648
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46636
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRANK WINTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRANK WINTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO NONCOMPLIANT PARTIAL LAKE BYPASS OPERATION
"At 1120 [CST] on February 22, 2011, Dresden Station transitioned to indirect open cycle (Partial Lake Bypass). This was done to control level in the Hot Discharge Canal, which was rising due to a failure of the 2/3 'E' Lift Pump on neutral over current earlier in the day. This is a noncompliance of the NPDES [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] permit, which does not allow operation in lake bypass except when both units are shutdown. This noncompliance is reportable to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. The site representative for the Illinois Emergency Management Agency was also notified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1120 [CST] on February 22, 2011, Dresden Station transitioned to indirect open cycle (Partial Lake Bypass). This was done to control level in the Hot Discharge Canal, which was rising due to a failure of the 2/3 'E' Lift Pump on neutral over current earlier in the day. This is a noncompliance of the NPDES [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] permit, which does not allow operation in lake bypass except when both units are shutdown. This noncompliance is reportable to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. The site representative for the Illinois Emergency Management Agency was also notified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46637
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCCARTHY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCCARTHY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 14:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 57 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SERVICE WATER PIPING LEAK
"At approximately 1030 hours, the Control Room received notification of a leak in the Unit 3 West Service Water (SW) valve pit of approximately 150 gpm on the SW piping downstream of SW valves SWN-6 and SWN-7. The piping supplies conventional essential SW loads. Abnormal operating procedure 3-AOP-SW-1 (SW Malfunction) was entered due to a report of approximately 3 feet of water in the West valve pit in the area of SW valves SWN-6/SWN-7 and SWN-1111/SWN-1112. Adjustments were made to equipment to reduce the leak and pumps placed in the pit to reduce the pit water level. At 1203 hours, Technical Specification 3.7.9, 'Service Water System' (SWS), Condition E, 'SWS piping and valves inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, B, C or D with no loss of safety function' was entered.
"After further assessment of the condition, it was determined at 1425 hours, that the condition would prevent the credited method of isolating the SW loads in the event of cold leg recirculation during a DBA due to inaccessibility to the valve pit for valve operation. This condition constituted a loss of safety function, and the plant entered TS 3.0.3. In accordance with TS 3.0.3, the unit initiated actions to shut down the plant at 1524 hours. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any plant shutdown required by the plants TS,' and an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures, or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Investigations of the condition are in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 1030 hours, the Control Room received notification of a leak in the Unit 3 West Service Water (SW) valve pit of approximately 150 gpm on the SW piping downstream of SW valves SWN-6 and SWN-7. The piping supplies conventional essential SW loads. Abnormal operating procedure 3-AOP-SW-1 (SW Malfunction) was entered due to a report of approximately 3 feet of water in the West valve pit in the area of SW valves SWN-6/SWN-7 and SWN-1111/SWN-1112. Adjustments were made to equipment to reduce the leak and pumps placed in the pit to reduce the pit water level. At 1203 hours, Technical Specification 3.7.9, 'Service Water System' (SWS), Condition E, 'SWS piping and valves inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, B, C or D with no loss of safety function' was entered.
"After further assessment of the condition, it was determined at 1425 hours, that the condition would prevent the credited method of isolating the SW loads in the event of cold leg recirculation during a DBA due to inaccessibility to the valve pit for valve operation. This condition constituted a loss of safety function, and the plant entered TS 3.0.3. In accordance with TS 3.0.3, the unit initiated actions to shut down the plant at 1524 hours. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any plant shutdown required by the plants TS,' and an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures, or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Investigations of the condition are in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46634
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT CHAVET
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT CHAVET
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 09:09 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 09:09 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF POTABLE WATER SUPPLY
"Arizona Public Service Co. made an offsite notification to the Maricopa County Environmental Services Division at 0909 MST on February 22, 2011, to report a loss of power to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station drinking water supply pumps which resulted in the depressurization of the site domestic water supply header. The pumps were out of service on February 21, 2011, between the hours of 2001 and 2300 MST. Full service has been restored.
"The loss of power was related to the loss of Startup Transformer A-E-NAN-X02 as reported in ENS #46633 at 0023 on February 21, 2011.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
"Arizona Public Service Co. made an offsite notification to the Maricopa County Environmental Services Division at 0909 MST on February 22, 2011, to report a loss of power to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station drinking water supply pumps which resulted in the depressurization of the site domestic water supply header. The pumps were out of service on February 21, 2011, between the hours of 2001 and 2300 MST. Full service has been restored.
"The loss of power was related to the loss of Startup Transformer A-E-NAN-X02 as reported in ENS #46633 at 0023 on February 21, 2011.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 46648
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
Region: 3
City: IOWA CITY State: IA
County:
License #: 0037152AAB
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
Region: 3
City: IOWA CITY State: IA
County:
License #: 0037152AAB
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/28/2011
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2011
Notification Time: 12:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCE SEAL INTEGRITY LOST
"The following report was received by the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on February 23, 2011. On February 22, 2011, the University of Iowa Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) staff discovered evidence that a Nickel-63 foil in a custom made static eliminator had lost its seal integrity. The source in question consists of two 8.951 mCi Ni-63 foils that are housed in a custom built static eliminator (2 inch diameter steel pipe with the foils glued to the walls of the pipe). The static eliminator is attached to a chamber apparatus located in a fume hood within a principal investigator's lab. The results of the leak test indicated approximately 40,203 dpm (0.0181 uCi's) of activity on a wipe taken of several areas in the apparatus housing the Ni-63 foils. EHS personnel bagged the static eliminator and returned it to EHS for disposal. The two Ni-63 sources were purchased from DuPont/Merck in March of 1995. The Principle Investigator (PI) had been conducting research using these sources since that time. The University RSO reports that the PI does not have any more of these custom devices and will be pursuing other options for research. A previous leaking Ni-63 foil was reported as NMED Item Number 100592."
Iowa Incident No. 110002
"The following report was received by the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on February 23, 2011. On February 22, 2011, the University of Iowa Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) staff discovered evidence that a Nickel-63 foil in a custom made static eliminator had lost its seal integrity. The source in question consists of two 8.951 mCi Ni-63 foils that are housed in a custom built static eliminator (2 inch diameter steel pipe with the foils glued to the walls of the pipe). The static eliminator is attached to a chamber apparatus located in a fume hood within a principal investigator's lab. The results of the leak test indicated approximately 40,203 dpm (0.0181 uCi's) of activity on a wipe taken of several areas in the apparatus housing the Ni-63 foils. EHS personnel bagged the static eliminator and returned it to EHS for disposal. The two Ni-63 sources were purchased from DuPont/Merck in March of 1995. The Principle Investigator (PI) had been conducting research using these sources since that time. The University RSO reports that the PI does not have any more of these custom devices and will be pursuing other options for research. A previous leaking Ni-63 foil was reported as NMED Item Number 100592."
Iowa Incident No. 110002